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Preface
The idea of giving thanks to everyone that has affected our lives, even if only briefly, is
quite daunting. How could one ever thank everyone that has played a role, instrumental
or not? How do we know how instrumental their role was? I approach this section with
the ambition of brevity. My hope is that I show(ed) my gratitude and affection to those
that were, and are, part of my life during our encounters.
That said, there a few people that I need to thank, because I know, without them,
I would not be here. Stefanie, I hope I showed my gratitude to you throughout the
years. However, I know I never specifically mentioned how much I admire and respect
you. Your work ethic, your dedication, and ambition are admirable. We have not had
the smoothest relationship, but then again, which supervisor-PhD relationship is? Yet,
I find myself being thankful for those bumpy roads, because I believe you learn the true
qualities of people in difficult times, and I can honestly say that you are a good role model
to have. Rob, you were never really involved in my projects, yet you were always there. I
am incredibly lucky I had you to push, help, and listen to me through many phases, like
going to NYU. Thank you, for being the mediator, the brains behind funding, and a guide
for me. Nadja, our relationship was short, yet instrumental. The first year was a forming
year, and I wouldn’t be where I am today if not for you. Thank you for the trust you had
in me, from day one. Tony, you welcomed me in NYU and gave me so much of your time,
thank you for teaching me so much in a such a short period of time. To the committee
members, Prof. Dennis Bams, Dr. Annelies Renders, Prof. Peter Sampers, and Prof.
Harald Sander, thank you for taking the time to read my dissertation and providing me
with comments to improve it, my gratitude is immense.
Ladies, Carina, Cecile, Els and Francien, you are the center of gravity. I am now more
aware than ever before, just how important you ladies really are. Thank you, not only for
all the work you do, but also for being there, to chat, eat, and share recipes. Jaap, you
took on many roles throughout the years, and I don’t really know how to thank you for
that, other than to say thank you, knowing it is not enough. Paulo, there are very few
people that are as intelligent and as genuinely good as you, I know no other. Thank you
for sharing that with me. Wiebke, you were often my sanity check. PhD-life would have
been difficult without you, I am glad I didn’t have to figure out just how difficult.
Mamita, Papito, Myriam, Sarya, thank you for not asking questions when you knew I
did not want to answer any. And thank you for being my biggest fans always, even when
there was no reason to be. Mi stima bosnan, albiyeti. Rogier, there is too much to say, I
would not know where to start or where to end. You are my hero.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Banks fulfill an important role in the economy and in society by being one of the main
providers of financing. However, these institutions do not enjoy a reputation for being free
of scandals, or for being socially inclined. Especially following the 2008 financial crisis,
society as whole was forced into realizing how important these institutions are indeed.
There are many forms of banks, and many forms of banking. The focus of this dis-
sertation is on the syndicated loan market. The syndicated loan market caters mainly to
very large loans, which individual banks are rarely, if ever, able to provide independently.
A syndication is therefore, in essence, a pooling of different banks, and their funds. This
pooling allows for greater availability of cash to fund single large projects and/or firms.
There are many reasons for banks to engage in syndicated lending, such as knowledge
transfer, risk sharing and bypassing regulation (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1996; Pichler and
Wilhelm, 2001; Tykvova´, 2007). For example, from a regulatory perspective syndication
may result from the limit on loan size as a portion of a bank’s equity capital. From a risk
sharing perspective, it may reflect a bank’s diversification strategy.
Syndicated lending represents the largest source of US corporate financing (Sufi, 2007).
Worldwide, syndicated lending reached an 11-year high of approximately US$5.28 trillion
in 2018, of which approximately 17% originated in Europe (Dealogic, 2019; European
Commission, 2019; Reuters, 2018). To put it into perspective, the annual GDP of the
Netherlands in 2017 equaled US$0.826 trillion.
A syndicate is organized differently from a bilateral loan. Syndicate members are cat-
egorized as either lead arrangers or participant lenders, with generally one lead arranger
that acts as managing agent for the group. The lead arranger establishes a relationship
with the borrower, and fulfills the role of information collector ex ante, and loan monitor
ex post. Importantly, each bank that forms part of the syndicate is a direct lender to
the borrower, evidenced by a separate note, although there is only one loan agreement
contract. The lead arranger signs a preliminary agreement, called a mandate, with the
borrower, specifying covenants, fees, collateral, loan amount and a range for the interest
rate. The lead arranger then turns to potential participant lenders, with an informa-
tion memorandum on the borrowing firm, which includes privately acquired information.
1
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When banks agree to become participants in a syndicate, they sign the loan jointly with
the lead arranger. Each participant holds a share of the loan, and the loan terms are
identical for all members of the syndicate. The lead arranger traditionally receives a fee
for loan management.
To date, the academic literature on syndicated lending has focused mostly on studying
the effects of syndicate structure on information asymmetry, the effect of lead arrangers’
reputation, loan pricing, and liquidity management. A distinguishing feature of the syn-
dicated loan market is the information asymmetry within a syndicate. Participant banks
are generally concerned about adverse selection and moral hazard. The former is when
lead arrangers sell participant banks portions of bad loans, and the latter is when lead
arrangers have less incentive to monitor the borrower once the loan has been signed.
Each of the chapters in this dissertation is related to specific issues that have been at
the forefront of both the general media and recent academic literature. More specifically,
they deal with hotly debated issues of Corporate Social Responsibility (Chapter 2), the
usefulness and implications of Credit Rating Agencies (Chapter 3), and systemic risk
(Chapter 4). The latter two have been at the forefront of financial policy debate since
the financial crisis of 2008, while the former is becoming increasingly important in light
of the severe threats of climate change.
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and its pricing in financial markets has been
studied in a number of influential papers. Goss and Roberts (2011) examine the link
between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and bank debt and find that low quality
borrowers with discretionary CSR spending face higher spreads and shorter maturities.
Chava (2014) studies the effect of a firm’s environmental profile on its cost of equity and
debt capital and finds that firms with environmental concerns have higher spreads on
their loans and fewer banks participate in their syndicate. Esty and Megginson (2003)
investigate the effect of investor rights protection on the size and concentration of lending
syndicates and find that lower legal enforcement mechanisms lead to larger and more
diffuse syndicates. The chapter in this dissertation is most closely related to Hong and
Kacperczyk (2009), who provide evidence that social norms are priced in the equity mar-
ket. They show that sin stocks, stocks in the alcohol, tobacco, and gaming industry are
held less by norm-constrained institutions and have a higher expected return relative to
otherwise comparable firms.
In Chapter 2, “Do Banks Really Care? Evidence from the syndicated loan market”, we
contribute to this literature by investigating the effects of social norms in the syndicated
loan market. We look at whether firms in the alcohol, tobacco and gaming industry
have different loan prices relative to otherwise similar firms. There is common belief that
social norms outweigh the pure profit motive at times. One example of norm-constrained
behavior in financial markets is socially responsible investments (SRI). Two common SRI
strategies in the equity market involve shunning sin firms, i.e. companies involved in
the production of alcohol, tobacco, gaming, and favoring firms with high corporate social
2
responsibility (CSR) (Statman and Glushkov, 2009). We investigate if sin firms can obtain
financing from banks relatively easily or whether social norms also affect bank lending
decisions. If banks are indeed not norm-constrained, we expect sin firms to be able to
obtain similar loan terms as comparable firms. If, however, sin firms are shunned in the
bank loan market, we expect to observe a higher spread for these firms. Contrary to
expectations, we find that spreads on loans to borrowers in sin industries are consistently
and significantly lower than spreads on loans to otherwise comparable firms, even after
controlling for general firm, loan, and bank factors known to affect the cost of debt.
Following the debate on the failure of credit rating agencies (CRAs) to adequately as-
sess the risk inherent in complicated financial products, their value and effectiveness have
been extensively researched. We focus on their role in the cost of capital setting. Accord-
ing to Becker and Milbourn (2011) issuers seek credit ratings to improve marketability,
and importantly, pricing of their financial obligations. Investors, financial intermediaries,
and regulators use ratings as an indicator of risk and likely repayment of securities, they
disseminate information on default probabilities and limit duplication of risk in financial
markets. Ratings are determining factors in regulations as a tool for measuring risk. Com-
mercial banks, insurance companies and pension funds are among some of the financial
institutions which are bound by regulations based on credit ratings. Thus, credit ratings
are a key channel of information availability and are considered important by legislators,
regulators, issuers, and investors alike. Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2005) show that
credit ratings serve as focal points, where they help fix the equilibrium in environments
where multiple equilibria would otherwise exist. Faulkender and Petersen (2005) find that
firms with publicly available credit ratings are able to raise more debt. Bosch and Steffen
(2011) show that credit ratings provide a certification which is critical to the supply of
debt financing. Our paper is most closely linked to Livingston and Zhou (2010) who find
that split ratings, a proxy for uncertainty, is priced by bond holders.
Chapter 3 looks at the effects of borrower credit ratings on borrower loan spreads
in the syndicated loan market. Loan interest rates are determined by the perceived
riskiness of borrowers. Information on the riskiness is limited and difficult to obtain.
This information scarcity, introduces uncertainty in the certification process of banks.
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) are specialized information gatherers that evaluate the
riskiness inherent to a country, corporation or specific debt instrument (Bavaria, 2002),
and indeed, they play an increasingly important role in banks’ risk assessment of potential
borrowers. Correspondingly, their existence seems to reduce the information uncertainty
greatly. However, CRAs have been criticized often due to the uncertainty in the rating
determination process. One would think that the existence of multiple (independent)
CRAs would serve as a remedy for this. This would indeed be true, when and if the
letter ratings for a product are the same across rating agencies. However, when the CRAs
independently assess the risk of borrowers, and they do not come to the same conclusion,
resulting in what is often termed a ‘split rating’, the uncertainty becomes twofold. First,
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the uncertainty of the risk that exists regardless, and second, the uncertainty about the
true estimate of this risk. In such a scenario, the informativeness of the ratings is greatly
decreased because it highlights the uncertainty around a borrower’s credit worthiness.
We investigate this uncertainty in the syndicated bank loan market. We argue that
when banks are uncertain about the credit worthiness of a borrower, they will only be
willing to provide capital at a higher rate. We call this the ‘split premium.’ Results show
that borrowers experience increased loan spreads when their ratings are changed from two
equal ratings to split ratings. Similarly, borrowers whose ratings change from split to two
equal ratings experience a discount. We also show that the split premium is increasing
in the size of the split, i.e. the level of uncertainty. On average, split rated borrowers
have approximately 5% higher spreads than non-split rated borrowers, which amounts to
approximately a quarter of a million dollars per year in additional interest payments for
a typical loan.
The global financial crisis showed that the connections between banks can have dire
consequences on the system with large costs to society. Banks are linked through many
channels, some of the most distinguished being the interbank deposit market, deposit
interest rate risk, and syndicated loans. Syndicated lending carries many positive ele-
ments, mainly related to diversification effects. In an effort to reduce the apparent risk of
the loan portfolio, syndication has become increasingly important, disregarding potential
negative effects. Ibragimov, Jaffee, and Walden (2011) show theoretically that diversifi-
cation efforts by individual banks may be optimal for them, but may prove sub optimal
for society. Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015) show that diversification is
mostly beneficial for small shocks, however, if a shock is large enough a highly diversified
lending pattern can create a more fragile system.
Chapter 4 aims to measure to what extent financial markets see the increased intercon-
nectedness of banks, created by their syndicated lending activity, as a threat to financial
stability. This chapter is most closely related to Cai, Eidam, Saunders, and Steffen (2018),
who were the first to explicitly empirically measure the interconnectedness of banks re-
sulting from syndicated loans. Their results show that a higher interconnectedness in
the syndicated loan market is positively correlated with, but distinct from, other known
measures of systemic risk.
Chapter 4 uses their measure to test whether markets recognize the systemic connec-
tions that arise from syndicated loans. Specifically, we look at whether the equity and
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) markets recognize the interconnection between banks stem-
ming from the syndicated loan market. The CDS market revolves around instruments
that are a bet on the default of the underlying firm. Therefore it is perfectly suited to
investigate this question, as it reflects the market’s downside sentiment. The loan shar-
ing, stemming from syndication, results in banks holding very similar portfolios, which
is good in normal times, but is risky in bad times. We show that equity markets re-
act almost instantly to the signing of a new syndicated loan that greatly increases the
4
interconnectedness of the associated banks.
Interestingly, our results show that the global financial crisis shook investors into rec-
ognizing these risks. Before the failure of Lehman Brothers, a large investment bank,
financial markets did not appear to price the systemic risk inherent in syndicated loans.
Since its demise in September 2008, markets appear to more closely follow the intercon-
nectedness in the financial system, and react accordingly. However, we find that markets
only react to the announcement of deals that have a large negative impact on the degree
of interconnectedness. The economic and statistical significance of the result is driven by
the 5% of deals that lead to the largest increase in interconnectedness. There is no such
impact in the middle or the left-tail of the distribution, suggesting that most syndicated
loans are treated as day-to-day business, and that equity markets mainly care about the
potential downside risk of such deals. Overall, the chapter shows that market participants
are concerned about the underexposed negative implications of syndication. Risk is not
appropriately diversified if it is spread across a small group of highly influential and large
financial institutions, and this is recognized by the market.
Overall, this thesis sheds light on the impact of the syndicated loan market on the
economy as a whole. We highlight their social impact, as well as their role in providing
stability through risk assessment, and fostering instability through their sheer magnitude.
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Chapter 2
Do Banks Really Care? Social
Norms in Bank Lending∗
2.1 Introduction
There is common belief that social norms outweigh the pure profit motive at times. One
example of norm-constrained behavior in financial markets is socially responsible invest-
ments (SRI). Two common SRI strategies in the equity market involve shunning sin firms,
i.e. companies involved in the production of alcohol, tobacco, gaming, and favoring firms
with high corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Statman and Glushkov, 2009). Hong
and Kacperczyk (2009) show that sin firms are shunned by norm-constrained institutions,
such as banks, insurance companies, university endowments, and pension funds. Because
of the neglect effect (Merton, 1987), sin firms trade at 15-20% lower valuations and out-
perform comparable stocks by about 2.5% per year. Because sin firms are shunned in
equity markets, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) suggest that they move to the less trans-
parent debt markets to obtain financing. They find that sin firms have about 20% higher
leverage ratios than other firms.
Building on the evidence in Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), we investigate if sin firms
can obtain financing from banks relatively easily or whether social norms also affect bank
lending decisions. If banks are indeed not norm-constrained in the less transparent debt
markets, we expect that sin firms are able to obtain similar loan terms as comparable firms.
If, however, sin firms are also being shunned in the (less transparent) bank loan market,
these firms should pay a higher spread. Understanding the role of social norms in bank
lending is interesting, because bank debt is a predominant source of new external funds for
US corporations (Chava (2014); Shrieves and Dahl (1992)). Lee and Mullineaux (2004)
state that the syndicated loan market has become the largest source of firm financing
worldwide.
We focus our investigation on the effects of social norms in the bank debt market by
∗This chapter is co-authored with Nadja Guenster (University of Muenster), Stefanie Kleimeier (Maas-
tricht University, University of Stellenbosch Business School and Open University)
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looking at the three industries identified by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) and collectively
known as the “Triumvirate of Sin”, namely alcohol, tobacco, and gaming. We compare
the spreads on the loans of sin firms to the spreads on the loans of comparable firms.
The bank loan data are taken from DealScan and cover the years 1987 to 2012. We start
with a sample of approximately 85,000 loan observations for private and public firms.
However, our sample decreases to about 6000 loans to public firms when we merge our loan
information from DealScan with the borrower’s financial information from Compustat.
Contrary to our expectations, we consistently find that sin firms pay an economi-
cally relevant and statistically significant lower spread than otherwise comparable firms.
Considering loans to public and private firms and controlling for loan characteristics, the
spread paid by sin firms is between 18.85 bps and 32.06 bps lower than the spread paid
by comparable firms. After controlling for firm characteristics, this difference widens and
public sin firms pay between 42.71 to 57.2 bps less than comparable public firms. As the
overall average spread for our sample is about 283.2 bps, these findings imply that sin
firms have a 10-20% lower cost of bank debt relative to otherwise similar firms.
We investigate four possible explanations for these findings. First, Kim, Park, and
Wier (2012) show that the financial reporting quality of sin firms is superior relative to
comparable firms. Sin firms have a higher predictability of earnings for future cash flows
and a more timely recognition of losses. To investigate if the more favorable loan terms for
sin firms could be due to the better accounting quality, we include measures for accrual
quality. As expected, accrual quality has a significantly negative effect on the cost of
bank debt. However, even after controlling for accrual quality, the negative sin effect
persists. Second, we investigate if the lower spread paid by sin firms can be explained
by relationship lending. Relationship lending involves the acquisition of customer-specific
information as a result of multiple interactions over time, which decreases information
asymmetry (Boot, 2000). Lower information asymmetry could lead to lower spreads
(Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan, 2011). In line with this reasoning, our
results show that relationship lending indeed lowers the spread. Again, however, the sin
coefficient remains statistically significant and similar in magnitude. Third, we investigate
whether loans to sin firms serve as a hedge for banks due to the anti-cyclical nature of their
business. To measure this effect, we estimate a CAPM-beta for each firm and include it
in our model. Beta is significantly positively related to the spread, but the sin coefficient
is not affected by the inclusion of betas. Finally, we investigate whether organizational
structure could be driving our results. We include a measure for corporate diversification
following Aivazian, Qiu, and Rahaman (2015), whose results show that diversified firms
have significantly lower loan rates than comparable focused firms. Similar to their results,
we find that diversification is negatively related to loan spreads, however, this does not
affect the spread for sin firms. As such, accrual quality, relationship lending, cyclicality,
and corporate diversification do not explain our results. The lower spreads paid by sin
firms remain a puzzle.
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2.2 Literature Review
Social scientists such as Akerlof (1980) and Becker (1957), propose that agents obey
social norms unless there is a financial gain in violating the norm. Akerlof (1980) argues
that social norms established and followed by a majority in a community will persist
despite carrying a cost, because agents fear a loss of reputation and utility. This in
turn implies that the violation of a norm by agents that are less norm-constrained will
result in a gain to those respective agents. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) were the first
to empirically show that these theories translate to investors’ preferences in the stock
market. They investigate the pricing of sin stocks, i.e. publicly traded firms in the
alcohol, tobacco, and gaming industry. Their results show that sin stocks have higher
expected returns than otherwise comparable stocks. They further corroborate the link
to the agency theory above by observing lower ownership levels by norm-constrained
institutions, such as (public) pension funds or universities.
Kumar and Page (2014) also investigate the effects of social norms on investor behavior.
The authors test the hypothesis that sophisticated individuals deviate from established
norms only when they perceive the benefits of deviating are large. Consistently, their
results show that when gambling-averse institutions invest in lottery-type stocks, these
investments generate strong abnormal returns. Correspondingly, sin-averse institutions
earn higher abnormal returns on those sin stocks they choose to hold. Thus, both Kumar
and Page (2014) and Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) find that social norms lead to higher
abnormal returns for shunned firms in the equity market.
Fauver and McDonald (2014) investigate whether heterogeneity in social attitudes
impact equity markets. The authors develop a measure of time varying social norms
pertaining to sin stocks in the G20 nations and report that while sin stocks are shunned
in some nations, they are not shunned in others. Thus, sin firms in countries where society
is opposed to the products or services, experience decreased valuation relative to non-sin
firms. Similarly, countries where these industries are not shunned by societal views do
not experience valuation differences with otherwise similar firms. The authors conclude
that there is a significant relation between social views and equity market valuation of
firms that do not comply with these views, consistent with the conclusion drawn in Hong
and Kacperczyk (2009) that sin firms have lower equity valuations because society shuns
these stocks in the equity market.
The shunning that sin firms experience does not seem to be limited to equity markets.
Novak and Bilinski (2014) provide evidence of sin shunning in the labor market. Their
results show that executives in the alcohol, tobacco, and gambling industries earn a sig-
nificant compensation premium, which compensates the executives for the social stigma
related to employment in sin industries. Consistent with these findings, they document
that executive compensation in sin industries is higher in periods, and in states, with
higher social aversion to sin and that the executives hold less outside board seats, indi-
cating lower social prestige. Taken the together, the evidence suggests that executives
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demand a compensation premium for bearing the negative costs of working in industries
perceived negatively.
Leventis, Hasan, and Dedoulis (2013) provide evidence of social norms in audit pricing.
Their results show that firms charge significantly higher audit and consulting fees to
companies that deviate from prevailing social norms. They also show that audit pricing
levels within the “sin” group, which include companies in the alcohol, tobacco, firearms,
gambling, and nuclear power industries, depend both on prevailing political views and on
the level of “vice” exhibited by sin companies.
In addition to the sin effect in equity markets, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) also give
some insight into the capital structure of sin firms. Next to showing that the equity of
sin stocks is undervalued, making it more expensive for these firms to finance operations
using equity, the authors postulate that sin firms use debt to finance their operations.
Their results show that sin firms have 19.3% higher leverage ratio than the typical com-
pany, providing support for this expectation. One explanation for the observed leverage
ratio is that debt markets are less transparent than equity markets, leading to potentially
advantageous conditions for sin firms. Although it is possible to trace large public is-
suances of corporate bonds, large amounts of bank debt are difficult to trace (Hong and
Kacperczyk, 2009), making bank debt particularly interesting to study in this setting. In
this paper, we analyze, if sin firms are also shunned in debt markets, specifically focusing
on the syndicated bank loan market.
While the empirical evidence suggests that social norms affect equity investment deci-
sions and equilibrium prices, we know little about the effect of social norms in corporate
debt markets. Based on the findings in the literature to date, we expect that sin firms
have to pay a higher yield or, at best, there is no difference in the yield relative to other-
wise similar firms. Existing evidence on social norms in the bank debt market is limited
to studies looking at a broader definition of social norms. Goss and Roberts (2011) an-
alyze the effect of firms’ corporate social responsibility standards on the cost of bank
loans. They include the KLD screens on nuclear, military, tobacco, gambling, and alcohol
in some regressions as control variables. However, the focus of their study is to show
that lenders demand higher yield spreads from borrowers with the worst records in so-
cial responsibility based on the KLD strengths and concerns indicators. Similarly, Chava
(2014) shows a higher cost of debt and equity for firms with environmental concerns. Kim,
Surroca, and Tribo´ (2014) show that borrowers’ ethical behavior leads lending banks to
charge lower interest rates. These low rates are further enhanced when borrowers and
lenders exhibit similarities in their ethical guidelines, emphasizing the relationship aspect
of bank lending.
9
2. SOCIAL NORMS AND BANK LENDING
2.3 Data and Method
In our empirical analysis, we focus on bank loans raised by US borrowers with loan data
obtained from LPC’s DealScan database. Our full sample consists of 86,514 loans to
private as well as public borrowers signed between 1987 and 2012. DealScan provides
an expansive list of loan characteristics as well as syndicate information, but data on
borrower characteristics are limited to borrower name, industry, credit ratings and sales.
We therefore also consider a sub-sample of 6,093 loans to public borrowers for which we
collect detailed borrower characteristics from Compustat. In order to match DealScan to
Compustat, we use the matched dataset provided by Roberts and Chava (2008). Analyz-
ing both samples allows us to, on the one hand, examine the largest possible cross-section,
and on the other hand, include an array of factors known to affect loan terms. The full
sample allows for the analysis of a large, comprehensive sample of loans in which we
consider the main drivers of loans spreads, e.g. credit risk and loan characteristics. The
Compustat sample allows us to consider the impact of specific borrower characteristics
on loan spreads, albeit on a limited number of loans to public borrowers only. Our main
question is centered on the cost of bank debt for sin firms in comparison to other, non-sin
borrowers. We therefore estimate the multivariate regression model shown in Equation
(2.1). Our estimates are OLS estimates with standard errors clustered by borrower.
Spreadi = α + β1Sini + β2Comparablei + β3Controlsi + i, (2.1)
where Spreadi represents the cost of debt of loan i, Sini identifies whether the loan is
made to a borrower in a sin industry, Comparablei identifies an industry control, Controls
is a vector of firm, loan, or bank characteristics and i are the residuals. The dependent
variable Spreadi measures loan i’s all-in-spread drawn (AISD) as the total annual cost
net of upfront fees for each dollar used under the loan commitment (Ivashina, 2009). The
AISD is measured in bps. over LIBOR or LIBOR equivalent 1. Sin is a dummy variable
defined to take unity if loan i is made to a sin firm and zero otherwise. We adopt Hong and
Kacperczyk (2009)’s definition of sin, which includes all borrowers in the alcohol, tobacco,
and gambling industries, labeled “Triumvirate of sin”. We use the SIC codes provided in
DealScan to identify the industry group each borrower belongs to. We group borrowers
based on the Fama and French (1997) industry classification. Firms in the Fama-French
industry group 4 with SIC codes 2080 - 2085 belong to the Beer & Liquor group and
firms in industry group 5 with SIC codes 2100 - 2199 belong to Tobacco Products, and
both groups are classified as sin stocks. The Fama-French classification scheme does not
differentiate the gaming industry from the hotel industry or other entertainment firms.
Therefore, the NAICS classification is used instead, which identifies gaming stocks as those
pertaining to the following NAICS codes: 7132, 71312, 713210, 713290, 72112, 721120.
The NAICS codes are obtained through matching with Compustat, thus this method can
1AISD is winsorized at the 1% level.
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only be applied to the Compustat sample. For the DealScan sample, we manually identify
firms in the gaming industry using the 4-digit SIC codes.
In order to control for the fact that some companies - which are not flagged or identified
as sin stocks in the first phase - have segments that operate in sin industries, a second
company screening is applied. We start with the Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) augmented
list of sin companies which utilizes Compustat segments data from 1985 to 2006. We
expand this list by applying the same method to the data for the remainder of our sample
period, i.e. 2007 to 2012. Thus, a borrower is identified as a sin firm if any of its segments
has an SIC code in the Fama and French industry group 4 or 5 or a NAICS code in
the gaming group, as previously defined. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) argue that this
second screening process is imperative in obtaining an accurate list of sin firms, since
many companies have diversified operations.
While in their paper, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) focus on the Triumvirate of sin, two
other industries could be considered sinful. The first one is the sex industry. In line with
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) we decide against the inclusion of this industry due to the
limited number of publicly traded companies and the lack of an industry identifier even
at the NAICS level. The second, potentially sin-related industry is defense. However, due
to the uncertainty in whether, and when, the American population started to perceive
the defense industry as sinful, it is problematic to classify it as such.
Including a sin dummy in Equation 1 allows us to measure whether sin firms have a dif-
ferent loan spread relative to otherwise similar firms, while controlling for other borrower,
loan, and/or bank characteristics. However, we acknowledge that our control variables
might not be complete and we are particularly concerned about unexplained industry-
effects. In order to maintain a parsimonious specification, we construct a comparable
industry dummy following Hong and Kacperczyk (2009). We consider Fama and French
(1997) industry group 2 (food) and 3 (soda) and 43 (meals, restaurants, hotels, and mo-
tels) to be such comparable industries. Note that our comparable industry dummy takes
the value of one in two instances, first if the loan is to a sin firm and second if the loan
is to a non-sin firm in one of the above mentioned Fama and French comparable industry
groups.
We include sin in the comparables indicator variable, which allows for an immediate
test of significance, next to an easy-to-interpret coefficient. Any comparable firm will have
β2 mean spread in bp. A sin firm on the other hand will have β1 + β2 on average. This
means that the difference between sin, and all comparable firms equals (β1 +β2)−β2 = β1.
Significance of this coefficient can therefore be interpreted as a significantly different
average spread, or a ‘mean shift’/‘level shift’ for sin firms, compared to their direct peers.
Significance means that there is indeed a sin effect, controlling for other factors including
industry. In short, the comparable dummy is an industry control variable, which still
allows for a parsimonious specification.
Following existing literature, we control for firm financial characteristics, loan char-
11
2. SOCIAL NORMS AND BANK LENDING
acteristics and bank characteristics in the following manner. We start by controlling for
firm credit ratings. Credit ratings are widely thought to be the main driving force in
determining loan terms. We use the Moody’s senior debt rating, available in DealScan as
the main rating. In addition to ratings, we control for firm size. We have two proxies for
firm size, one obtained using DealScan data and one obtained using Compustat data 2.
Firm size in DealScan is computed as the natural logarithm of firm sales. Our Compustat
measure for size is proxied by the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets (Sufi, 2007).
The theory is that larger firms have a greater ability to withstand negative shocks to cash
flows and are thus less likely to default. Larger firms are also more likely to be viewed as
less risky by banks and should experience a lower cost of debt (Goss and Roberts, 2011).
The tangibility of firms is an important aspect in the pricing of bank debt, because lenders
recover from risk exposure via tangible assets in case of default. We measure tangibility
as property, plants, and equipment, divided by total assets. Leverage has been shown to
lead to higher spreads. Leverage is measured as total debt to total assets (Demerjian,
2011). Profitability of firms is also expected to be an important determinant of cost of
debt 3. Here we define profitability as EBITDA divided by total assets. One of the most
important determinants of bank loan terms is the default probability of the borrowers.
Although the ratings are the primary measure of default probability, we follow Chava
(2014) in also measuring the modified Altman Z-score of each borrower. We use the mod-
ified Z-score because it allows us to control for leverage separately. Given the nature of
our research, leverage is a key component as it is one of the main driving elements in loan
pricing. We calculate the modified Z-score in the following way:
1.2×Working Cap. + 1.48× Retained Earnings + 3.3× EBIT + 0.999× Sales
Total Assets
. (2.2)
A higher Z-score means firms are farther from financial distress. All else equal evidence
shows that higher leverage, lower profitability, and a lower Z-score are related to higher
default risk, and in turn, a higher cost of debt. Following Fauver and McDonald (2014)
we also control for the growth options of firms. All else equal, a firm with better growth
opportunities should face lower default risk and thus enjoy lower loan prices. Fauver
and McDonald (2014)’s results suggest that sin firms have higher growth opportunities.
Specifically, they find that sin firms have higher free cash flows to assets and higher capital
expenditures-to-sales ratios.
In addition to controlling for firm characteristics, we also control for the heterogeneity
in loans. We include several loan features which have been found to affect loan terms.
We start by controlling for loan size, measured as the natural logarithm of loan size in
2We perform a sanity check on the reliability of the borrower size variable obtained from DealScan,
by cross-validating it with the borrower size variable obtained from Compustat. In particular, we drop a
small number of observations that deviate abnormally from a linear relationship (R2 = 0.7) between the
two size proxies.
3Tangibility and Profitability are winsorzied at the 5% level.
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US dollars, following Sufi (2007). Another important aspect of loans is the maturity.
Loan maturity is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of months between
loan inception and loan end-date (Chava, 2014; Hasan, Park, and Wu, 2012). There are
two differing views on the effects of maturity on cost of debt. The “trade-off” hypothesis
posits that banks will charge higher spreads on loans with longer maturities to account for
the risks involved in lending over longer periods of time. The “credit-quality” hypothesis
argues that long-term debt should have lower cost of debt because high-risk lenders are
excluded from this type of debt (Goss and Roberts, 2011). Thus, the effect of maturity is
an empirical question. We also include dummy variables to control for whether the loan
is secured, whether there are financial covenants in place, for the exact purpose of the
loan, and we control for the type of loan by capturing whether it is a term loan or any
other type of loan.
Lastly, we control for bank characteristics. Although the main drivers of loan terms
are borrower characteristics, there is undoubtedly an interaction between bank preferences
and the loan terms borrowers receive. Given that we are mainly interested in whether
banks are socially responsible entities, and whether this affects their lending decisions, we
control for whether banks are signatories of the Equator Principles. This follows from the
premise that these banks might generally be norm-constrained, as they make an explicit
social association by joining the equator principles. We identify whether any of the lead
arrangers for a loan are signatories to the Equator Principles. Our hypothesis here is that
lead arrangers that are Equator Principles Signatories will shun sin firms, and this will
affect the loan terms these borrowers receive by the syndicate.
2.4 Results
In this section we discuss the results of the empirical analysis. We start with discussing the
full DealScan sample including loans to private and public borrowers and continue with
a discussion of the Compustat sample of loans to public borrowers only. The regressions
include firm-level control variables and loan-level control variables, with standard errors
clustered at the borrower level. The dependent variable is the loan spread in each regres-
sion, and the focus is on the sin coefficient. Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics
for the Compustat and DealScan variables, for each respective sample, where we present
the descriptives for the maximum number of available observations where spread is also
available. The mean is presented for sin firms, comparable firms, and non-sin firms. This
allows us to draw an inference, at an early stage, of the dynamics between these groups.
As Table 2.1 shows, the loan spread is significantly lower for sin firms than for both com-
parable firms and all non-sin firms. The Z-score of sin firms is also significantly lower
than that of both comparable firms and all non-sin firms. Although the magnitude of the
difference is not alarming, it means that sin firms have higher credit risk than other firms.
Interestingly, Table 2.1 also shows that loans to sin firms require, on average, less collat-
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eral as the secured variable shows. This is significantly lower for sin firms than for both
the comparable group and all other firms. The magnitude of the difference is negligible
however. Overall, the descriptive statistics show that sin firms have lower spreads when
compared to other firms, however, a majority of the firm and loan level characteristics
are not statistically different between these groups.
Table 2.1 shows the results for different specifications on the full DealScan sample.
Following Carey and Nini (2007) we use ratings as our primary measure of credit quality,
as this is arguably the most important determining factor in loan pricing. Regression 1 of
Table 2.2 presents the specification controlling only for credit quality measured by credit
rating. The sin coefficient for this specification is negative and significant at the 5% level,
largely in line with the descriptive statistics. Regression 2 shows a more comprehensive
specification, which controls for a multitude of loan-level characteristics. Adding loan-level
characteristics decreases the sample size by approximately half, however, the sin coefficient
remains negative at the 10% significance level. Controlling for borrower-characteristics
represents a challenge when using only DealScan data. Borrower sales is reported, but
a significant portion of observations is missing. Regression 3 includes borrower sales for
robustness, and the sin coefficient remains negative, at -32 bps., and significant at the
1%-level. Due to the large decrease in number of observations stemming solely from this
variable, we decide to exclude it from further specifications, as it does not materially affect
results, but does significantly decrease the sample size.
One important factor that could lead to banks making lending decisions based on social
norms are the Equator Principles. Although the Principles are specific to project finance,
banks make an implicit association with social behavior, and thus, might treat sin firms
differently than otherwise similar firms. In an effort to test this hypothesis, we control
for whether banks are committed to the Equator Principles. Also, following from the
premise that these banks are more likely to shun sin firms based on their social affiliation,
we construct an interaction term between Equator Principles committed banks and sin
firms. Regression 4 shows the specification controlling for Equator Principles committed
banks, and it shows that while these banks charge lower spreads on average, they do
shun sin firms, as evidenced by the fact that the overall sin effect remains negative, and
statistically significant.
In an effort to control for firm level characteristics in a comprehensive manner, we
match the loans in DealScan to firm financial data from Compustat. Table 2.3 presents
the results for this sample. Note that the sample size decreases significantly in the match-
ing process. However, this step is essential as it allows us to control for numerous firm
level characteristics known to affect loan terms. In regression 1 we include all loan level
characteristics as shown in regression 2 of Table 2.2 in addition to different firm level
characteristics, such as firm size, leverage ratio, and Z-score. The results remain qual-
itatively similar to those shown in Table 2.2. After controlling for numerous loan level
and firm level characteristics, the sin coefficient remains negative and significant at the
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Table 2.2: Full DealScan Sample
We estimate the cross-sectional relation between loan spreads and firm characteristics, loan characteristics, and bank
characteristics for the full DealScan sample. In this sample, firm characteristics are limited to credit ratings and borrower
sales. Our main variable of interest is the sin dummy variable (Sin). In order to maintain a parsimonious specification,
while still controlling for industry effects, we include a comparable industry dummy (Comparable). The Comparable
dummy variable takes unity for firms in comparable industries, i.e. industry group 2 (food) and 3 (soda) and 43 (meals,
restaurants, hotels, and motels), and when firms are sin firms. This allows for an immediate test of differences between
sin firms and firms in comparable industries. Any comparable firm will have β2 mean spread in bp. A sin firm on the
other hand will have β1 + β2 on average. This means that the difference between sin, and all comparable firms equals
(β1 + β2) − β2 = β1. We control for loan characteristics following existing literature. Lastly, we control for whether
banks are equator banks. Banks make an explicit social association by joining the equator principles, allowing for the
assumption that these banks shun socially irresponsible products and/or the producing firm. Clustered standard errors
in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sin -18.73* -20.67** -33.02*** -38.79***
(9.776) (9.845) (10.09) (12.02)
Comparable 5.194 15.33*** 17.99*** 19.23***
(4.369) (4.732) (5.138) (5.156)
Size -4.949*** -4.587***
(1.208) (1.209)
Loan Characteristics
Secured 60.40*** 59.38*** 58.18***
(3.898) (4.140) (4.144)
Financial Covenant -74.47*** -72.39*** -72.19***
(3.064) (3.553) (3.545)
Termloan 65.92*** 58.91*** 58.75***
(2.561) (2.825) (2.817)
Senior -545.4*** -552.4*** -549.8***
(21.97) (24.16) (24.09)
Loansize -32.51*** -28.75*** -27.79***
(0.820) (1.233) (1.225)
Multiple Tranches -13.49*** -10.40*** -9.775***
(2.558) (2.751) (2.749)
Currency 26.30 31.19 29.46
(27.79) (22.23) (22.22)
Maturity 8.132*** 8.025*** 7.905***
(2.223) (2.503) (2.484)
Bank Characteristics
Equator Bank -27.13***
(2.393)
Equator Bank × Sin 18.56
(19.37)
Constant 305.0*** 1,308*** 1,308*** 1,286***
(0.00173) (38.14) (36.16) (36.26)
Observations 86,513 45,423 37,310 37,310
Adjusted R-squared 0.117 0.285 0.293 0.295
Rating Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower borrower borrower
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Table 2.3: Compustat Sample
We estimate the cross-sectional relation between loan spreads and firm characteristics, loan characteristics, and bank
characteristics for the matched DealScan-Compustat sample. This sample includes a wide array of firm-level control
variables. Our main variable of interest is the sin dummy variable (Sin). In order to maintain a parsimonious specification,
while still controlling for industry effects, we include a comparable industry dummy (Comparable). The Comparable
dummy variable takes unity for firms in comparable industries, i.e. industry group 2 (food) and 3 (soda) and 43 (meals,
restaurants, hotels, and motels), and when firms are sin firms. This allows for an immediate test of differences between
sin firms and firms in comparable industries. Any comparable firm will have β2 mean spread in bp. A sin firm on the
other hand will have β1 + β2 on average. This means that the difference between sin, and all comparable firms equals
(β1 + β2) − β2 = β1. We control for different firm level characteristics known to affect loan spreads. We also control
for loan characteristics following existing literature. Lastly, we control for whether banks are equator banks. Banks
make an explicit social association by joining the equator principles, allowing for the assumption that these banks shun
socially irresponsible products and/or the producing firm. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
Borrower Characteristics
Sin -39.88* -57.07**
(21.08) (23.15)
Comparable 26.79 27.78
(20.93) (21.18)
Size 10.34** 10.58**
(5.208) (5.231)
Tangibility 13.08* 12.71*
(6.836) (6.803)
Leverage 99.78*** 100.1***
(16.38) (16.42)
Z - Score -9.223** -9.200**
(4.139) (4.136)
Profitability -194.0*** -192.4***
(42.57) (42.68)
FCF/Assets -23.37 -23.80
(14.76) (14.59)
CAPX/Sales -2.321 -1.963
(7.482) (7.487)
Bank Characteristics
Equator Bank -9.933**
(4.659)
Equator Bank * Sin 57.38***
(14.17)
Constant 1,198*** 1,194***
(82.08) (82.21)
Observations 5,446 5,446
Adjusted R-squared 0.436 0.437
Rating Dummies Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes
Purpose Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower
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5% level. In addition to the base specification, we also extend regression 4 of Table 2.2
by including firm level characteristics. As regression 2 in Table 2.3 shows, and similar
to the results found in the DealScan sample, Equator banks charge lower spreads om
average. However, they charge sin firms a higher spread relative to the average firm. Our
results are contrary to our expectations, as we find a significantly lower spread for sin
firms, which persist across samples and specifications. For the remainder of this paper,
we will use regressions 1 and 4 from Table 2.2 and regression 2 from Table 2.3 as our main
specifications. These regressions allow us to show results for the largest sample and/or
for the most comprehensive specification.
2.5 Potential Explanations
To explain the unexpected results reported above, we analyze a number of potential
explanations. In addition to the standard firm-level control variables, we control for
the accrual quality of firms, following Kim, Park, and Wier (2012). We also capture
borrower-lender relationships, given the effects these are known to have on bank lending
according to Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011). Third, we control for
the co-movement of a firm’s equity with the market, as measured by firm beta. We want
to determine whether sin firms are less cyclical than other firms and if this can explain
the lower spreads observed. And lastly, following Aivazian, Qiu, and Rahaman (2015)
we control for the organizational structure. Here we want to test whether firms with
diversified operations receive beneficial loan terms.
2.5.1 Financial Reporting
We control for accrual quality following evidence that sin firms have more prudent report-
ing (Kim, Park, and Wier, 2012). Dechow and Dichev (2002) take the view that earnings
that map more closely into cash are more desirable. This follows from the premise that
one of the primary objectives of financial reporting is to provide information to investors
and creditors to assess future cash flows. Better financial reporting leads to lower in-
formation risk. Accrual quality tells us about the mapping of accounting earnings into
cash flows. Relatively poor accruals quality weakens this mapping, increasing information
risk (Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper, 2005). The authors also show that accruals
quality affects the cost of debt after controlling for other known factors, implying that the
information risk is priced by investors. We use the modified version of the Dechow and
Dichev (2002) model following Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005). We obtain
all accounting data from Compustat Annual. Accrual quality is specified as follows (all
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variables are scaled by total assets):
TCAj,t = λ0,j + λ0,jCFOj,t−1 + λ2,jCFOj,t + λ3,jCFOj,t+1
+ λ4,j∆Revj,t + λ5,jPPEj,t + νj,t (2.3)
where,
TCAj,t = Firm j’s total current accruals in year t (∆CAj,t − ∆CLj,t − ∆Cashj,t +
∆STDEBTj,t), where,
∆CAj,t = firm j’s change in current assets between year t-1 and t;
∆CLj,t = firm’s j change in current liabilities between year t-1 and year t;
∆Cashj,t = firm j’s change in cash between year t-1 and year t; and
∆STDEBTj,t = firm j’s change in debt in current liabilities between year t-1 and t;
DEPRj,t = firm j’s depreciation and amortization expense in year t.
CFOj,t = Firm j’s cash flow from operations in year t, calculated as net income before
extraordinary items in year t (NIBE) less total accruals (TA) in year t, where
TAj,t = ∆CAj,t −∆CLj,t −∆Cashj,t + ∆STDEBTj,t −DEPRj,t;
DEPRj,t = firm j’s depreciation and amortization expense in year t.
∆Revj,t = firm j’s change in revenue between year t− 1 and year t.
PPEj,t = firm j’s gross value of PPE in year t.
For each firm-year we estimate Equation (2.3) using as many data points as possible,
with a minimum of four years of data availability. These estimations yield firm- and
year-specific residuals, νj,t, which we then use to compute the accruals quality metric
for each firm. We start by taking σ(νj,t), the standard deviation of firm j’s estimated
residuals. A firm’s earnings are deemed of high quality if the standard deviation is low,
and of poor quality if the standard deviation is high. For our model, we compute accruals
quality as −σ(νj,t), the negative of accruals quality, to facilitate interpretation of the
coefficient. In unreported results we also take the inverse of accruals quality, σ(νj,t)
−1 to
test for robustness and the results remain unchanged. By taking the negative (inverse),
a higher value of the coefficient is in line with better earnings quality. Some might
argue that accruals are used in an opportunistic manner, to window-dress and mislead
users of financial statements. Following Dechow and Dichev (2002) we do not attempt
to disentangle “intentional” from unintentional errors, because both imply low-quality
accruals. The authors argue that even in the absence of intentional earnings management,
accruals quality will systematically be related to firm and industry characteristics. We
control for accruals quality in Table 2.4 regressions 1 and 2. As results show, accruals
quality does indeed have a negative relationship with spread, significant at the 1% level.
Accruals quality cannot, however, explain the preferential treatment sin firms receive in
the way of lower spreads.
In order to test the sensitivity of the results to the measure of accruals quality used,
we compute different proxies for financial reporting quality. For our second measure we
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consider the ability of earnings and its components to predict future cash flows. For the
this model, dubbed Accruals Quality Method 2, we follow Kim, Park, and Wier (2012),
Dechow, Kothari, and L Watts (1998) and Barth, Cram, and Nelson (2001). We compute
the extent to which earnings and its components can predict future cash flows as follows
(all variables are scaled by total assets):
CFOj,t+1 = Φ0 + Φ1CFOj,t + Φ2∆ARj,t + Φ3∆INV ENTj,t + Φ4∆APj,t
+ Φ5DEPRj,t + Φ6∆OTHERj,t + κj,t+1 (2.4)
where, CFOj,t+1 and CFOj,t are the cash from operations in years t + 1 and t for each
firm j adjusted for the accrual portion of extraordinary items in the respective years;
∆ARj,t is the change in accounts receivable for firm j; ∆APj,t is the change in accounts
payable and accrued liabilities for firm j; DEPRj,t is the depreciation and amortization
expense in year t for firm j; and ∆OTHERj,t represents all other accruals, computed as
(NIBE − (CFO + ∆AR + ∆INV ENT −∆AP −DEPR)).
The residuals from Equation (2.4) capture the deviation of earnings and components
in predicting future cash flows. Similar to our first measure of accruals quality, we take
the standard deviation of the residuals, i.e., σ(κt+1). Again, we take the negative of
this measure -σ(κt+1), which means that a higher residual volatility shows that earnings
are better able to predict future cash flows, implying higher earnings quality. As results
reported in Table 2.4 regressions 3 and 4 show, using this proxy for accruals quality does
not change our results in a material manner.
Lastly, we follow Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2004) in controlling for
earnings persistence and earnings predictability using Equation (2.5). Persistent earnings
are desirable because it means they are recurring. We follow the authors and measure
earnings persistence as the slope coefficient from the regressions of current earnings on
lagged earnings, as specified in Equation (2.5).
NIi,t = αi + βiNIi,t−1 + i,t (2.5)
Here, a βi close to 1 implies highly persistent earnings, while small βi imply transitory
earnings. Earnings predictability is measured as above, i.e. σ(i,t), and as above, we take
the negative of this measure to conform with the ordering attributes applied throughout.
As results show, persistent earnings do indeed lead to a lower spread, however, they do
not change the fact that sin firms have a lower spread relative to otherwise similar firms.
2.5.2 Are sin industries anti-cyclical?
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) characterize sin stocks by calculating market betas for Fama
and French (1997) industry groups. In their paper, the beer and smoke industries appear
to have somewhat lower betas than other industries, whereas the gaming sector’s beta
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Table 2.4: Potential Explanations - Financial Reporting
We estimate the cross-sectional relation between loan spreads and firm characteristics, loan characteristics, and bank
characteristics for the matched DealScan-Compustat sample. This sample includes a wide array of firm-level control
variables. Our main variable of interest is the sin dummy variable (Sin). In order to maintain a parsimonious specification,
while still controlling for industry effects, we include a comparable industry dummy (Comparable). The Comparable
dummy variable takes unity for firms in comparable industries, i.e. industry group 2 (food) and 3 (soda) and 43 (meals,
restaurants, hotels, and motels), and when firms are sin firms. This allows for an immediate test of differences between
sin firms and firms in comparable industries. Any comparable firm will have β2 mean spread in bp. A sin firm on the
other hand will have β1 + β2 on average. This means that the difference between sin, and all comparable firms equals
(β1 + β2) − β2 = β1. We control for different firm level characteristics known to affect loan spreads. In addition to the
standard firm-level characteristics, we control for the accrual quality of firms, following Kim, Park, and Wier (2012). We
also control for loan characteristics following existing literature. Lastly, we control for whether banks are equator banks.
Banks make an explicit social association by joining the equator principles, allowing for the assumption that these banks
shun socially irresponsible products and/or the producing firm. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and *
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sin -36.65* -52.59** -49.85** -65.90** -39.65* -57.44** -40.24* -59.14**
(20.34) (22.65) (24.34) (27.45) (21.51) (23.77) (21.18) (23.27)
Comparable 29.38 30.37 42.23* 43.09* 27.45 28.56 27.88 29.43
(20.53) (20.79) (24.28) (24.61) (21.33) (21.59) (20.69) (20.98)
Size 13.63** 13.93** 6.768 6.979 9.671* 9.954* 11.39** 11.77**
(5.399) (5.439) (5.517) (5.563) (5.271) (5.301) (5.233) (5.261)
Tangibility 24.86*** 24.43*** 17.83** 17.88** 12.69* 12.24* 12.50* 11.78*
(7.095) (7.036) (7.813) (7.836) (6.879) (6.855) (6.823) (6.793)
Leverage 99.62*** 99.92*** 92.95*** 93.08*** 96.80*** 97.16*** 93.78*** 94.05***
(16.90) (16.94) (17.57) (17.61) (16.90) (16.94) (16.87) (16.90)
Z - Score -6.684* -6.678* -8.598* -8.566* -8.889** -8.860** -8.515** -8.482**
(3.936) (3.939) (4.697) (4.693) (4.212) (4.211) (4.193) (4.191)
Profitability -209.9*** -208.1*** -217.7*** -217.6*** -192.2*** -190.8*** -169.2*** -166.6***
(42.70) (42.83) (48.08) (48.21) (42.69) (42.81) (42.49) (42.62)
FCF/Assets -19.04 -19.18 -15.75 -16.00 -24.91* -25.21* -27.45* -27.72*
(14.03) (13.90) (16.37) (16.17) (14.62) (14.47) (14.68) (14.54)
CAPX/Sales -6.107 -5.674 -3.038 -2.827 -2.286 -1.887 -3.014 -2.461
(8.209) (8.252) (8.117) (8.142) (7.504) (7.514) (7.672) (7.635)
Accrual Quality -733.3*** -727.1***
(178.0) (177.5)
Accrual Quality (Method 2) -0.0422** -0.0420**
(0.0206) (0.0203)
Earnings Predictability -2.396 -2.380
(1.540) (1.535)
Earnings Persistence -36.70*** -37.00***
(9.759) (9.796)
Constant 1,172*** 1,169*** 1,189*** 1,188*** 1,112*** 1,114*** 1,127*** 1,127***
(75.01) (75.21) (89.05) (89.29) (84.79) (83.59) (84.28) (82.64)
Observations 5,184 5,184 4,432 4,432 5,352 5,352 5,216 5,216
Adjusted R-squared 0.443 0.444 0.440 0.441 0.433 0.433 0.431 0.433
Rating Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower
is comparatively high. This difference in betas might also have an effect on how stable
banks deem certain firms/ industries to be. We compute the firm-level beta following
this premise. We obtain monthly return data from CRSP and use CRSP-Compustat
merged to match these to our sample of Compustat firms. We use the value weighted
CRSP market index as the market factor. The betas are computed over a 60-month time
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period, with a minimum of 24 months of data availability for each firm. We then add the
firm-level beta to our regressions as a control variable. The idea here is that if sin firms
have lower betas than other firms, then banks might consider them hedge opportunities,
and as such, provide them with preferential loan terms.
We control for the borrower beta in specification 9 and 10 in Table 2.5. As expected,
beta has a positive relationship with spread, implying that more cyclical firms pay higher
spreads than less cyclical firms. However, as the sin coefficient shows, the cyclicality of
firms cannot explain the fact that sin firms have lower spreads than otherwise similar
firms.
2.5.3 Relationship Lending
Following Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011), we employ two proxies for
the bank-borrower relationship. First, we construct a relationship dummy variable, which
takes a value 1 if borrower i borrowed from lead arranger b in the past five years. If a
borrower has a deal with multiple tranches, we do not consider those in our relationship
dummy variable as these will likely bias the relationship effect upward.
Second, we construct a variable, relationship number, which measures the number of
loans by lead arranger b to borrower i to all loans of borrower i in the past five years,
calculated as follows:
Relationship Number =
Number of loans by lender b to borrower i in the past five years
Total number of loans by borrower i in the past five years
(2.6)
This measure returns a continues variable, which allows for an estimate of the strength
of the relationship between borrower i and lender b. In cases where there are multiple lead
arrangers we take the highest relationship value. Regressions 3 and 4 in Table 2.5 show,
the coefficient for the relationship proxies is negative, implying that repetitive borrowing
from the same banks leads to lower spreads. However, borrower-lender relationship does
not explain the preferential treatment sin firms receive from banks. Regressions 5 and
6 are in line with the simple relationship dummy, that is, a bank-borrower relationship
leads to significantly lower spreads, however, the sin effect persists.
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Table 2.5: Potential Explanations - Relationship and Beta
We estimate the cross-sectional relation between loan spreads and firm characteristics, loan characteristics, and bank
characteristics for the matched DealScan-Compustat sample with additional potential explanatory variables. This sample
includes a wide array of firm-level control variables. Our variable of interest is the sin dummy variable. The comparable
dummy variable takes unity for firms in comparable industries, industry group 2 (food) and 3 (soda) and 43 (meals,
restaurants, hotels, and motels), and when firms are sin firms. This allows for an immediate test of differences between
sin firms and firms in comparable industries. In addition to the standard firm-level characteristics, we control for the
co-movement of a firm’s equity with the market measured by firm beta, to identify whether the cyclicality of firms has
an effect on their cost of debt. We also control for borrower-lender relationships, given the effects these are known to
have on bank lending Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011) in regressions 3 through 6. We also control
for loan characteristics following existing literature. Lastly, we control for whether banks are equator banks. Banks
make an explicit social association by joining the equator principles, allowing for the assumption that these banks shun
socially irresponsible products and/or the producing firm. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Borrower Characteristics
Sin -53.93** -73.85** -39.82* -56.95** -40.00* -57.21**
(26.47) (29.09) (21.09) (23.14) (21.08) (23.09)
Comparable 46.22* 47.05* 26.49 27.47 26.68 27.66
(27.11) (27.40) (21.12) (21.37) (21.13) (21.38)
Size 12.49** 12.85** 10.47** 10.70** 10.62** 10.84**
(6.324) (6.366) (5.179) (5.205) (5.097) (5.120)
Tangibility 12.68 12.08 13.77** 13.40** 13.54** 13.17*
(8.487) (8.448) (6.795) (6.761) (6.773) (6.740)
Leverage 109.9*** 110.7*** 99.41*** 99.76*** 99.71*** 100.1***
(25.85) (25.89) (16.39) (16.43) (16.37) (16.41)
Z - Score -9.861** -9.721** -9.022** -9.005** -9.082** -9.063**
(4.895) (4.921) (4.108) (4.105) (4.106) (4.102)
Profitability -194.1*** -193.5*** -194.2*** -192.7*** -194.3*** -192.7***
(52.50) (52.76) (42.56) (42.66) (42.55) (42.65)
FCF/Assets -19.33 -18.59 -23.52 -23.95 -23.44 -23.86
(20.25) (20.20) (14.71) (14.55) (14.74) (14.57)
CAPX/Sales 4.793 6.139 -2.369 -2.022 -2.366 -2.014
(12.27) (12.32) (7.432) (7.446) (7.464) (7.474)
Beta 2.491 2.503
(1.551) (1.553)
Bank Characteristics
Equator Bank -11.33** -10.30** -10.45**
(4.890) (4.245) (4.254)
Equator Bank * Sin 45.57*** 47.41*** 48.19***
(12.38) (11.41) (11.37)
Relationship (Number) -19.20 -18.60
(12.13) (12.20)
Relationship (Dummy) -6.038 -5.857
(5.587) (5.622)
Constant 907.7*** 915.7*** 1,195*** 1,192*** 1,195*** 1,192***
(71.83) (70.62) (82.31) (82.42) (82.46) (82.56)
Observations 3,822 3,822 5,446 5,446 5,446 5,446
Adjusted R-squared 0.435 0.436 0.437 0.438 0.437 0.437
Rating Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower
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2.5.4 Corporate Diversification
Corporate diversification is widely thought to positively affect a firms cost of capital.
Aivazian, Qiu, and Rahaman (2015) study the effect of a corporation’s organizational
structure on its financing capacity. They use the diversification strategy of the firm as
an identification tool for organizational structure and analyze the effect of structure on a
firm’s financing capacity. Their results show that diversified firms have significantly lower
loan rates than comparable focused firms, without being subject to restrictive non-price
terms. These results indicate that coinsurance effects in investment opportunities and
cash flows reduce the spreads firms pay on their loans.
Following these results, we use two different measures of corporate diversification to
test whether this has an effect on the lower spreads to sin firms we observe. Our first
measure is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 when a firm operates in more than one
unique four-digit SIC code industry. We also construct a similar measure based on two-
digit SIC codes, which implies greater diversification by firms as they operate in entirely
different industries. The second measure is an integer, enumerating the number of unique
SIC code industries a firm operates in. The results for diversification can be seen in
Table 2.6 for the Dealscan and the Compustat samples. The results for the full sample,
in regressions 1 and 2, show that corporate diversification is associated with significantly
lower spreads. However, including diversification as an additional variable does not affect
the coefficient of the sin dummy. For the Compustat sample in regressions 3 and 4 the
coefficient on diversification is not significant. Most important to note in our context is
that including diversification does not affect the sin coefficient in the Compustat sample
either. Our results remain largely the same for all measures of corporate diversification.
Therefore, for brevity, we only report the results for the second measure.
Lastly, we include all four potential explanations in one specification to rule out that
it is a joint effect of these different factors which leads to lower spreads for sin firms.
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show the results for these specifications, and as can be seen, the results
remain qualitatively similar across different specifications, and the sin effect persists.
2.6 Robustness
In our first robustness test, we control for industry fixed effects for both the full DealScan
sample and the Compustat sample. As Table 2.9 shows, including industry fixed effects,
instead of the comparable industry dummy, does not materially affect the results relative
to our main regressions in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. The results remain qualitatively and
quantitatively similar. Table 2.10 shows results for the Compustat sample including
industry fixed effects. We see a little more variability in results for this sample, which is
expected given the smaller sample size. For regression 1, the economic magnitude of sin
decreases and the significance disappears. However, regression 2 is largely in line with
previous results. Thus, we conclude that even after controlling for all industries, the sin
24
2.6 Robustness
Table 2.6: Potential Explanations - Diversification
We estimate the cross-sectional relation between loan spreads and firm characteristics, loan characteristics, and bank
characteristics for the full DealScan sample in regressions 1 and 2 and for the matched Dealscan-Compustat sample in
regressions 3 and 4. In the Dealscan sample, firm characteristics are limited to credit ratings and borrower sales, while in
the matched Dealscan-Compustat sample we can control for a wide array of firm-level characteristics. Our main variable
of interest is the sin dummy variable (Sin). In order to maintain a parsimonious specification, while still controlling for
industry effects, we include a comparable industry dummy (Comparable). The Comparable dummy variable takes unity
for firms in comparable industries, i.e. industry group 2 (food) and 3 (soda) and 43 (meals, restaurants, hotels, and
motels), and when firms are sin firms. This allows for an immediate test of differences between sin firms and firms in
comparable industries. Any comparable firm will have β2 mean spread in bp. A sin firm on the other hand will have
β1 + β2 on average. This means that the difference between sin, and all comparable firms equals (β1 + β2) − β2 = β1.
We control for loan characteristics following existing literature. Lastly, we control for whether banks are equator banks.
Banks make an explicit social association by joining the equator principles, allowing for the assumption that these banks
shun socially irresponsible products and/or the producing firm. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and *
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sin -32.62*** -37.72*** -40.37* -57.59**
(10.12) (12.00) (21.22) (23.32)
Comparable 17.71*** 18.93*** 26.89 27.87
(5.163) (5.181) (20.94) (21.18)
Size (Dealscan) -4.220*** -3.865***
(1.215) (1.215)
Size 10.14* 10.36**
(5.198) (5.222)
Tangibility 12.54* 12.19*
(6.920) (6.886)
Leverage 99.52*** 99.87***
(16.37) (16.41)
Z - Score -9.803** -9.782**
(4.248) (4.245)
Profitability -190.8*** -189.2***
(42.89) (42.99)
FCF/Assets -23.58 -24.02
(14.88) (14.70)
CAPX/Sales -2.413 -2.034
(7.514) (7.513)
Diversification -4.853*** -4.895*** 1.295 1.394
(1.520) (1.521) (3.442) (3.451)
Constant 1,327*** 1,304*** 1,197*** 1,194***
(35.94) (36.04) (82.01) (82.12)
Observations 36,994 36,994 5,442 5,442
Adjusted R-squared 0.294 0.297 0.437 0.437
Rating Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Characteristics No Yes No Yes
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower borrower borrower
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Table 2.7: Potential Explanations - Full Specification
We estimate the cross-sectional relation between loan spreads and firm characteristics, loan characteristics, and bank
characteristics for the matched DealScan-Compustat sample. This sample includes a wide array of firm-level control
variables. Our main variable of interest is the sin dummy variable (Sin). In order to maintain a parsimonious specification,
while still controlling for industry effects, we include a comparable industry dummy (Comparable). The Comparable
dummy variable takes unity for firms in comparable industries, i.e. industry group 2 (food) and 3 (soda) and 43 (meals,
restaurants, hotels, and motels), and when firms are sin firms. This allows for an immediate test of differences between
sin firms and firms in comparable industries. Any comparable firm will have β2 mean spread in bp. A sin firm on the
other hand will have β1 + β2 on average. This means that the difference between sin, and all comparable firms equals
(β1 + β2) − β2 = β1. We control for different firm level characteristics known to affect loan spreads. In addition to the
standard firm-level characteristics, we control for the accrual quality of firms, following Kim, Park, and Wier (2012),
we also control for the co-movement of a firm’s equity with the market measured by firm beta, to identify whether
the cyclicality of firms has an effect on their cost of debt. And we control for borrower-lender relationships, given the
effects these are known to have on bank lending Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011). This table shows all
potential explanations. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Borrower Characteristics
Sin -50.53* -69.40** -71.91** -91.99*** -55.26** -75.36** -56.46** -77.97***
(25.84) (28.69) (30.07) (33.41) (26.71) (29.28) (26.19) (28.57)
Comparable 47.63* 48.52* 64.46** 64.99** 46.52* 47.34* 46.28* 47.42*
(26.91) (27.22) (31.02) (31.35) (27.44) (27.72) (26.32) (26.60)
Size 15.96** 16.30*** 8.016 8.297 12.45** 12.78** 13.26** 13.71**
(6.256) (6.300) (6.001) (6.056) (6.163) (6.206) (6.082) (6.130)
Tangibility 21.67** 21.04** 12.49 12.53 11.86 11.29 12.48 11.73
(8.836) (8.777) (8.678) (8.706) (8.476) (8.440) (8.576) (8.527)
Leverage 112.5*** 113.2*** 107.5*** 108.2*** 109.8*** 110.6*** 103.6*** 104.1***
(26.04) (26.09) (27.79) (27.85) (25.69) (25.72) (25.88) (25.89)
Z - Score -7.619* -7.513 -9.770* -9.669* -10.42** -10.28** -9.865** -9.684*
(4.608) (4.636) (5.043) (5.062) (5.023) (5.051) (5.006) (5.042)
Profitability -213.4*** -212.6*** -213.9*** -214.4*** -188.9*** -188.3*** -157.3*** -155.4***
(51.04) (51.29) (56.24) (56.56) (53.05) (53.28) (51.40) (51.60)
CAPX/Sales 5.493 6.878 12.38 13.32 5.225 6.624 0.835 2.451
(11.95) (12.00) (12.74) (12.75) (12.33) (12.39) (12.35) (12.39)
FCF/Assets -13.31 -12.53 -21.98 -21.66 -20.45 -19.74 -23.47 -22.38
(17.54) (17.52) (19.84) (19.72) (20.31) (20.24) (19.99) (19.99)
Beta 2.274* 2.286* 2.202 2.253 2.480 2.489 2.268 2.274
(1.234) (1.244) (1.716) (1.737) (1.516) (1.517) (1.449) (1.449)
Earnings Quality -827.8*** -821.7***
(218.2) (217.8)
Earnings Quality (Method 2) -0.0459 -0.0467
(0.0297) (0.0296)
Earnings Predictability -0.183 -0.206
(2.251) (2.254)
Earnings Persistence -44.88*** -46.03***
(12.60) (12.76)
Diversification 2.003 2.192 2.390 2.601 2.511 2.743 2.091 2.306
(3.975) (3.981) (4.281) (4.290) (3.962) (3.970) (4.087) (4.094)
Bank Characteristics
Equator Bank -12.21** -9.468* -11.82** -14.17**
(5.401) (5.645) (5.319) (5.501)
Equator Bank × Sin 53.38*** 56.09*** 57.48*** 60.63***
(14.81) (15.36) (14.53) (14.19)
Relationship (Dummy) -6.573 -6.386 -5.929 -5.886 -6.828 -6.677 -7.486 -7.283
(6.713) (6.754) (7.204) (7.236) (6.691) (6.724) (6.588) (6.627)
Constant 881.8*** 888.8*** 1,057*** 1,056*** 1,052*** 1,050*** 1,058*** 1,056***
(71.20) (70.23) (104.0) (103.3) (93.55) (93.13) (93.52) (93.12)
Observations 3,783 3,783 3,305 3,305 3,818 3,818 3,716 3,716
Adjusted R-squared 0.443 0.445 0.444 0.445 0.435 0.437 0.435 0.437
Rating Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower
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Table 2.8: Potential Explanations - Full Specification Continued
We estimate the cross-sectional relation between loan spreads and firm characteristics, loan characteristics, and bank
characteristics for the matched DealScan-Compustat sample. This sample includes a wide array of firm-level control
variables. Our main variable of interest is the sin dummy variable (Sin). In order to maintain a parsimonious specification,
while still controlling for industry effects, we include a comparable industry dummy (Comparable). The Comparable
dummy variable takes unity for firms in comparable industries, i.e. industry group 2 (food) and 3 (soda) and 43 (meals,
restaurants, hotels, and motels), and when firms are sin firms. This allows for an immediate test of differences between
sin firms and firms in comparable industries. Any comparable firm will have β2 mean spread in bp. A sin firm on the
other hand will have β1 + β2 on average. This means that the difference between sin, and all comparable firms equals
(β1 + β2) − β2 = β1. We control for different firm level characteristics known to affect loan spreads. In addition to the
standard firm-level characteristics, we control for the accrual quality of firms, following Kim, Park, and Wier (2012),
we also control for the co-movement of a firm’s equity with the market measured by firm beta, to identify whether
the cyclicality of firms has an effect on their cost of debt. And we control for borrower-lender relationships, given the
effects these are known to have on bank lending Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011). This table shows all
potential explanations. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Borrower Characteristics
Sin -50.21* -68.98** -71.54** -91.48*** -54.91** -74.89** -56.13** -77.53***
(25.93) (28.86) (30.22) (33.66) (26.80) (29.45) (26.22) (28.69)
Comparable 47.29* 48.19* 64.12** 64.65** 46.16* 46.99* 45.94* 47.08*
(26.95) (27.25) (31.09) (31.42) (27.48) (27.76) (26.29) (26.58)
Size 15.77** 16.12** 7.876 8.153 12.26* 12.59** 13.06** 13.51**
(6.372) (6.419) (6.124) (6.182) (6.280) (6.325) (6.188) (6.238)
Tangibility 21.75** 21.12** 12.58 12.61 11.98 11.41 12.65 11.89
(8.824) (8.766) (8.658) (8.687) (8.466) (8.430) (8.558) (8.510)
Leverage 112.1*** 112.8*** 107.1*** 107.8*** 109.4*** 110.2*** 103.2*** 103.7***
(26.06) (26.12) (27.84) (27.90) (25.71) (25.75) (25.87) (25.88)
Z - Score -7.533 -7.432 -9.700* -9.604* -10.32** -10.18** -9.735* -9.558*
(4.606) (4.634) (5.038) (5.056) (5.021) (5.049) (5.005) (5.041)
Profitability -213.1*** -212.3*** -213.7*** -214.3*** -188.6*** -188.0*** -156.9*** -155.0***
(51.04) (51.29) (56.23) (56.54) (53.03) (53.26) (51.41) (51.60)
CAPX/Sales 5.783 7.147 12.61 13.53 5.529 6.908 1.178 2.778
(11.84) (11.89) (12.60) (12.62) (12.22) (12.28) (12.23) (12.27)
FCF/Assets -13.38 -12.61 -21.93 -21.62 -20.51 -19.81 -23.60 -22.52
(17.48) (17.46) (19.82) (19.71) (20.24) (20.18) (19.92) (19.92)
Beta 2.291* 2.302* 2.218 2.267 2.497* 2.505* 2.290 2.295
(1.237) (1.246) (1.716) (1.737) (1.514) (1.515) (1.448) (1.448)
Earnings Quality -825.6*** -819.6***
(218.4) (218.1)
Earnings Quality (Method 2) -0.0454 -0.0463
(0.0297) (0.0295)
Earnings Predictability -0.201 -0.223
(2.238) (2.242)
Earnings Persistence -44.75*** -45.89***
(12.62) (12.78)
Diversification 2.152 2.334 2.460 2.662 2.664 2.888 2.228 2.438
(3.974) (3.980) (4.288) (4.298) (3.959) (3.968) (4.087) (4.095)
Bank Characteristics
Equator Bank -12.12** -9.377* -11.73** -14.10**
(5.394) (5.660) (5.312) (5.484)
Equator Bank × Sin 53.05*** 55.72*** 57.15*** 60.27***
(14.76) (15.37) (14.46) (14.10)
Relationship (Number) -20.70 -20.04 -17.48 -17.03 -21.63 -21.05 -24.23* -23.60
(14.59) (14.69) (16.04) (16.14) (14.50) (14.58) (14.31) (14.38)
Constant 880.7*** 887.8*** 1,057*** 1,057*** 1,051*** 1,050*** 1,058*** 1,056***
(70.74) (69.80) (103.8) (103.1) (93.34) (92.93) (93.34) (92.96)
Observations 3,783 3,783 3,305 3,305 3,818 3,818 3,716 3,716
Adjusted R-squared 0.444 0.445 0.444 0.445 0.436 0.437 0.435 0.437
Rating Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower
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Table 2.9: Full DealScan Sample - Industry Fixed Effects
We estimate the cross-sectional relation between loan spreads and firm characteristics, loan characteristics, and bank
characteristics for the full DealScan sample. In this sample, firm characteristics are limited to credit ratings and borrower
sales. Our main variable of interest is the sin dummy variable (Sin). We control for industry by including industry fixed
effects, instead of our choice of Comparable. This table is a replica of Table 2.2 - Full DealScan Sample with industry fixed
effects. We control for loan characteristics following existing literature. Lastly, we control for whether banks are equator
banks. Banks make an explicit social association by joining the equator principles, allowing for the assumption that these
banks shun socially irresponsible products and/or the producing firm. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; ***, **
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sin -33.54*** -17.18* -24.30** -28.54**
(9.293) (9.575) (9.729) (11.80)
Size -4.362*** -3.847***
(1.234) (1.237)
Bank Characteristics
Equator Bank -28.03***
(2.391)
Equator Bank × Sin 16.78
(19.33)
Constant 306.2*** 1,318*** 1,323*** 1,299***
(5.841) (37.67) (35.93) (36.01)
Observations 86,513 45,423 37,310 37,310
Adjusted R-squared 0.128 0.289 0.296 0.299
Rating Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower borrower borrower
effect remains economically and statistically significant in most cases. This shows that
our results are not driven by our choice of industry control.
We also want to make sure that our results are not being driven by a specific period
in our sample. Tables 2.11 and 2.12 show the results for a sub-period starting in 1993
and ending in 2012. We choose this time period, because coverage of the syndicated loans
significantly increases starting in 1993 relative to previous years. As results show, the
sin effect is not being driven by a phenomenon early in the sample nor by any potential
biases due to reduced database coverage, as the results remain robust to those shown in
previous results.
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Table 2.10: Compustat Sample - Industry Fixed Effects
We estimate the cross-sectional relation between loan spreads and firm characteristics, loan characteristics, and bank
characteristics for the matched DealScan-Compustat sample. This sample includes a wide array of firm-level control
variables. Our main variable of interest is the sin dummy variable (Sin). We control for industry by including industry
fixed effects, instead of our choice of Comparable. This table is a replica of Table 2.2 - Full DealScan Sample with
industry fixed effects. We control for different firm level characteristics known to affect loan spreads. We also control
for loan characteristics following existing literature. Lastly, we control for whether banks are equator banks. Banks
make an explicit social association by joining the equator principles, allowing for the assumption that these banks shun
socially irresponsible products and/or the producing firm. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
Borrower Characteristics
Sin -13.70 -30.72***
(9.486) (11.10)
Size 10.39** 10.70**
(4.830) (4.873)
Tangibility 7.724 7.746
(8.455) (8.458)
Leverage 99.31*** 99.65***
(16.35) (16.40)
Z - Score -12.13*** -12.05***
(4.272) (4.279)
Profitability -197.4*** -197.1***
(45.15) (45.34)
FCF/Assets -25.62* -26.04*
(15.45) (15.25)
CAPX/Sales -4.777 -4.475
(7.127) (7.081)
Bank Characteristics
Equator Bank -8.260*
(4.712)
Equator Bank × Sin 53.01***
(14.44)
Constant 1,230*** 1,228***
(82.81) (82.91)
Observations 5,446 5,446
Adjusted R-squared 0.442 0.443
Rating Dummies Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes
Purpose Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower
29
2. SOCIAL NORMS AND BANK LENDING
Table 2.11: Full DealScan Sub-Sample
We estimate the cross-sectional relation between loan spreads and firm characteristics, loan characteristics, and bank
characteristics for a sub-period (1993-2012) of the DealScan sample. In this sample, firm characteristics are limited to
credit ratings and borrower sales. Our main variable of interest is the sin dummy variable (Sin). In order to maintain
a parsimonious specification, while still controlling for industry effects, we include a comparable industry dummy (Com-
parable). The Comparable dummy variable takes unity for firms in comparable industries, i.e. industry group 2 (food)
and 3 (soda) and 43 (meals, restaurants, hotels, and motels), and when firms are sin firms. This allows for an immediate
test of differences between sin firms and firms in comparable industries. Any comparable firm will have β2 mean spread
in bp. A sin firm on the other hand will have β1 + β2 on average. This means that the difference between sin, and all
comparable firms equals (β1 + β2)− β2 = β1. We control for loan characteristics following existing literature. Lastly, we
control for whether banks are equator banks. Banks make an explicit social association by joining the equator principles,
allowing for the assumption that these banks shun socially irresponsible products and/or the producing firm. Clustered
standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Borrower Characteristics
Sin -16.12* -13.37 -23.33** -29.17**
(9.501) (9.285) (9.402) (11.44)
Comparable 4.428 12.95*** 15.39*** 16.44***
(4.370) (4.904) (5.258) (5.267)
Size -5.753*** -5.436***
(1.274) (1.274)
Bank Characteristics
Equator Bank -23.79***
(2.423)
Equator Bank × Sin 18.41
(19.59)
Constant 321.6*** 1,508*** 1,427*** 1,410***
(8.251) (40.95) (41.59) (41.63)
Observations 76,348 39,973 33,032 33,032
Adjusted R-squared 0.134 0.309 0.317 0.319
Rating Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower borrower borrower
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Table 2.12: Compustat Sub-Sample
We estimate the cross-sectional relation between loan spreads and firm characteristics, loan characteristics, and bank
characteristics for a sub-period (1993-2012) of the matched DealScan-Compustat sample. This sample includes a wide
array of firm-level control variables. Our main variable of interest is the sin dummy variable (Sin). In order to main-
tain a parsimonious specification, while still controlling for industry effects, we include a comparable industry dummy
(Comparable). The Comparable dummy variable takes unity for firms in comparable industries, i.e. industry group 2
(food) and 3 (soda) and 43 (meals, restaurants, hotels, and motels), and when firms are sin firms. This allows for an
immediate test of differences between sin firms and firms in comparable industries. Any comparable firm will have β2
mean spread in bp. A sin firm on the other hand will have β1 + β2 on average. This means that the difference between
sin, and all comparable firms equals (β1 + β2) − β2 = β1. We control for different firm level characteristics known to
affect loan spreads. We also control for loan characteristics following existing literature. Lastly, we control for whether
banks are equator banks. Banks make an explicit social association by joining the equator principles, allowing for the
assumption that these banks shun socially irresponsible products and/or the producing firm. Clustered standard errors
in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
Borrower Charateristics
Sin -36.21* -52.84**
(19.95) (21.79)
Comparable 25.61 26.36
(19.50) (19.62)
Size 10.59** 10.78**
(5.176) (5.189)
Tangibility 14.60** 14.26**
(6.931) (6.910)
Leverage 104.9*** 105.4***
(17.21) (17.25)
Z - Score -9.450** -9.428**
(3.899) (3.897)
Profitability -197.4*** -196.4***
(44.68) (44.87)
FCF/Assets -25.19* -25.70*
(14.99) (14.81)
CAPX/Sales -3.238 -2.876
(7.623) (7.627)
Bank Characteristics
Equator Bank -9.333**
(4.520)
Equator Bank × Sin 55.65***
(14.30)
Constant 1,211*** 1,209***
(76.96) (77.02)
Observations 5,221 5,221
Adjusted R-squared 0.450 0.450
Rating Dummies Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes
Purpose Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower
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2.7 Conclusion
Our investigation focuses on the effects of social norms in the bank debt market by
looking at the three industries identified by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) as sin firms,
namely alcohol, tobacco, and gaming. We compare the spreads on the loans of sin firms
to the spreads on the loans of other, comparable, firms. If banks are norm-constrained
institutions, then we would expect them to charge sin firms a higher spread on their loans.
Alternatively, if banks are not norm-constrained, or neutral, then we would expect sin
firms to have spreads similar to otherwise similar firms. Contrary to our expectations, we
find that spreads on loans to borrowers in sin industries are consistently and significantly
lower than spreads on loans to otherwise comparable firms. That is, we find that banks
give sin firms preferential treatment, even after controlling for general firm, loan, and
bank factors known to affect cost of debt.
In an attempt to explain these results, we control for various aspects which have been
shown to affect sin firms and/or loan conditions. We start by controlling for earnings
quality, following Kim, Park, and Wier (2012). Our results show that although better
earnings quality does indeed have a negative relationship with loan spread, it does not
explain away the lower spreads sin firms pay. We continue by controlling for bank-borrower
relationships. Again, when there is such a relationship, spreads are on average lower,
however, the sin effect persists. Third, we control for firm beta. Here we follow the premise
that when firms are anti-cyclical, they might be seen as a hedge opportunity by banks.
We find that beta is positively related to loan spreads, but controlling for this does not
eliminate the negative sin effect on spreads. Lastly, we control for organizational structure,
following the theory that corporate diversification is negatively related to a firm’s cost of
capital. Our evidence is inconclusive regarding the effect of diversification on spreads. In
the Full DealScan sample, we find that corporate diversification is negatively related to
spreads in a significant manner. These results are not supported by the Compustat sample
however, where we find no significant relation between diversification and spreads. More
importantly, controlling for diversification does not affect our sin coefficient. Our results
remain qualitatively and quantitatively in line with our previous findings, which provide
evidence of preferential treatment by banks to sin firms in the form of lower spreads. One
potential explanation for our results, although not formally tested in this paper, is that
banks know the true underlying value of their borrowers. Banks are potentially smarter
than investors in their estimation of risk and are potentially better informed than market
participants. One of the main reasons for this higher level of information hypothesis is
that banks perform due diligence prior to lending to borrowers and therefore make more
informed decisions and are less likely to overestimate risk. In conclusion, we show that
sin firms enjoy lower spreads on their loans relative to otherwise similar firms. Our results
remain qualitatively similar across different samples and different specifications.
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Chapter 3
Split Ratings in the Syndicated Loan
Market∗
3.1 Introduction
Loan interest rates are set in accordance with the perceived riskiness of borrowers. In-
formation on this riskiness is limited and difficult to obtain. Due to this information
scarcity, banks face uncertainty in their assessment. As a result “good” borrowers may
be overcharged and the underestimation of the risk of “bad” borrowers may result in too
low rates.
In practice, the existence of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) seems to reduce this
information uncertainty greatly. CRAs are specialized information gatherers that evaluate
the riskiness inherent to a country, corporation or specific debt instrument (Bavaria,
2002). According to Frost (2007), large CRAs play two key important roles in capital
markets. First, they play a valuation role through information dissemination to market
participants. In this role, CRAs gather and analyze information relevant for assessing
credit quality, and provide markets with the results of their analyses. The second role of
CRAs is that of facilitating contracting, because letter ratings are seen as efficient credit
quality benchmarks. These ratings are used widely, and rating-based constraints appear
in loan agreements, bond covenants and other financial agreements, making their effects
widespread and significant. The increasing worldwide presence of these agencies suggests
that their services represent a valuable information source to creditors and investors (Sufi,
2009).
These credit ratings are useful for both the parties seeking and providing capital. For
the former, credit ratings improve marketability (Becker and Milbourn, 2011), and non-
speculative grade ratings open the door for investments from large financial institutions
(Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits, 2005). The providers of capital use ratings as an indicator
of risk and likely repayment of securities. They supplement, or are a fundamental input,
∗This chapter is co-authored with Stefanie Kleimeier (Maastricht University, University of Stellenbosch
Business School and Open University).
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in their own credit risk assessments. According to Bongaerts, De Jong, and Driessen
(2011), credit ratings reflect the creditworthiness of an issue or issuer. Rating agencies
do however, have some discretion in the philosophy underlying their rating system and
are not required to make their rating methodology public. More importantly, Jorion, Liu,
and Shi (2005) posit that credit analysts at rating agencies have access to confidential
information that is not available to other securities professionals. This, in turn, has two
effects, one is that the ratings of these agencies are impossible to measure using solely
public information, and second, this potentially increases the value of ratings to the public.
While the repeated interactions between banks and firms does provide banks with some
non-public information, it is likely that the CRAs still have more information than the
banks themselves, such that their ratings may more accurately reflect the inherent risks.
Ratings are also widely used in determining loan conditions. For example, Sufi (2007)
and Asquith, Beatty, and Weber (2005) state that loans often have pricing that is mainly
dependent on the borrower’s credit rating. Sufi (2007) also posits that anecdotal evidence
from practitioner interviews suggests that the existence of a third-party credit rating
makes obtaining loan approvals easier. Bosch and Steffen (2011) find that credit rating
certification is critical to the supply of debt financing. Faulkender and Petersen (2005)
show that issuer credit ratings are associated with higher leverage ratios. Sufi (2009)
finds that loan ratings allow borrowers to expand their set of creditors, in line with the
argument that credit ratings are critical in the attraction of investors without specialized
monitoring or screening skills.
An indication of the importance of credit ratings in our sample is that credit ratings
alone explain 53% of variation in loan spreads. Confirming that credit ratings play a sig-
nificant role in determining loan pricing. The availability of credit ratings is particularly
important in syndicated loans, as it allows lead arrangers to easily communicate informa-
tion about the borrower’s credit risk to potential participant banks in the syndicate. As
such, having a credit rating decreases the uncertainty about the firm’s credit risk, such
that rates may be set more accurately.
The information role of credit ratings is, however, conditional on ratings across differ-
ent agencies concurring. When CRAs do not agree on their assessment of credit risk of
the borrower, resulting in split ratings, the conflicting information fails to reduce uncer-
tainty on borrower risk. Although there are other information sources available, credit
ratings are the only source which require no investment by credit providers and are easily
available to all banks in a syndicate. When uncertainty on the credit worthiness of a bor-
rower remains largely unresolved due to split ratings, banks might require an additional
premium to provide capital.
To that effect, in this paper we analyze the role of (un)certainty resulting from credit
ratings in syndicated loan pricing. Banks that are not familiar with the borrower will be
less likely, and less willing, to provide capital (Sufi, 2007) when it is difficult to correctly
estimate the riskiness of a borrower, except at a higher price. We call this premium, which
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is solely dependent on the level of uncertainty banks face when determining the credit
risk of the borrower, the uncertainty premium.
Split ratings have been widely documented in the bond market, where research finds
that approximately 13% of bond ratings are split at the letter level and 50% are split at
the notch level. In our sample, 46% of borrowers with two ratings are split rated and of
these 6% are split at the letter level. Morgan (2000) shows that disagreement between
rating agencies can be an indication of information opacity of the borrower to the market.
Livingston and Zhou (2010) find that information uncertainty, as proxied by split ratings,
is priced by bond holders.
The effect of split ratings on bank loans is especially interesting, because bank loans
offer an insight into dynamics not present in the bond market. We exploit the fact that
we know who the providers of credit are, allowing us to study the effect of ratings in
the presence of other information sources, such as creditor-debtor relationships and bank
monitoring ability. This allows us to more accurately determine the weight of ratings in
the pricing process, and the importance of ratings for bank loans.
We develop a theoretical framework, which demonstrates that the uncertainty in the
riskiness of the firm will lead to banks charging an uncertainty premium to split rated
firms. The theory also provides a rationale explaining why firms still opt for two ratings
rather than one, despite the risk of split ratings. If borrowers believe their ratings will
corroborate each other, obtaining a second rating would be optimal as it results in a
discount relative to a single rating.
We empirically test the predictions of the theoretical model in the syndicated loan
market. We start by investigating the question in the pooled cross-section, where we
estimate the effect of split ratings on spreads. We also decompose the effect into different
levels of uncertainty, as measured by the gap between ratings, led by the predictions of
our model that the magnitude of the uncertainty premium is directly proportional to the
degree of information uncertainty. We acknowledge that there are numerous potential
sources of endogeneity. The main potential source is that rated firms may be fundamen-
tally different from non-rated firms, for example they are bigger firms with larger loans.
Additionally, some might argue that firms with two ratings are, in turn, different from
firms with only one rating. We consider two complimentary strategies to deal with the
potential endogeneity. First, we run all our specifications on both a sample of all firms,
i.e. all firms with one rating and two ratings, and on a sub sample of only firms with two
ratings. Second, we use a difference-in-difference (DD) approach to estimate the premium
on loans of firms switching from two equal ratings to split ratings, and those switching
from split ratings to two equal ratings. This allows us to more clearly provide evidence
of a causal relationship, albeit on a much smaller sample.
The identity of credit providers is known in the syndicated loan market, and they can
build a relationship with the borrower over successive loans, obtaining private informa-
tion, and as a consequence potentially reducing the uncertainty they face. We can observe
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the effect of relationship lending on the importance of third party information sources.
Repeated borrower-lender transactions have been shown to lead to lower loan spreads
with stronger effects when borrower transparency is low (Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and
Srinivasan, 2011). We expect a strong borrower-lender relationship to reduce the uncer-
tainty premium that split rated borrowers experience. Lead banks, which have repeatedly
lent to the same borrowers, gather private information and will therefore have a stronger
prior on the creditworthiness of the borrower. This private information will presumably
decrease the importance of credit ratings for these particular borrowers. Consequently,
we think split ratings will have a weaker effect on spreads when there is a borrower-lender
relationship resulting from private information at these lenders’ disposal. This private
information will lead to lower uncertainty on the true underlying rating of the borrower.
Second, we can look at the structure of the syndicate to see whether or not a syndicate
headed by a reputable lead arranger is better able to accumulate information and effec-
tively communicate this information to syndicate members, thereby potentially making
ratings less important. A syndicated loan is set up by the lead arranger, which in turn
sells pieces of the loan to other participant banks. Lead arrangers sign a preliminary
contract, ‘mandate’, where they provide the borrower with an amount they are willing
to lend and a spread range, which also specifies collateral, covenants and fees. Lead
arrangers proceed with the search for participant lenders. The effect of lead arranger
reputation plays an important role in the syndicate formation, as reputation can reduce
the problem of information asymmetry in a syndicate (Sufi, 2007). If a loan to a borrower
is headed by a reputable bank, participant banks may deem credit ratings less important
given the certification of quality that the reputable lead arranger represents. Participant
banks will also factor in the information signaled by the reputable lead arranger, which
might, in turn, make credit ratings and particularly split ratings, a less important factor
in the pricing process. If a borrower has split ratings, implying that information about
the borrower is ambiguous, lead arranger certification could potentially offset some of this
uncertainty, resulting in a lower premium. Participant banks might shift their appraisal
of the true underlying creditworthiness of a borrower if lead arranger certification weights
heavily enough.
Finally, based on our theoretical model, as well as previous research, we expect the
uncertainty premium to be increasing in the level of risk aversion. We examine whether
the uncertainty premium is sensitive to the level of risk aversion in the market. We argue
that banks will likely require a larger premium to lend to informationally risky borrowers
during times of high risk aversion. We investigate this by looking at the uncertainty
premium during the global financial crisis as defined by NBER. Next to looking at the
global economic crisis, we also specifically control for the time-varying risk aversion in the
market. Overall, our results show that banks do indeed care more about the informational
uncertainty during high risk aversion periods, as evidenced by a higher required premium
to lend to these borrowers during such times.
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The rest of this paper is organized as followed. In section 3.2 we develop a theoretical
model to determine the predictions we test with the empirical section. In section 3.3, we
discuss the data we use followed by the methodology in section 3.4. Sections 3.5 and 3.6
present the empirical results and we conclude in section 3.7.
3.2 Theory
This section proposes a general theory on the uncertainty premium firms face based on
their ratings. Our model is loosely based the model of Sharpe (1990). We consider three
borrower types, H(igh), M(edium) and L(ow), where the type refers to their probability of
success (or one minus probability of default) P = [PH PM PL], with PH > PM > PL.
For simplicity we will assume that PM =
PH+PL
2
. For banks it is typically unknown of
which type the firm is, and without any information, they have to base their loan pricing
on population proportions θH , θM , and θL, which sum to one. Again, for simplicity assume
an equal distribution, θq = 1/3 for all q, i.e. θ = [θH θM θL]
′ = [1/3 1/3 1/3]′.
Banks use credit rating agencies to obtain information on borrower types. A bank
updates its beliefs about the firm based on the attached rating, and shifts its assigned
probabilities of firm type θ with the CRAs assessment φ, which is a vector with 1 on the
type assessed by the CRA. We will assume a very strict updating rule, which can easily
be relaxed at the cost of elegance. A single rating will update the beliefs to θ˜ = θ+φ
2
. An
additional rating from a different CRA may be requested to further update the beliefs to
θ˜ = φ1+φ2
2
,where φi denotes the rating of the first or second CRA.
In this set-up the bank’s beliefs θ˜ can have one of three forms. A single rating induces
beliefs that are strongly favored toward one type, with a small probability of it being one
of the others. A twice-rated firm with two equal ratings makes the banks certain the firm
is of that type. However, when φ1 6= φ2 the CRAs cannot agree, the firm obtains a split
rating and the bank is still uncertain about the type of the firm. The beliefs are that the
firm is one of two types with equal probability.
How should banks price these three types of beliefs? Here it should be noted that
this induces two types of uncertainty, which we argue should both be priced. First, the
loan is risky, as there is a non-zero probability of default. Next, the banks (potentially)
face uncertainty on the firm’s quality, and thus probability of default, and as such the
utility derived from a loan provided at any given rate. To analyze the relative risk premia
we analyze four examples. We consider a firm that has been issued an M rating by a
single agency, such that θ˜Single M Rating = [1/6 2/3 1/6]
′, a firm that’s been issued two
M ratings, such that θ˜Two M Rating = [0 1 0]
′ and a firm that has been issued an L and
a H rating, θ˜Split L/H Rating = [1/2 0 1/2]
′.
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3.2.1 No Risk Aversion
First consider the break-even rate when assuming no risk aversion for banks. At this
loan rate, the gross cost of fund per unit loaned, (1 + r˜) equals the bank’s expected gross
return (assuming zero recovery rate); r satisfies (1 + r˜) = pe(1 + r), where pe is the bank’s
expected probability of success pe = θ˜′P . Note that for all four set-ups the assumptions
imply that pe = PH+PL
2
. That is, a risk-neutral bank would treat all these firms equally,
and set the rate to r = r˜+1−p
e
pe
. In the empirical section we will use controls such that
firms have the same pe conditional on observables to obtain a similar concept.
3.2.2 No Type Uncertainty
We now introduce risk aversion. The payoff of any given loan can be written as a lottery
Lq with two states, success and failure, which have payoff 0 and (1 + r) with probabilities
(1− Pq) and Pq, respectively. The bank then faces a compound lottery LC(θ˜), which has
lotteries Lq with probability θ˜q. So while the expected probability of success is equal,
the probability of being in different states differs amongst all, so the bank faces different
compound lotteries in each of the four scenarios.
We assume a simple utility function U(W ) = E(W ) − γ
2(1+γ)
V ar(W ), where W is
the payoff of the unit investment, and γ is the coefficient of relative risk-aversion. The
expected wealth of each lottery Lq equals Pq(1 + r). Their variance equals Pq(1 + r −
Pq(1 + r))
2 + (1−Pq)(0−Pq(1 + r))2 = (1 + r)2Pq(1−Pq), such that typically V ar(LH) <
V ar(LM) < V ar(LL) (as long as PL > 0.5).
We can write down the utility of each of the three lotteries.
U(LL) = PL(1 + r)− γ
2(1 + γ)
(PL)(1− PL)(1 + r)2
U(LM) =
1
2
(PL + PH)(1 + r)− γ
2(1 + γ)
[
1
2
(PH + PL − PHPL)− 1
4
(P 2H + P
2
L)
]
(1 + r)2
U(LH) = PH(1 + r)− γ
2(1 + γ)
(PH)(1− PH)(1 + r)2
(3.1)
It can easily be shown that, U(LL) < U(LM) < U(LH). Moreover, given PM =
PL+PH
2
and
PL > 0.5, we can write U(LM)− U(LH)+U(LL)2 = γ2(1+γ)
[
1
2
(PHPL)− 14(P 2H + P 2L)
]
(1 + r)2,
which is negative as long as PL < PH . In other words, U(LM) <
U(LH)+U(LL)
2
.
To conclude, if the bank is certain of the type of firm, it will set the rates to their
utility break even rate U(1 + r˜) = U(Lq), where rL > rM > rH , which are the break even
rates corresponding to each type as set in section 3.2.1.
3.2.3 Type Uncertainty
Now assume the bank is uncertain about the type of the firm, but it has beliefs, based on
the CRA ratings, of θ˜. The bank faces what is essentially a compound lottery and has to
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set a rate to hedge in the possibility of the firm being of the lower type.
For any belief θ˜, the expected utility equals
E[U(LC(θ˜))] = θ˜LU(LL) + θ˜MU(LM) + θ˜HU(LH),
and its variance equals
V ar[U(LC(θ˜))] = θ˜L(U(LL)− E[U(LC(θ˜))])2
+ θ˜M(U(LM)− E[U(LC(θ˜))])2
+ θ˜H(U(LH)− E[U(LC(θ˜))])2.
Using the utility function U and the utility of each lottery (3.1), we can determine the
ordering in utility of the three beliefs for a given rate r. We can then again, using the
utility function U determine the expected utility. The expressions are rather complicated,
but it can easily be shown that
U(Lc(θ˜Two nonsplit) > U(Lc(θ˜One rating) > U(Lc(θ˜Two Split) (3.2)
As a direct consequence of this, the rates charged on the loan have an inverse relationship,
with the split rating obtaining the highest premium.
Obtaining a rating gives a credible signal to the banks on the firm’s quality. The
reduction in uncertainty the bank faces is priced in the loan, and the firm gets a lower
rate. The theory provides a reason for obtaining not just one, but two ratings. Two equal
ratings further reduce uncertainty, which does not have to be priced by the bank, lowering
the loan rate. However, when the second rating differs from the first, the uncertainty will
lead the bank to charge a much higher premium.
3.3 Data
We obtain the data from Loan Pricing Corporation’s DealScan, which contains detailed
information on loan contract terms, lead arrangers, and participant lenders. According
to DealScan, their data are primarily collected from Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) filings. Our starting sample includes information on 110,641 completed loans issued
between 1993 and 2014 where information on spreads is available. The data include the
spread borrowers pay on their loans, the all in spread drawn (AISD), in addition to an
expansive list of loan characteristics, syndicate information, and borrower information
such as borrower name, industry, credit ratings and borrower sales. We start our analysis
by investigating our question using only the data available in DealScan. Given that we are
interested in the effect of credit ratings, and their differences, on loan spreads, DealScan
provides us with the most important data to answer our question. This follows from
Sufi (2007) and Asquith, Beatty, and Weber (2005) who argue that syndicated loans
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often have pricing that is mainly dependent on the borrower’s credit rating. We use
senior secured issuer credit ratings at issuance from Moody’s and S&P, which are the
two most represented CRAs in general and in DealScan in particular. We transform
the letter ratings into an ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 21, at the notch level, see
Table 3.1. In general, ratings from Moody’s and S&P are used interchangeably, therefore
this transformation to an ordinal variable and the comparison should not represent a
problem. In addition, in our sample ratings from the two agencies carry similar credit
risk, as evidenced by similar spreads per rating class across agencies shown in Table 3.1.
In order to be able to compare the ratings of borrowers, especially borrowers with more
than one rating, we construct a measure of the average rating for each borrower when
both Moody’s and S&P are available. We do not find systematic differences in ratings
between Moody’s and S&P in our sample. The average of Moody’s is 10.46, median is
10 and standard deviation is 4.44, while the average of S&P is 10.74, the median is 11
and the standard deviation is 4.21. More specifically, Table 3.1 shows the average rating
per class per agency, and whether they are significantly different from each other. As the
table shows, only 3 of the 21 classes show significant differences. This shows that in most
instances ratings by Moody’s and S&P are not significantly different from each other in
our sample.
Next, we match Dealscan to Compustat in order to further control for borrower char-
acteristics. This allows us to control for a multitude of firm financial information that
have been shown to affect spreads. We control for firm, bank, and loan characteristics
following previous literature, a detailed explanation of variables and their description can
be found in Appendix A.
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3.2 for different samples, in order to compare
across the different groups of interest. The first column shows the full dataset, that is, all
observations for which AISD is non-missing and at least one rating is available. The second
column shows the results for the sample of firms which have two available ratings, which
are split. Finally, the third column shows the descriptives for borrowers which have two
ratings, but are not split rated. The differences in spread for firms in these different groups
is clear in this table. Firms with split ratings pay significantly higher spreads than firms
with no split ratings, and firms with only one rating. This is in line with our theoretical
model, which predicts that having a split rating leads to information uncertainty in the
market that harms the borrower in the form of higher spreads. Importantly, differences
for other variables across groups are not significant. Thus, on average, firms with split
ratings are not fundamentally different from firms with no split ratings.
3.4 Estimating the effect of Split Ratings
The empirical methodology attempts to identify the causal effect of split ratings on the
required risk premia in the form of loan spreads. The ideal situation to determine the
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Table 3.1: Rating Conversion
This table presents the Moody’s and S&P ratings and their transformation to an ordinal scale. The last column presents
the p-values of the t-test on the paired spreads being equal. Significant differences are presented in bold.
All rated firms Twice rated firms
Numerical Rating Rating Mean St. Dev Rating Mean St.Dev p-value Difference
1 Aaa 38.491 79.233 AAA 40.417 66.764 0.762
2 Aa1 29.511 26.033 AA+ 35.630 33.919 0.200
3 Aa2 50.775 90.351 AA 46.113 75.774 0.557
4 Aa3 42.587 74.266 AA- 41.308 67.068 0.797
5 A1 43.579 60.937 A+ 45.980 53.901 0.453
6 A2 47.154 50.319 A 50.559 57.159 0.097
7 A3 59.401 54.818 A- 61.350 52.434 0.395
8 Baa1 82.987 67.668 BBB+ 81.239 66.001 0.503
9 Baa2 100.448 69.758 BBB 101.492 70.760 0.647
10 Baa3 136.708 85.642 BBB- 134.252 83.283 0.406
11 Ba1 182.356 108.849 BB+ 175.692 103.346 0.187
12 Ba2 208.653 113.096 BB 201.788 119.322 0.177
13 Ba3 271.301 148.332 BB- 249.284 132.428 0.000
14 B1 311.002 149.872 B+ 295.052 145.013 0.000
15 B2 355.334 185.239 B 348.247 182.455 0.238
16 B3 327.994 163.894 B- 322.928 159.819 0.486
17 Caa1 377.061 180.014 CCC+ 368.959 184.463 0.481
18 Caa2 399.988 190.158 CCC 381.455 188.150 0.359
19 Caa3 388.056 179.427 CCC- 389.773 200.498 0.956
20 Ca 455.278 242.482 CC/C 450.114 278.089 0.914
21 C 467.986 284.984 D 448.739 238.312 0.693
causal relation would be random assignment of split ratings to firms. If split ratings are
randomly assigned, then the specification that estimates the causal effect of (split) ratings
on outcome Spread of firm i would be:
Spreadi = α + β × SPLITi + i (3.3)
With random assignment, the coefficient β represents the causal effect of having a
split rating on outcome Spread. While this specification is indicative of the effect of split
ratings, in reality, at least two factors limit the reliability of these results. First, some
firms have only one rating, and as such, cannot have split ratings. Whether or not to get
two ratings is a choice by the firms, and it is difficult to argue that the choice to obtain
two ratings is not influenced by the possibility of having a split rating or not. Second,
firms that obtain split ratings may be fundamentally different from firms that obtain two
equal ratings and similarly, firms that obtain one rating might be fundamentally different
from firms that obtain two ratings. In either situation we have to control for the possible
endogeneity, as standard estimates of β are biased.
Our analysis therefore consists of two main specifications. First we consider a gen-
eral cross-sectional setting in which we can use all loan information we have. Here, we
can compare the pricing of loans to split rated borrowers with otherwise similar loans,
controlling for a long list of characteristics such as the borrower’s rating or the loan’s
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Figure 3.1: Empirical Assumption
This graph shows spreads as a function of ratings. We make the economically motivated restriction to impose a polynomial
relationship, which is supported by data as evidenced by this figure.
size and maturity etc. Second, we attempt to more clearly pin down the causal effect
of obtaining a split rating by using a difference-in-difference (DD) setup. Transforming
the DealScan data into a format such that we can estimate a DD results in a significant
reduction of loans used for estimation, but allows us to estimate the causal effect, as we
can specifically look at the premium firms have to pay on new loans when their ratings
change from non-split to split and from split to non-split.
3.4.1 Ratings and spreads
Our methodology allows us to specifically see the effect of having a split rating relative
to having a non-split rating. According to our theoretical model, when a borrower has
a split rating, in a world with no information uncertainty and with no risk-aversion, the
loan should be priced at the same rate as if the borrower would have the average of both
ratings. However, in a world where information is priced very heavily, and where agents
are risk averse, having a split rating will likely increase spreads as the banks will require
an uncertainty premium relative to a loan of a borrower who has the average rating with
certainty.
Hence, we define the cost of split ratings as the difference in spreads between a loan of
a split-rated borrower, and an otherwise similar loan to an otherwise similar firm with a
single rating or non-split two ratings with equal average as the split ratings. For example,
when a borrower has two ratings, one of the value A and one of the value BBB, we want
to compare its loan spread to loans of similar borrowers with an A- rating, which is equal
to the average of the two ratings for the split rated borrower.
It is clear that the correct specification of the relation between ratings and spreads
is vital to accurately measure the effect of split ratings. Since ratings are a discrete
variable, the standard in the literature is to include rating dummies. For the analysis of
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split ratings this leads to a problem. When a firm has a one-notch split, the average of
the two ratings is in between two ratings and we cannot observe any non-split loans with
equal average rating to compare them to. For this reason we opt for a specification in
which we put the ratings on an ordinal scale instead (an overview is provided in Table
3.1), and include the average rating and its square term in a regression set-up. Figure
3.1 shows the relationship between spread and ratings, which in turn also justifies our
choice for a polynomial relationship. This choice has two advantages. First, we easily
solve the problem of one-notch splits. Second, for some of the lower ratings very few
observations are available, such that a dummy set-up would not always lead to higher
spreads for lower ratings. This is stricly a small sample issue, as evidenced by the larger
confidence bounds. Imposing the polynomial relationship essentially amounts to imposing
the economic constraint that this should be the case.1
3.4.2 Cross-sectional analysis
First we estimate the difference in spreads between loans to split-rated borrowers and oth-
erwise similar loans to non-split rated borrowers. To that effect we consider the following
baseline specification
Spreadi = α + β1SPLITi + β2AverageRatingi + β3AverageRating
2
i + β
′xi + i, (3.4)
where SPLITi is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the borrower has a split
rating, and x is a vector of control variables at the loan, borrower, and bank level. The
coefficient of the SPLITi variable can be interpreted as the difference between the actual
spread and the estimated spread if both ratings would have been the same. If spreads
on split rated loans are determined by the average of the two ratings available, then the
coefficient on SPLITi should be zero. If however, lenders view split ratings as information
uncertainty and require an uncertainty premium, then we expect to find a positive and
significant coefficient on SPLITi. All specifications throughout the paper have clustered
standard errors at the borrower level to take cross-sectional correlations of different loans
to the same borrowers into account.
As a first step towards dealing with the potential endogeneity of firms that are rated
twice versus those that are only rated by one CRA, we present results for all specifications
using both the full sample of all rated firms, i.e. those rated by both CRAs and those
only rated by one, and a sub-sample of only firms with two ratings. The main results are
reported in Table 3.3. Specifications (1) and (2) concern the full sample, i.e. borrowers
1Livingston and Zhou (2010) provide an alternative methodology to deal with the one-notch split
ratings while using rating dummies. They use two regression specifications where first, the superior
rating of a split rated borrower is taken as the rating to that particular borrower, and in a second
specification the inferior rating is used. By taking a weighted average of the two results a split-premium
can be estimated as well. For robustness we include these results in a later section. See Appendix A for
details.
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Table 3.3: Cross-Sectional Analysis
This table presents the results for the cross-sectional analysis. The dependent variable is spread in basis points. The
SPLIT variable takes the value of one if the borrower has split ratings and zero otherwise. A positive coefficient implies
that the bank requires a premium above the spread that corresponds to non-split rated borrower with the same average
rating. The control variables include loan and firm level characteristics. The regressions also include year, industry, and
country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and
* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
All rated firms Twice rated firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Borrower Characteristics
SPLIT 14.56*** 16.37*** 4.927* 10.09***
(2.272) (3.004) (2.592) (3.353)
Average Rating 11.02*** 7.339*** 11.55*** 9.381***
(1.930) (2.448) (2.417) (3.006)
Average Rating2 0.418*** 0.529*** 0.423*** 0.509***
(0.0876) (0.119) (0.114) (0.145)
Leverage 55.62*** 40.80**
(16.49) (20.11)
Profitability -111.0** -83.37
(46.04) (52.94)
Size 0.693 3.136** -0.492 3.074*
(0.955) (1.306) (1.192) (1.578)
Loan Characteristics
Multiple Tranches 14.07*** 12.30*** 15.58*** 12.11***
(2.233) (2.954) (2.676) (3.476)
Termloan 55.16*** 46.08*** 53.66*** 44.05***
(2.222) (3.080) (2.642) (3.417)
Secured 37.54*** 42.11*** 39.33*** 42.72***
(3.250) (4.377) (4.097) (5.312)
Covenant -25.01*** -5.017 -30.80*** -10.59**
(2.888) (4.108) (3.823) (5.229)
Libor base -22.12*** -22.25*** -15.35*** -15.97**
(3.871) (6.054) (4.868) (7.615)
Loan size -11.00*** -11.85*** -10.69*** -10.91***
(1.065) (1.575) (1.348) (1.895)
Maturity -8.169*** -13.08*** -9.654*** -14.57***
(2.026) (2.371) (2.366) (2.774)
Constant 202.9*** 171.4*** 229.6*** 153.7***
(24.97) (38.21) (31.64) (44.84)
Observations 13,835 6,099 9,126 4,449
Adjusted R-squared 0.551 0.586 0.573 0.604
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower borrower borrower
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with both one and two ratings, and (3) and (4) are the same specifications for firms
rated by both CRAs only. (1) and (3) only have control variables provided by DealScan
while the other two specifications show results including firm specific control variables
retrieved from Compustat. The table shows that after controlling for a large variety of
spread determinants, split rated firms pay between 5 and 16 basis points higher spreads
than non-split rated firms. The table also shows that, as expected, the lower the rating,
i.e. the higher the credit risk, the higher the spread. This relationship is non-linear as
evidenced by the positively significant coefficient on the square term of average rating.
Note that the coefficient size difference between the two samples, i.e. all firms with ratings
and firms with two ratings only, is exactly what we expect to see. According to our model,
any single rated firm is likely to obtain a lower second rating. Therefore, the spread we
observe for single rated firms is lower than it should be, biasing downward the estimated
spread per rating and inflating the SPLIT premium. In addition we see that borrowers
with higher leverage will have significantly higher spreads, this is also expected given that
a higher leverage means that a borrower is riskier. For the loan characteristics we see that
spreads are higher on loans where the deal has multiple sub-deals, when the loan is a term
loan, and when the loan is secured. In contrast, having financial covenants, having Libor
as the base rate, having larger loans and a longer maturity all lead to lower spreads.
3.4.2.1 Difference-in-Difference
Next we consider the Difference-in-Difference set-up. We use the general specification
Spreadist = α + γsTreateds + δDst + λt + xist + ist, (3.5)
where Dst ≡ Splits × dt a dummy variable which equals one for the borrower with split
ratings during the time period where it is ‘treated’, and λt are year dummies.
In order to be able to estimate this model we have to transform the DealScan database
into a panel. We proceed as follows. We set up a panel at a yearly frequency2, where
we take the largest loan provided to borrower i within year t as the observation for that
firm’s year. This results in an unbalanced panel with roughly 1500 year-firm observations.
Next we have to determine the treatment and control groups. We consider two analyses
here, firms that go from non-split ratings to split ratings and the reverse, those that go
from split ratings to non-split ratings. For the former, we define the Treated sample as
any firm that during our sample at any point changes from having two equal ratings to
having two unequal ratings. The relevant elements in the Dst matrix are set to 1 starting
from the non-split-year until the split reverses and the ratings are unequal. As a control
group, we consider all firms that have two equal ratings throughout the sample. For the
latter analysis we have the exact reverse situation.
2The results are similar when we consider half-yearly or two-yearly periods.
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Table 3.4: Difference-in-Difference
This table presents the results for the difference-in-difference analysis. We define the treatment as a firm that has
switched from being non-split to split, or vice versa. Correspondingly, the control group is a firm which has been non-
split throughout the entire sample, and the reverse. The dependent variable is spread in basis points. The control
variables include loan and firm level characteristics. The regressions also include year, industry, and country fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Borrower Characteristics
Treatment non-split to split 10.52** 13.18**
(4.882) (6.450)
Control for non-split to split -6.125 -4.182
(5.282) (9.000)
Treatment split to non-split -11.72** -18.67***
(5.843) (6.771)
Control for split to non-split -5.425 -1.970
(4.468) (6.350)
Average Rating 17.53*** 19.36*** 27.24*** 21.80***
(3.878) (5.194) (3.600) (4.739)
Average Rating2 -0.0654 -0.0958 -0.550*** -0.326
(0.176) (0.230) (0.149) (0.202)
Constant -9.939 -69.59 -30.05 -243.6***
(61.85) (80.20) (53.19) (75.22)
Observations 1,110 575 1,503 708
Adjusted R-squared 0.696 0.694 0.623 0.661
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Characteristics No Yes No Yes
Borrower Size Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower borrower borrower
Table 3.4 contains the results of the difference-in-difference analysis. Specifications (1)
and (2) consider the non-split to split treatment, while (3) and (4) report the results of
the reverse. For both specifications we see that there is no significant difference in spreads
between the treated and non-treated firms, apart from the effect of changing from non-
split to split ratings or the reverse. The coefficients on the variable Treatment non-split
to split shows a positive and significant effect on the spread of these borrowers. The effect
is economically significant, ranging from 11 to 14 basis points. These results show that
when a borrower switches from being non-split rated to being split rated, he will face
significantly higher costs of borrowing. This shows the causal effect of split ratings on
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the spreads banks demand from borrowers. Specifications (3) and (4) show the results for
borrowers that switch from having split ratings to having equal ratings from both CRAs.
These results are again in line with the results show above. A borrower will benefit from
significantly lower spreads, between 12 and 20 basis points lower on average, if and when
he switches from having split ratings to having non-split ratings. The results of our DD
approach show that the analysis performed above is capturing the effect of ratings on
spread, given that the magnitude and the signs of the coefficients are both in line and
very similar to those reported above.
3.4.3 The role of split magnitude
All split ratings are not equal. Basic risk-aversion theory dictates that the larger the
uncertainty the higher the required risk premium. As such one would expect that a one-
notch split would require a smaller premium than a two- or three-notch split. Indeed, out
of the almost 11,000 loans for which we have two ratings, nearly 7,000 are split. Over
6,000 of those are one or two notches apart, and only 1% of the differences is more than
three notches. We investigate these dynamics in Table 3.5. The general specifications are
the same as in Table 3.3, with the only difference that the SPLITi dummy is split up
into the number of notch-differences. Specifically, we consider one-, two- and three-notch
splits, and bundle all splits larger than three into the four-notch+ variable in order to
obtain a reasonable amount of observations. The table shows that across specifications,
the split-premium is increasing in the magnitude of the split. The results are mostly
significant, except in specification (3), and in general there is an increasing trend in the
premium for larger splits. These results also give us some insight into the risk aversion
of the average bank. For example, specification four shows that banks charge split rated
borrowers approximately 7 basis points higher spreads on their loans relative to non-split
rated borrowers. Similarly, borrowers with two-notch splits have 11 basis points higher
spreads than those with one notch difference, and those with three notch splits have 22
basis points higher spreads than those with two-notch splits. The results coincide with
our expectation that the larger the split, the larger the premium banks demand. Four
splits or more lead to a premium of 40 basis points to split rated borrowers, which is both
economically and statistically significant.
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Table 3.5: Notch Level Split Ratings
This table presents the results for the cross-sectional analysis at the notch level. The difference between the Moody’s and
the S&P rating for each borrower is calculated and a dummy variable captures the effect of a split size. The dependent
variable is spread in basis points. The control variables include loan and firms level characteristics. The regressions also
include year, industry, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Robust standard errors
in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
All rated firms Twice rated firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Borrower Characteristics
SPLIT one 12.67*** 12.48*** 3.452 6.804*
(2.491) (3.200) (2.732) (3.529)
SPLIT two 13.42*** 17.23*** 3.528 11.31**
(3.880) (4.793) (4.192) (5.221)
SPLIT three 17.97** 29.47*** 8.252 22.26**
(7.553) (10.18) (7.702) (10.02)
SPLIT four+ 43.13*** 49.56*** 32.46*** 39.76**
(10.32) (15.81) (10.39) (15.54)
Average Rating 11.25*** 7.473*** 12.08*** 9.656***
(1.939) (2.441) (2.434) (2.999)
Average Rating2 0.404*** 0.515*** 0.392*** 0.485***
(0.0879) (0.118) (0.115) (0.144)
Leverage 55.23*** 40.87**
(16.39) (19.90)
Profitability -107.8** -80.09
(46.06) (53.14)
Size 0.555 2.961** -0.704 2.837*
(0.951) (1.305) (1.186) (1.575)
Loan Characteristics
Multiple Tranches 14.08*** 11.99*** 15.60*** 11.74***
(2.234) (2.949) (2.677) (3.469)
Termloan 55.11*** 45.99*** 53.56*** 43.92***
(2.221) (3.072) (2.636) (3.410)
Secured 37.16*** 41.33*** 38.95*** 41.83***
(3.223) (4.340) (4.045) (5.270)
Covenant -25.13*** -4.856 -31.02*** -10.48**
(2.883) (4.057) (3.814) (5.162)
Libor Base -22.49*** -22.37*** -15.87*** -16.07**
(3.860) (5.955) (4.855) (7.499)
Loan size -11.00*** -12.08*** -10.67*** -11.20***
(1.065) (1.578) (1.348) (1.898)
Maturity -8.028*** -12.92*** -9.389*** -14.36***
(2.010) (2.353) (2.332) (2.749)
Constant 205.4*** 180.1*** 231.8*** 164.3***
(24.95) (38.01) (31.58) (44.71)
Observations 13,835 6,099 9,126 4,449
Adjusted R-squared 0.552 0.588 0.574 0.606
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower borrower borrower
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3.5 Further Predictions
3.5.1 The role of risk-aversion
The previous results show that banks significantly price the uncertainty resulting from
split ratings. The magnitude of the premium banks demand is a function of their risk
aversion. In order to specifically test the effect of risk aversion on spreads, we look at
spreads and the split premium in times of higher risk aversion. We start by comparing
split premia in periods of economic down-turns to split-premia in good economic times.
We investigate the effect of economic crises by looking at the global economic crisis of
2008, as defined by the NBER. Investigating the crisis is of great interest as the crisis
drove debates on whether or not the rating agencies were doing their job. As such, ratings
were already seen as troublesome and led to less credible information. This intensifies the
scrutiny on ratings, and increases the importance of a joint signal from the rating agencies
to retain some credibility. Therefore a split rating is expected to be of larger consequence
during the crisis than in any other period. In addition, and in order to more accurately
proxy for risk aversion in certain periods, we control for time-varying risk aversion, proxied
by the measure of Brandt and Wang (2003). The measure allows time-variation in risk
aversion as a response to news about aggregate consumption growth and inflation.3 This
last measure allows us to more specifically test for the risk aversion in the market at any
particular point in time. The results are reported in Tables 3.7.
3.5.1.1 Global financial crisis
To proxy for the global financial crisis we use the NBER definition dates to determine
when the US (where the majority of our loans originate) was in recession and include
an interaction term between recession dummy and SPLIT. We do not include the main
recession effect, because we are controlling for year fixed effects across all specifications.
Table 3.6 shows the results for the global financial crisis. The interaction term Crisis ×
SPLIT shows the effect of having a split rating during poor economics times on spreads.
The positive significant coefficient shows that banks do indeed charge split rated borrowers
higher spreads during poor economic times. The magnitude ranges from 24 basis points
to 30 basis points. These differences are both economically and statistically significant.
Following the reasoning that risk aversion is higher during poor economic times, these
results provide some support to the hypothesis that banks are risk averse institutions,
leading banks to require higher premia.
3For a detailed explanation of how the measure is constructed, see Bams, Honarvar, and Lehnert
(2015); Brandt and Wang (2003). We thank Iman Honarvar Gheysary for providing us with his estimates.
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3.5.1.2 Time-varying market risk aversion
Next, in order to more precisely tackle risk aversion we consider the time-series of market
risk aversion as in Brandt and Wang (2003). Brandt and Wang (2003) find that risk
aversion varies with inflation and aggregate consumption. We specifically control for the
level of risk aversion, in addition to the crises periods, because it has been shown that
there need not be a crisis for risk aversion to be high. This measure captures the level
of risk aversion on a more granular level. The results can be seen in Table 3.7. We take
the time varying risk aversion measure and standardize it by demeaning and dividing
by standard deviation. This allows for an easy to interpret coefficient. Table 3.7 shows
the results of risk aversion at any point in time on spreads to split rated borrowers. The
coefficient on the variable Risk Aversion × SPLIT shows the effect of risk aversion to split
rated borrowers. The positively significant coefficient across all specifications shows that
during times of high risk aversion, the average bank will charge a split rated borrower a
higher premium than during other times. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase
in risk aversion leads to an additional uncertainty premium of approximately 24 to 28
basis points, again, both economically and statistically significant, as shown in Table 3.7.
These results are in line with our hypothesis that banks are risk averse institutions and
that the uncertainty due to split ratings is priced by banks. The results using the market
risk aversion also reinforce the results found using poor economic times. In general, our
results show that indeed, during poor economic times and in times of high risk aversion,
banks require higher premia from split rated borrowers than they do in normal economic
times, and in times when risk aversion is low.
3.5.2 The role of leadarrangers
Bank loans allow for repeated interactions between borrowers and lenders which can, in
turn, affect the loan terms borrowers obtain. Bank-borrower relationships provide lenders
with the opportunity to obtain additional information about borrowers, potentially not
identified by CRAs. Through their relationship, banks might be better able to determine
the true underlying “rating” of a borrower and determine whether a split rated borrower
is closer to the superior or the inferior rating, in turn making credit ratings less important
to these banks. Therefore, we expect to observe a smaller premium on loans to split rated
borrowers where a bank-borrower relationship exists.
The reputation of lead arrangers can also play an important role in the information
dissemination process, and the trust that other banks in the syndicate place on the infor-
mation provided by a particular lead arranger. We hypothesize that more reputable lead
arrangers are better able to convince participant banks of the private information they
have on a borrower, leading to lower spreads on loans to firms whose syndicate is headed
by a reputable lead arranger.
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Table 3.6: Split Ratings in Crises Periods
This table presents the results for the cross-sectional analysis. The dependent variable is spread in basis points. The
SPLIT variable takes the value of one if the borrower has split ratings and zero otherwise. A positive coefficient implies
that the bank requires a premium above the spread that corresponds to non-split rated borrower with the same average
rating. We also include a dummy variable for the global financial crisis interacted with split to determine whether premias
are higher during periods of high risk aversion. The control variables include loan and firm level characteristics. The
regressions also include year, industry, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Robust
standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
All rated firms Twice rated firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Borrower Characteristics
SPLIT 13.42*** 15.23*** 3.680 8.928***
(2.272) (3.030) (2.593) (3.383)
Crisis × SPLIT 30.84*** 25.07* 31.98*** 24.02*
(10.69) (13.18) (10.58) (12.99)
Average Rating 11.12*** 7.461*** 11.82*** 9.597***
(1.925) (2.441) (2.408) (2.989)
Average Rating2 0.412*** 0.522*** 0.407*** 0.496***
(0.0872) (0.118) (0.113) (0.144)
Leverage 56.70*** 42.47**
(16.30) (19.76)
Profitability -106.9** -78.68
(46.23) (53.27)
Size 0.543 3.018** -0.732 2.904*
(0.954) (1.305) (1.187) (1.572)
Loan Characteristics
Multiple Tranches 14.33*** 12.58*** 15.98*** 12.45***
(2.237) (2.957) (2.673) (3.477)
Termloan 55.13*** 45.98*** 53.60*** 43.90***
(2.223) (3.089) (2.645) (3.433)
Secured 37.32*** 41.93*** 39.02*** 42.53***
(3.246) (4.379) (4.093) (5.317)
Covenant -24.94*** -4.942 -30.70*** -10.57**
(2.889) (4.109) (3.819) (5.228)
Libor Base -21.89*** -22.07*** -14.90*** -15.62**
(3.845) (5.995) (4.809) (7.529)
Loan size -11.02*** -11.88*** -10.72*** -10.94***
(1.065) (1.576) (1.347) (1.895)
Maturity -7.850*** -12.78*** -9.150*** -14.19***
(2.011) (2.336) (2.331) (2.732)
Constant 204.5*** 171.4*** 231.8*** 153.9***
(24.94) (38.22) (31.63) (44.84)
Observations 13,835 6,099 9,126 4,449
Adjusted R-squared 0.552 0.587 0.574 0.605
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower borrower borrower
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Table 3.7: Risk Aversion
This table presents the results for the cross-sectional analysis. The dependent variable is spread in basis points. The
SPLIT variable takes the value of one if the borrower has split ratings and zero otherwise. A positive coefficient implies
that the bank requires a premium above the spread that corresponds to non-split rated borrower with the same average
rating. Risk Aversion*SPLIT shows whether banks charge split rated borrowers higher premias during periods of high
risk aversion. Market risk aversion is measured following Brandt and Wang (2003). The control variables include loan
and firm level characteristics. The regressions also include year, industry, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
All rated firms Twice rated firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Borrower Characteristics
SPLIT 20.64*** 20.62*** 10.37*** 13.66***
(2.336) (3.038) (2.623) (3.375)
Risk Aversion × SPLIT 26.95*** 24.99*** 28.38*** 25.46***
(2.049) (2.650) (2.073) (2.700)
Average Rating 10.77*** 7.161*** 11.19*** 9.198***
(1.949) (2.444) (2.436) (2.982)
Average Rating2 0.419*** 0.519*** 0.420*** 0.487***
(0.0873) (0.118) (0.113) (0.141)
Leverage 68.05*** 58.56***
(15.94) (19.23)
Profitability -92.87** -64.42
(45.20) (51.46)
Size -0.585 2.184* -2.540** 1.672
(0.937) (1.265) (1.142) (1.493)
Loan Characteristics
Multiple Tranches 13.73*** 11.84*** 14.73*** 11.21***
(2.194) (2.902) (2.582) (3.401)
Termloan 55.68*** 47.04*** 54.32*** 45.34***
(2.205) (3.084) (2.586) (3.422)
Secured 35.40*** 40.51*** 36.18*** 41.05***
(3.165) (4.308) (3.911) (5.171)
Covenant -22.46*** -2.390 -26.24*** -6.681
(2.863) (3.981) (3.756) (4.990)
Libor Base -21.04*** -21.75*** -14.00*** -14.70**
(3.797) (5.722) (4.661) (6.966)
Loan size -11.82*** -13.11*** -12.02*** -12.67***
(1.048) (1.560) (1.299) (1.873)
Maturity -7.710*** -12.79*** -8.738*** -13.96***
(2.015) (2.346) (2.311) (2.728)
Constant 247.1*** 208.4*** 300.9*** 207.5***
(25.07) (37.98) (31.64) (44.20)
Observations 13,835 6,099 9,126 4,449
Adjusted R-squared 0.564 0.602 0.594 0.625
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower borrower borrower
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3.5.2.1 Borrower - Lender Relationship
Theoretically, information uncertainty decreases with the amount of information accumu-
lated on a specific borrower. Relationship lending involves customer-specific information
gathered over time through multiple interactions (Boot, 2000). The more frequently a
borrower has borrowed from a lender, the less important ratings will be, due to infor-
mation accumulated over the span of the relationship. This, in turn, means that when
there is an established borrower-lender relationship, split ratings will have a smaller ef-
fect on spread than in the absence of such a relationship. Previous research has show
that borrower-lender relationships do indeed lead to better loan terms (Bharath, Dahiya,
Saunders, and Srinivasan, 2011; Sufi, 2007). We control for borrower-lender relationship
using a dummy variable, relationship (dummy), which takes the value of one if the bor-
rower has had the particular lead arranger in a previous syndicate in the past five years.
The results are shown in Table 3.8. We also construct this variable for a period of three
years and one year, but the results stay relatively stable across the different measures.
Specifications (1) through (4) show the results for the full sample of borrowers rated
both once and twice. Specifications (1) and (2) include only a proxy for relationship and
in specifications (3) and (4) we also interact relationship with SPLIT. We do this in order
to see whether relationship banking is more important to split rated borrowers than to
non-split rated borrowers. Specifications (5) through (8) include the same specifications,
but on the sample of borrowers only rated twice.
Borrower-lender relationships do indeed lead to lower premia, as evidenced by the sig-
nificantly negative coefficients, ranging from approximately -6 to -10 basis points across
all specifications. The interaction term is however, not significantly different from zero.
Implying that repeated interactions do not offer a higher benefit to split rated borrowers
relative to other borrowers. An established borrower-lender relationship is evidently ben-
eficial to all borrowers. A potential explanation for the fact that relationships do not lead
to reductions in split premia, but do lead to reductions in the general level is as follows.
When banks face a new potential borrower, they have to incur large costs in acquiring
information, reducing uncertainty, and establishing terms of loans. For any subsequent
loan, this investment is no longer necessary to the same extent, and spreads on loans are
reduced. This, however, does not take away the fact that these borrowers are split rated.
Banks will do everything they can to resolve the uncertainty for the first loan. Repeated
interaction is not going to reduce the uncertainty about creditworthiness.
3.5.2.2 Lead arranger reputation
The structure of the syndicated loan market allows for situations in which credit ratings
are potentially less important. Loans are headed by lead arrangers, and previous research
has shown that lead arranger reputation can significantly mitigate information problems in
the syndicate (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Demiroglu and James, 2010; Jones, Lang,
54
3.5 Further Predictions
Table 3.8: Borrower-Lender Relationship
This table presents the results for the cross-sectional analysis. The dependent variable is spread in basis points. The
SPLIT variable takes the value of one if the borrower has split ratings and zero otherwise. A positive coefficient implies
that the bank requires a premium above the spread that corresponds to non-split rated borrower with the same average
rating. Relationship is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the borrower-lender pair has happened before
in the previous five years. The control variables include loan and firm level characteristics. The regressions also include
year, industry, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
All rated firms Twice rated firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Borrower Characteristics
SPLIT 10.49*** 12.89*** 11.26*** 15.02*** 2.110 7.575*** 1.398 7.321*
(1.774) (2.512) (2.289) (3.470) (2.099) (2.849) (2.797) (4.147)
Relationship × SPLIT -1.776 -4.204 1.569 0.480
(3.073) (4.305) (3.625) (4.891)
Average Rating 17.06*** 13.23*** 17.06*** 13.31*** 16.85*** 15.24*** 16.82*** 15.23***
(1.645) (2.004) (1.645) (1.995) (2.145) (2.633) (2.144) (2.629)
Average Rating2 -0.0460 0.0955 -0.0461 0.0928 -0.0170 0.0440 -0.0160 0.0446
(0.0652) (0.0857) (0.0652) (0.0853) (0.0876) (0.112) (0.0876) (0.112)
Leverage 63.79*** 63.85*** 52.01*** 51.99***
(12.38) (12.37) (14.70) (14.71)
Profitability -139.6*** -139.1*** -105.6*** -105.7***
(35.54) (35.50) (40.86) (40.87)
Size -1.714** 0.356 -1.709** 0.369 -2.665*** 0.00139 -2.667*** -0.000804
(0.772) (1.182) (0.772) (1.181) (0.947) (1.342) (0.947) (1.343)
Loan Characteristics
Multiple Tranches 20.35*** 21.12*** 20.33*** 21.05*** 20.16*** 18.47*** 20.16*** 18.48***
(1.828) (2.502) (1.830) (2.508) (2.182) (2.877) (2.183) (2.881)
Termloan 39.58*** 36.45*** 39.59*** 36.47*** 39.14*** 35.50*** 39.13*** 35.49***
(1.620) (2.302) (1.620) (2.304) (1.936) (2.626) (1.935) (2.626)
Secured 45.70*** 47.59*** 45.70*** 47.58*** 49.50*** 51.15*** 49.48*** 51.14***
(3.035) (4.038) (3.034) (4.038) (3.885) (4.875) (3.885) (4.874)
Covenant -14.19*** 0.470 -14.18*** 0.440 -15.89*** -2.245 -15.89*** -2.238
(2.191) (3.312) (2.191) (3.315) (2.832) (3.910) (2.832) (3.910)
Libor Base -20.43*** -19.80*** -20.48*** -19.90*** -17.00*** -19.05*** -16.94*** -19.02***
(3.564) (5.496) (3.571) (5.522) (4.452) (6.410) (4.451) (6.412)
Loan size -9.682*** -10.45*** -9.690*** -10.45*** -9.146*** -9.069*** -9.145*** -9.071***
(0.836) (1.327) (0.836) (1.329) (1.039) (1.549) (1.039) (1.549)
Maturity -2.994* -8.949*** -2.998* -8.927*** -4.164** -9.617*** -4.161** -9.617***
(1.591) (1.962) (1.591) (1.965) (1.824) (2.224) (1.825) (2.224)
Bank Characteristics
Relationship -8.522*** -7.798*** -7.772*** -5.847* -8.957*** -9.670*** -9.955*** -9.976**
(1.627) (2.380) (2.067) (3.046) (1.940) (2.776) (2.895) (4.022)
Constant 187.6*** 168.8*** 187.3*** 166.9*** 205.9*** 147.1*** 206.5*** 147.5***
(20.97) (32.62) (20.96) (32.60) (25.95) (38.52) (25.95) (38.62)
Observations 13,835 6,099 13,835 6,099 9,126 4,449 9,126 4,449
Adjusted R-squared 0.629 0.654 0.629 0.654 0.659 0.674 0.659 0.674
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower
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Table 3.9: Lead Arranger Reputation
This table presents the results for the cross-sectional analysis. The dependent variable is spread in basis points. The
SPLIT variable takes the value of one if the borrower has split ratings and zero otherwise. A positive coefficient implies
that the bank requires a premium above the spread that corresponds to non-split rated borrower with the same average
rating. The variable for lead bank reputation (Reputation) measured as the market share of a lead arranger in particular
year based on loans originated in that specific year. The control variables include loan and firm level characteristics. The
regressions also include year, industry, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Robust
standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
All rated firms Twice rated firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Borrower Characteristics
SPLIT 10.22*** 12.71*** 11.73*** 15.72*** 2.154 6.674** 2.330 9.403**
(1.819) (2.585) (2.088) (3.105) (2.173) (2.961) (2.569) (3.797)
SPLIT × Reputation -2.698* -4.514** -0.271 -3.544
(1.578) (2.281) (1.810) (2.493)
Average Rating 17.55*** 14.29*** 17.57*** 14.45*** 16.88*** 15.88*** 16.89*** 16.09***
(1.755) (2.143) (1.746) (2.111) (2.278) (2.812) (2.278) (2.779)
Average Rating2 -0.0635 0.0552 -0.0639 0.0483 -0.0218 0.0157 -0.0223 0.00667
(0.0688) (0.0903) (0.0685) (0.0891) (0.0924) (0.118) (0.0924) (0.117)
Leverage 66.73*** 67.17*** 54.41*** 55.14***
(12.75) (12.74) (15.22) (15.26)
Profitability -139.7*** -140.9*** -108.2** -109.4***
(36.31) (36.30) (42.05) (41.98)
Size -1.339 0.746 -1.368* 0.733 -2.169** 0.338 -2.175** 0.292
(0.814) (1.242) (0.813) (1.240) (0.998) (1.421) (0.999) (1.420)
Loan Characteristics
Multiple Tranches 21.50*** 22.35*** 21.43*** 22.18*** 21.17*** 19.67*** 21.17*** 19.56***
(1.908) (2.615) (1.908) (2.616) (2.275) (3.032) (2.275) (3.030)
Termloan 39.90*** 36.47*** 39.89*** 36.43*** 39.36*** 35.68*** 39.37*** 35.68***
(1.661) (2.348) (1.661) (2.349) (1.983) (2.685) (1.983) (2.685)
Secured 44.85*** 45.94*** 44.84*** 45.98*** 49.38*** 50.21*** 49.39*** 50.22***
(3.173) (4.235) (3.169) (4.223) (4.046) (5.105) (4.045) (5.102)
Covenant -14.15*** 0.700 -14.19*** 0.748 -14.83*** -1.511 -14.83*** -1.424
(2.281) (3.447) (2.281) (3.441) (2.901) (3.966) (2.902) (3.975)
Libor Base -20.44*** -21.78*** -20.40*** -21.60*** -17.32*** -20.25*** -17.31*** -20.42***
(3.980) (6.040) (3.965) (5.991) (4.754) (6.701) (4.752) (6.692)
Loan size -9.236*** -9.791*** -9.262*** -9.765*** -8.902*** -8.700*** -8.900*** -8.607***
(0.869) (1.354) (0.869) (1.352) (1.075) (1.599) (1.074) (1.590)
Maturity -2.957* -9.653*** -2.970* -9.635*** -4.061** -10.21*** -4.062** -10.22***
(1.698) (2.088) (1.700) (2.092) (1.946) (2.355) (1.947) (2.363)
Bank Characteristics
Reputation -5.006*** -5.221*** -3.799*** -3.099* -5.546*** -5.898*** -5.368*** -3.618*
(0.911) (1.283) (1.167) (1.679) (1.075) (1.504) (1.559) (2.121)
Constant 167.0*** 142.2*** 167.5*** 139.7*** 188.8*** 129.7*** 188.7*** 125.6***
(22.61) (34.35) (22.60) (34.38) (28.17) (41.78) (28.16) (41.72)
Observations 12,991 5,754 12,991 5,754 8,644 4,203 8,644 4,203
Adjusted R-squared 0.626 0.649 0.626 0.650 0.656 0.670 0.656 0.670
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower borrower
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and Nigro, 2005; Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan, 2012; Sufi, 2007). We hypothesize that
lead arranger reputation might be able to, at least to some extent, offset the informational
uncertainty caused by split ratings. Lenders could take the presence of a reputable lead
arranger as a sign of quality of either the borrower, or of the monitoring that the lender
can provide. As a result, they might deem credit ratings in general, and split ratings
in particular, less important in the pricing process. That is, lenders might place more
emphasis on the signal a reputable lead arranger provides, in terms of credit risk of a
borrower, than on the information uncertainty induced by split ratings. We specifically
test for the effect a reputable lead arranger has on spreads to loans with split rated
borrowers.
Table 3.9 shows the results for lead arranger reputation. We proxy for lead arranger
reputation using the market share of each lead arranger per year (see e.g. Sufi (2007),
Ross (2010) and Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan (2012)).4 We do this using the universe
of loans signed in a particular year, and not canceled, and calculate for each lender the
market share per year based on all loans signed in that year. For ease of interpretation,
we standardize the reputation variable by demeaning it and dividing it by its standard
deviation.
Similar to the approach above, we start by looking at the sample with borrowers rated
both once and twice in specifications (1) through (4). Specifications (1) and (2) include
only a control for lead arranger reputation, which we confirm to have a significant effect on
loan spreads (similar to e.g. Sufi (2007)). Specifications (3) and (4) include both a proxy
for lead arranger reputation and an interaction term between lead arranger reputation
and SPLIT. Similar to our argument on borrower-lender relationships, we include an
interaction term in order to determine whether the mitigating effect of a reputable lead
arrangers is stronger for borrowers with uncertainty. The coefficient on reputation can
be interpreted as the sensitivity to a one standard deviation change in reputation, and as
expected, it has a negative effect.
The coefficient on SPLIT, which can now be interpreted as the premium on a loan to
a split rated borrower with a lead arranger with average reputation, is still significant and
of equal magnitude as the results reported before.
Specifications (3) and (4) and (7) and (8) include the interaction effect. In specifi-
cations (3) and (4) we see an increase in the coefficient of SPLIT relative to the other
specifications. In addition, we see that the interaction of SPLIT and lead arranger rep-
utation is significantly negative. As such, it appears that lead arranger selection might
offer a mitigating factor in the uncertainty premium. More reputable lead arrangers are
potentially better able to credibly signal the quality of a borrower to participant banks,
resulting in a decreased effect of the uncertainty stemming from credit rating agencies
4The underlying intuition is that banks can only obtain a large market share by means of reputable
behavior, as the syndicated loan market is one of repeated interactions. If banks undercut competitors,
or lead a loan with terms at odds with the creditworthiness of the borrower, other banks will refuse
cooperation in future syndicates.
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alone. Specifications (7) and (8) have similar results, although, SPLIT is not signifi-
cant in specification (7) and the interaction term between SPLIT and reputation is not
significant in either specification for the sample of borrowers rated twice only.
3.6 Robustness
As mentioned above, our main specifications are based on an ordinal variable for ratings
as illustrated in Table 3.1. In this section, we show results for split ratings using the
methodology of Livingston and Zhou (2010), where instead of using an ordinal variable
to control for the ratings, we construct a dummy variable for each rating notch. The
SPLIT rating is largely similar to the one used in our main specifications. However, in
this section, there are two different models. In the inferior model, a borrower with split
ratings will have both ratings replaced by the lower of the two, which in turn means
that the SPLIT coefficient captures the premium or discount on a loan to a borrower for
having a second, higher, rating. For the superior model, the process is simply reversed,
the rating variable is replaced with the best of the two ratings, and the SPLIT reflects the
premium/discount associated with the lower rating. An exact and detailed explanation
of the methodology can be found in appendix B. This methodology also enables us to see
whether banks only judge the quality of split rated borrowers based on their inferior or
superior ratings. For example, if banks were to judge rated borrower based only on the
lower of the two ratings, then we would expect SPLIT to be equal to zero. If however,
SPLIT is different from zero, banks look at both ratings when determining loan prices.
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 show the results for this methodology. We control for all firm and
loan level characteristics as in the specifications above. SPLIT has a positive significant
coefficient in Table 3.10. This result means that, on average, a borrower with a second
rating, which is worse than the rating we are controlling for, has approximately 20 basis
points higher spreads on his loan. Similarly, Table 3.11 shows negative and significant
coefficients on the variable SPLIT. This, in turn, shows that a borrower with a second
rating, which is better than the rating we are controlling for, has on average between 10
to 13 basis points lower spreads on his loan.
In order to quantify the net effect of having a split rating, we need to take the difference
between the coefficients for SPLIT in the inferior and the superior model. If we take
specification one as an example, the net effect would be (19.85 - 13.48)/2 = 3.185 and
for specification four this would be (21.36 - 10.01)/2 = 5.675. These results reinforce
our main results and show that banks require a split premium from borrowers with split
ratings to compensate them for the information uncertainty.
An alternative option is to only consider even-notch splits such that a corresponding
loan with the average rating always exists. We consider this analysis in Table 3.12, where
we restrict the sample to exclude those firms whose ratings differ by an odd number of
splits. This restriction implies that we can observe loans to firms whose rating is exactly
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Table 3.10: Superior Model
This table measures the effect of split ratings on spread following Livingston and Zhou (2010). We use two regression
specifications. The first takes the superior rating as the actual rating for a split rated borrower and the second takes the
inferior rating as the actual rating for a split rated borrower. Dummy variables are constructed for each notch rating.
This table represents the Superior model. The dummy variable takes the value of one for the highest of the two ratings
on a split rated borrower. We take a weighted average of the two results (Superior and Inferior Model) and the difference
between these two allows us to determine the split-premium. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
All rated firms Twice rated firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SPLIT 19.85*** 19.39*** 19.47*** 21.36***
(Relative to highest) (2.092) (2.659) (2.366) (3.075)
Aa1 -20.07 -10.69 -12.41 -28.97
(15.67) (29.18) (16.79) (37.43)
Aa2 3.255 11.48 -6.666 -7.907
(8.967) (13.61) (13.17) (16.80)
Aa3 4.397 1.404 2.743 -16.05
(10.07) (13.42) (12.74) (15.00)
A1 10.75 6.176 10.20 -0.818
(8.075) (10.20) (11.52) (13.05)
A2 13.23* 16.11 14.42 14.10
(7.863) (10.65) (11.15) (13.30)
A3 24.56*** 21.82** 26.43** 17.35
(7.547) (9.770) (10.86) (12.59)
...
...
...
...
...
Caa1 244.3*** 211.8*** 256.1*** 219.0***
(12.21) (16.37) (16.26) (19.99)
Caa2 254.1*** 257.8*** 263.1*** 263.5***
(16.09) (27.70) (23.05) (33.67)
Caa3 246.0*** 259.6*** 268.7*** 262.1***
(18.84) (22.78) (25.92) (24.78)
Ca 272.7*** 265.4*** 266.1*** 274.4***
(29.68) (43.17) (42.69) (60.94)
C 312.8*** 311.1*** 221.9*** 238.7***
(17.67) (31.47) (42.92) (21.48)
Constant 365.2*** 278.3*** 305.8*** 184.6***
(26.21) (41.67) (43.24) (47.59)
Observations 13,835 6,099 9,126 4,449
Adjusted R-squared 0.617 0.668 0.637 0.683
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower borrower borrower
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Table 3.11: Inferior Model
This table measures the effect of split ratings on spread following Livingston and Zhou (2010). We use two regression
specifications. The first takes the superior rating as the actual rating for a split rated borrower and the second takes the
inferior rating as the actual rating for a split rated borrower. Dummy variables are constructed for each notch rating.
This table represents the Inferior model. The dummy variable takes the value of one for the lowest of the two ratings on
a split rated borrower. We take a weighted average of the two results (Superior and Inferior Model) and the difference
between these two allows us to determine the split-premium. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
All rated firms Twice rated firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SPLIT -13.48*** -11.13*** -13.34*** -10.01***
(Relative to lowest) (2.201) (2.674) (2.435) (3.007)
Aa1 -3.536 7.567 3.114 5.676
(10.02) (15.91) (12.49) (16.51)
Aa2 19.09* 25.04* 28.73* 4.571
(11.30) (13.65) (17.45) (17.63)
Aa3 9.059 21.85 6.642 4.983
(12.40) (17.76) (13.81) (22.24)
A1 14.67 15.63 16.31 8.734
(10.30) (10.18) (11.69) (13.49)
A2 17.26* 19.59* 20.19* 15.01
(9.471) (10.08) (10.81) (13.18)
A3 26.12*** 28.01*** 29.20*** 23.55*
(9.442) (9.493) (10.71) (12.78)
...
...
...
...
...
Caa1 237.9*** 230.4*** 249.5*** 241.3***
(11.48) (13.26) (12.80) (16.33)
Caa2 260.6*** 256.1*** 275.5*** 263.6***
(14.34) (19.95) (16.99) (23.64)
Caa3 296.3*** 288.1*** 337.4*** 315.6***
(20.90) (27.04) (24.73) (31.48)
Ca 277.3*** 286.9*** 277.2*** 294.3***
(21.31) (31.24) (23.84) (39.53)
C 302.3*** 298.0*** 294.2*** 292.6***
(15.39) (23.97) (19.79) (26.95)
Constant 376.9*** 298.6*** 322.1*** 220.1***
(26.51) (41.13) (39.33) (44.71)
Observations 13,835 6,099 9,126 4,449
Adjusted R-squared 0.621 0.675 0.644 0.691
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower borrower borrower
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Table 3.12: Even-numbered Notch Splits
This table presents the results for the cross-sectional analysis restricted to non-split and even-numbered notch splits. The
dependent variable is spread in basis points. The SPLIT variable takes the value of one if the borrower has split ratings
and zero otherwise. A positive coefficient implies that the bank requires a premium above the spread that corresponds to
non-split rated borrower with the same average rating. Specification (1) uses an ordinal variable to model the relationship
between ratings and spreads, while specification (2) uses rating fixed effects. The control variables include loan and firm
level characteristics. The regressions also include year, industry, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
(1) (2)
Borrower Characteristics
SPLIT 21.11*** 20.91***
(5.459) (5.485)
Average Rating 11.49***
(2.950)
Average Rating2 0.317**
(0.138)
Leverage 22.03 14.70
(21.88) (22.05)
Profitability -116.4** -109.0*
(56.76) (56.45)
Size 6.154*** 6.773***
(1.926) (1.922)
Loan Characteristics
Multiple Tranches 6.902* 7.206*
(4.019) (4.014)
Termloan 52.33*** 51.51***
(4.644) (4.587)
Secured 43.82*** 36.00***
(6.208) (8.058)
Covenant -8.543 -8.024
(5.613) (5.534)
Libor Base -21.80*** -22.02***
(7.336) (6.815)
Loan size -14.38*** -14.44***
(2.174) (2.180)
Maturity -11.75*** -12.59***
(3.181) (3.156)
Constant 162.7*** 205.2***
(51.32) (50.00)
Observations 4,007 4,007
Adjusted R-squared 0.518 0.522
Purpose Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Rating Fixed Effects No Yes
Clustered SE borrower borrower
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equal to the average of all split ratings, such that we can model the relationship between
ratings and spreads with fixed effects. Specification 1 repeats the usual specification which
uses the ordinal rating scale on the restricted sample, while specification 2 uses the rating
fixed effects. The split premium remains economically and statistically significant across
both specifications, and is even higher than the one estimated in our main specifications
of Table 3.3.
3.7 Conclusion
Credit ratings play an important in financial markets. They are the dominant source of
information, which both lenders and investors use as a decision rule in determining the
credit quality of firms. Consequently, credit rating agencies possess a significant influence
in determining the cost of financing. CRAs have often been criticized however, because
their rating methodology is a black box. They maintain complete discretion in their
approach to analyze and determine the letter rating of a borrower. This represents a
potential problem, particularly when the assessment of a borrower differs among CRAs.
Credit ratings place firms in a category, which in turn, conveys the credit risk. When
borrowers are placed in two different categories, credit ratings fail to properly inform users
of the credit risk of a borrower.
We investigate this uncertainty in the bank loan market. Specifically, we argue that
when banks are uncertain about the credit rating of a borrower, they will only be willing
to provide capital at a higher rate. Banks price a loan according to the risk a borrower
represents, when the risk is ambiguous to determine, banks will require a premium. We
call this the split premium.
We develop a theoretical model which shows that a borrower with two ratings, which
are the same, is a bank’s ideal situation, as the lender can, with almost complete certainty,
place the borrower in a credit risk category. However, when the ratings are split, lenders
cannot know with certainty which rating is the true underlying rating of a borrower, and
will only provide capital at a higher cost.
We test our theoretical predictions in a empirical setting. We start with a standard
cross-sectional study, where we show that having a split rating, after controlling for firm
and loan characteristics, leads to a split premium of between 5 and 17 basis points,
depending on the specification. We also show a causal relationship, through a Difference-
in-Difference approach. Results show that borrowers switching from being non-split rated
to being split rated, experience a premium of between 11 to 13 basis points. Accordingly,
borrowers switching from non-split to split rated experience a discount of between 12
to 19 basis points. We also show that the split premium is increasing in the size of
the split, i.e. the level of uncertainty. Next, we show that during times of high risk
aversion, banks require higher premia than during normal times. The premia banks charge
are both statistically and economically significant. On average, split rated borrowers
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have approximately 5% higher spreads than non-split rated borrowers, which amounts to
approximately a quarter of a million dollars per year in additional interest payments.
Some might argue that given the risk averse nature of banks, they will always be
conservative and price the loans based on the lowest rating a borrower has. Our results
show that this is not the case. When borrowers are split rated, banks will looks at both
ratings to determine the credit risk of borrowers.
The syndicated bank loan market allows us to study other mechanisms at work which
could, potentially, mitigate the effects of split ratings on spread. These mechanisms are
primarily bank-borrower relationships and lead arranger reputation. Both of which make
information gathering and/or information dissemination easier or better in the syndicate.
We find that relationship lending is equally important to all borrowers, and it is not
more important for split rated borrowers than for other borrowers. In contrast, having a
reputable lead arranger appears to be more important for split rated borrowers than for
non-split rated borrowers. One potential explanation is that reputable lead arrangers have
a certification effect, which dominates credit ratings. We show that split rated borrowers
with syndicates headed by reputable lead arrangers experience an additional discount,
above the average reputable lead arranger, of up to 5%.
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions
Variable Units Definition Source
All-in-spread-drawn basis points Total spread paid over LIBOR on each
dollar drawn down from the loan net of
upfront fees
DealScan
Senior dummy One if the loan is senior and zero other-
wise
DealScan
Secured dummy One if the loan is secured and zero oth-
erwise
DealScan
Multiple Tranches dummy One if there are multiple loans within a
deal and zero otherwise
DealScan
Termloan dummy One if the loan type is a termloan and
zero otherwise
DealScan
Covenant dummy One if the loan has a financial covenant
in place and zero otherwise
DealScan
Loan size Natural logarithm of loan size in US dol-
lars
DealScan
Maturity Natural logarithm of months to loan
maturity
DealScan
Size Natural logarithm of borrower sales in
US dollars
DealScan
Leverage Shows the level of leverage for the bor-
rower in the previous year. Calculated
as (lct + dltt) / at
Compustat
Profitability Shows earnings of the borrower in the
previous year. Calculated as: ebitda /
at
Compustat
Reputation The maximum market share of all lead
arrangers in a syndicate. Market share
is calculated using the universe of loans
signed and not canceled in the preced-
ing year. For ease of interpretation,
the variable is standardized to have zero
mean and unit variance.
DealScan
Relationship (Dummy) One if the borrower has had the partic-
ular lead arranger in a previous syndi-
cate in the past five years. For cases in
which there are multiple lead arrangers,
the variable takes unity if at least one
of the lead arrangers has led a syndicate
to the borrower in the past five years.
DealScan
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Appendix B: Methodology
An alternative methodology to quantify the effect of split ratings on spread is explained
in this section. We use two regression models to estimate the impact of split ratings on
bank loans. In the first model, we evaluate the spreads on loans with split ratings against
those with non-split ratings with superior ratings. That is, when a loan a has split rating,
we use the higher of the two ratings, the superior rating, to construct the rating variable.
The split rating dummy variable therefore reflects that this borrower has an inferior rating
not captured by the rating variable. The superior rating model is as follows:
Spreadi = α + βsupSPLITi + β2SuperiorRatingi + xi + i (3.6)
SPLIT is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the borrower has a split rating.
SuperiorRating is the rating variable, where 1 is the highest possible rating (AAA) and 21
is the lowest possible rating (D), and x is a vector of control variables. If the spreads on
split rated loans are determined by the superior rating alone, then the second rating should
have no impact and βsup should be insignificant. Alternatively, if the second rating does
matter to banks, and the inferior rating is also taken into consideration, then the inferior
rating should increase spreads and βsup should be positive and significant. Therefore, the
coefficient of the SPLIT variable can be interpreted as the difference between the actual
spread and the estimated spread if both ratings would have been the same.
In the second regression model we reverse the procedure. We evaluate the spreads
for loans based on the inferior of the two ratings. That is, for split rated borrowers, we
use the lower of the two ratings in the construction of the rating variable. Here, the
SPLIT dummy variable reflects the fact that the split rated loan has an inferior rating
not captured by the rating variable. This inferior rating model is as follows:
Spreadi = α + βinfSPLITi + β2InferiorRatingi + xi + i (3.7)
The variables are defined in the same way as the superior model except that the lower
of the two ratings is used to construct the rating variable. In the inferior model the
coefficient for SPLITi, βinf , can also be interpreted as the difference between the actual
loan spread and the estimated spread if both ratings would have been the same at the
highest of the two ratings.
The final step required to determine the net effect of split ratings on spreads is to take
the difference between the coefficient of SPLIT for the superior model and the inferior
model, i.e. βsup and βinf .
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Chapter 4
Interconnectedness Through
Syndication: Market Awareness and
Reactions∗
4.1 Introduction
The most important channels through which banks are linked are the interbank deposit
market, deposit interest rate risk, and through syndicated lending De Vries (2005). Indeed,
lending money to borrowers constitutes the core business of banks and syndicated loans
are a large part of this core business. Syndicated lending represents the largest source of
US corporate financing (Sufi, 2007), and it shows no signs of slowing down. Worldwide,
syndicated lending reached an 11-year high of approximately US$5.28 trillion in 2018,
having recovered from the shock of the financial crisis (Dealogic, 2019; Reuters, 2018).
A syndicated loan is a loan provided to a borrower by at least two lenders jointly.
Banks repeatedly cooperate on syndicated loans arranged by one another. One of the pri-
mary motives for the risk sharing is the promise of risk reduction through diversification,
because each bank only holds a portion of a loan, as opposed to the whole loan. Syndi-
cation therefore provides the lender with the possibility to hold a diversified portfolio of
small exposures to many different loans. For the borrowers, it means access to a larger
pool of capital. At first glance, the resulting networks of banks seems beneficial, for both
the lender and the borrower.
Although there are many positive aspects to syndicated lending, the resulting down-
sides are often overlooked. In particular, through the common exposures the banks now
face on their asset side, a sufficiently large (potentially local) shock, may bring down
part of the financial sector (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008). In this paper we investigate
whether these negative externalities of syndication are incorporated into asset prices by
financial markets. Our focus is on the connections that arise between the balance sheets
∗The data used in this chapter is supplied by Erasmus University Rotterdam, the current affiliation
of the author.
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of banks because of syndicated loans. While the diversification effect leads to reduced
risk, the common exposures to default risk lead to increased common, or systemic, risk.
We use the network of syndicated loans to assess the degree of balance sheet commonal-
ity between individual banks to proxy the re-distribution, rather than reduction, of risk
through syndication. We investigate whether participants in the equity and CDS markets
react to the level, or changes, in the degree of bank-specific interconnectedness through
syndicated loans. While the probability of a systemic breakdown is low, the magnitude of
the losses associated with such events may be sufficient to require a risk premium (Kelly
and Jiang, 2014). Conversely, market participants may deem the probability of a large
enough shock happening to be too small and therefore ignore the risk, or they may believe
the probability of a bailout to be very high, also resulting in them ignoring the risk.
We find that both equity and CDS markets appear to require a risk premium for
the systemic interconnectedness of firms as proxied by their common exposures in the
syndicated loan market. The risk premia are not constant over time. Indeed, in line with
the above, it appears that before the financial crisis of 2008 market participants deemed
the probability of a systemic event too small, or a bailout too likely, to require a risk
premium. After the demise of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, markets appear to
react to the level and changes of syndication-driven interconnectedness. It appears the
Lehman collapse made the market aware of the risk inherent in the joint operations of
financial institutions, causing the market to pay more attention to it. This argument is
in line with Chen (1999), who shows that negative information about failing banks in the
economy leads to a reassessment of risks of other similar banks in the economy.
Our analysis is therefore two-fold. First, based on the findings of Dumontaux and Pop
(2013) and Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010a), that the shock coming from the bankruptcy
of Lehman affected other financial institutions negatively, we investigate whether the com-
monality of the syndicated loan portfolio between individual banks and Lehman drives
heterogeneity in market reactions on individual banks around Lehman’s bankruptcy. Sim-
ilar to Iyer and Peydro (2011) and Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010a), we find that both
the effect on equity returns and CDS prices was stronger for banks whose loan portfolio
was strongly interconnected with that of Lehman.
Second, we investigate whether markets react to changes in the syndication driven in-
terconnectedness in normal times as well. While a market reaction to a large system-wide
event such as the collapse of Lehman Brothers is perhaps not entirely surprising, we also
find that investors appear to monitor small, apparently minute changes, in the syndicated
loan market. We show that markets react negatively to the signing of syndicated loans
that strongly increase the lead arrangers’ interconnectedness, while there is no market
reaction to the signing of a typical loan, or of an interconnectedness decreasing loan.
Similarly, we find that CDS spreads are higher for those banks that are central to the
syndicated loan market, with banks with high interconnectedness having higher spreads,
whilst controlling for the usual risk characteristics of the banks.
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Our paper is related to at least three streams of literature. First, and most importantly,
we provide empirical evidence related to a largely theoretical literature on the effects of di-
versification on the risk profile of financial institutions and the financial system. We build
on a large body of theoretical work on the negative aspects of diversification. Ibragimov,
Jaffee, and Walden (2011) show that financial institutions’ actions to diversify, which are
optimal for individual banks, may prove to be suboptimal for society. Similarly, De Vries
(2005) demonstrates that the potential for systemic breakdowns is strong if asset returns
have fatter tails than the normal distribution, which is an empirical regularity supported
by ample evidence see e.g. (Gabaix and Ibragimov, 2011; Jansen and De Vries, 1991).
Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015), study the extent of financial contagion
resulting from the structure of interbank liabilities. Their model predicts that diversifica-
tion is mostly beneficial for small shocks, as the resulting system is less prone to contagious
defaults. However, for sufficiently large shocks, highly diversified lending patterns facili-
tate financial contagion and create a more fragile system. The authors provide support
for the hypothesis of Haldane (2009), that a highly interconnected financial system may
be “robust, yet fragile”. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) develop a model that shows how
asset-side correlations, i.e. joint exposures to loans, can lead to joint asset side systemic
risk through information contagion. More recently, Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2012)
show that clustered asset structures lead to higher systemic risk when bad news about
banks’ future solvency circulates in the economy. Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014) de-
velop a model that demonstrates that cross-holdings of debt lead to cascading failures.
Cabrales, Gottardi, and Vega-Redondo (2017) explicitly study the trade-offs between the
benefits of risk-sharing and the costs of contagion, akin to the diversification and intercon-
nectedness trade-off the syndicated loan market faces. They find that the optimal level
of risk-sharing is limited in case risk exposures are not globally convex, which is generally
the case for fat-tailed distributions.
Few empirical papers have focused on the downside of syndicated lending and the
trade-offs between the costs and benefits associated with it. Our paper is most closely
related to Cai, Eidam, Saunders, and Steffen (2018), who were the first to explicitly
recognize and measure the systemic potential associated with syndicated lending. They
investigate the interconnectedness in the form of common risks among financial insti-
tutions by examining banks’ exposure to large syndicated loans. They find positive and
significant correlation between their interconnectedness measure and various systemic risk
measures including SRISK (Brownlees and Engle, 2016), CoVaR (Adrian and Brunner-
meier, 2016), and DIP (Black, Correa, Huang, and Zhou, 2016; Huang, Zhou, and Zhu,
2009, 2012).1 While diversification means that the frequency of individual bank failures
1All these measures are based on stock market returns and publicly available accounting data. The
syndicated loan market is decidedly less transparent. The SRISK as the expected capital shortfall of a
financial institution conditional on prolonged market downturn. It is measured based on the size of a
firm, its leverage, and its expected equity loss given economic distress. The ∆CoVaR is the difference
between the VaR of the market conditional on a firm being in distress and the market’s VaR when the
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is significantly decreased, if defaults do start to occur and shocks are large enough, the
sector as a whole is more vulnerable to systemic breakdowns. The authors also show
that, consistent with theory, interconnectedness amplifies systemic risk during recessions.
Their results highlight that bank-specific risk reduction through diversification ignores
the negative externalities of an interconnected financial system.
Second, our paper adds to the literature on the relationship between systemic risk
and equity returns. This stream of literature includes studies investigating the effects
of failures of large financial institutions on the performance of the surviving institutions
(e.g. Aharony and Swary, 1983; Dumontaux and Pop, 2013), and, Lang and Stulz (1992),
who show that on average, bankruptcy announcements decrease the value of the firm’s
competitors and this effect is stronger for firms more highly correlated with the bankrupt
firm. More broadly, this paper is also related to the literature on the pricing of risk and
bad news in financial markets see e.g. Docking, Hirschey, and Jones (1997). Generally,
these papers provide evidence for market discipline and show that investors make informed
decisions when pricing assets, rather than being driven by panic.
In the context of financial contagion, Iyer and Peydro (2011) find that it is higher
for banks with larger interbank exposure to the failing bank, as well as for those with
weaker fundamentals. Dumontaux and Pop (2013) study the stock market reaction to
Lehman’s failure, and find that the biggest firms, those that hold crucial positions in the
system, were most affected by Lehman’s demise. Similar to this paper, Gasbarro, Le,
Schwebach, and Zumwalt (2004) investigate stock market reactions to syndicated loan
announcements. They focus on the borrower, rather than the lender, and find that loan
announcements generate a positive wealth effect for the borrowing firm.
Our study adds to this literature by focusing on changes in systemic risk before it
materializes. More specifically, we estimate the effects of loan announcements on lead-
arranger stock prices, as a function of whether the loans in- or decrease the systemic risk
inherent in the firm’s portfolio. We find that loans that significantly increase the lead
arranger’s interconnectedness are met with a strong negative abnormal return of about
0.3% following the announcement of the loan. For loans with no effect on interconnect-
edness, or a diminishing effect, we don’t observe a similar response. Investors view these
loans as part of the ongoing business of the bank.
Finally, we add to the literature on Credit Default Swaps (CDS) pricing. A CDS can
be seen as a bet on an institution’s health and the price reflects the probability that the
institution will not repay its debt in full (Hart and Zingales, 2010). The idea is that an
increase in systemic risk in the financial sector should, in turn, lead to a greater risk of
default for each individual institution within the sector. This should result in an increase
in the average CDS spread (Giglio et al., 2011). Importantly, one can argue that CDS
spreads are a better indicator of risk than equity, because equity also captures upside
firm is at its median. The DIP is the risk neutral expectation of the loss conditional on the loss exceeding
a given threshold.
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potential, and therefore might underestimate the probability of default in very volatile
assets.
Indeed, Chiaramonte and Casu (2013) confirm that bank CDS spreads reflect the risk
captured by bank balance sheet ratios and are therefore a good proxy for general bank
risk. They find that the relationship between bank CDS spreads and balance sheet ratios
is particularly tight during crises periods and post-crises periods. Similarly, Annaert,
De Ceuster, Van Roy, and Vespro (2013) show that during the 2004-2006 period, changes
in CDS spreads were mainly dominated by credit risk drivers. However, in the period
preceding the crisis, their model virtually breaks down and economically sensible variables
hardly seem to explain variation in CDS spreads. Interestingly, during financial crises, it
is clear that credit risk drivers alone cannot explain changes in CDS spreads. They find
that liquidity and the overall perception of bank stability become important in explaining
significant parts of their variation.
To that end, we investigate whether the market sees the bank’s level of interconnected-
ness resulting from syndicated lending as a serious driver of credit risk. By exploiting the
cross-sectional and time variation in the levels of interconnectedness, we find that CDS
spreads are significantly influenced by the level of interconnectedness, after controlling for
a wide range of firm specific and market wide controls. The effect of interconnectedness
on the spread increases substantially after the failure of Lehman.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 explains how we
compute the firm-specific, syndicated loan market based measure of interconnectedness,
based on a methodology of Cai, Eidam, Saunders, and Steffen (2018). Section 4.3 discusses
the data. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 present results of our analysis on equity and CDS data
respectively. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Interconnectedness and the Syndicated Loan Mar-
ket
The syndicated loan market is one of the primary channels through which bank perfor-
mance is correlated (Cai, Eidam, Saunders, and Steffen, 2018; De Vries, 2005). While
most attention for the syndicated loan market has focused on the potential diversification
benefits, few have addressed or investigated the negative externalities of banks’ syndi-
cation. Indeed, if banks tend to work together with the same partner banks for the
majority of deals, diversification effects are limited, and from a credit risk perspective,
the two banks start to behave as one. As a result, during severe downturns, failure of a
single institution may result into a system-wide crisis. Accordingly, syndication may lead
to increased systemic risk.
Cai, Eidam, Saunders, and Steffen (2018) were one of the first to empirically study
the syndication network with a view on systemic crises. They propose a measure of
bank interconnectedness that is based on loan portfolio similarity using a large dataset of
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syndicated loans. They study the cross-sectional properties of these interconnectedness
risk measures and find that they are strongly correlated to, but are distinct from, some
of the popular systemic risk measures in the literature, such as the SRISK measure of
Brownlees and Engle (2016), which is an equity-based measure that computes how much
capital would be needed to keep a bank from failing in the event of a large market
downturn.
Rather than taking their measure as a general proxy for systemic risk, we take the
measure more literally and argue that it measures the risk banks face through their
syndicated loan portfolio in the event of extreme downturns. We then ask the question
of whether market participants react to changes in the portfolio composition, or in other
words, price the network-risk inherent in the syndicated loan portfolios of these banks.
We start by briefly recapping the interconnectedness measure of Cai, Eidam, Saun-
ders, and Steffen (2018). In essence, their measure simply computes the similarity in loan
portfolios by comparing their industry exposures. As with most distance measures, there
is a trade-off between granularity and information. The granularity of the data allows us
to construct this measure by taking the dollar exposure a bank has to each individual
borrowing firm. However, if firm performance is correlated, such a measure will under-
state the practical implications of the overlap. If bank A has exposure to firm x, and
none to firm y, with bank B having the opposite exposure, a simple distance measure will
make these risks seem uncorrelated. If firm x and y tend to default at the same time,
the actual commonality of the risk is understated. Cai, Eidam, Saunders, and Steffen
(2018) therefore suggest to compute similarity in industry exposures rather than individ-
ual firm exposure. Specifically, they look at the areas banks are most heavily invested
in by classifying their borrowers into industries based on 2-digit SIC codes. They sub-
sequently compute the distance between two banks by quantifying the similarity of their
total industry exposures.
The detailed construction of their measure is as follows. For each month during the
sample period, we compute each lead arranger’s total loan facility amount originated in
the prior 12 months.2 In case a loan has multiple lead arrangers, the loan amount is
distributed according to the actual lending shares if available, and equally distributed if
no data is available.
We then compute portfolio weights for each lead arranger i = 1, ..., N , in each special-
ization category j = 1, ..., J (i.e. 2-digit SIC industry). Define wi,j,t as the weight lead
arranger i invests in specialization j within the 12 months prior to month t. The weight is
computed as the loan amount bank i lent as a lead-arranger to firms in industry j during
months t− 12 to t− 1, divided by the total loan amount of that same lead-arranger over
that time window.
2We only consider the lead arrangers for several reasons. First, lead arrangers hold larger fractions of
loans than participant banks (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010b). Second, lead arrangers are more likely
to keep the loans on their balance sheet (Benmelech, Dlugosz, and Ivashina, 2012), rather than selling it
on the secondary loan market.
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Next, for each month t, the distance between two banks, m and n, is computed as the
Euclidean distance between their industry weight vectors:
Distancem,n,t =
1√
2
√∑J
j=1(wm,j,t − wn,j,t,)2. (4.1)
In order to transform the pairwise distances into a single interconnectedness measure
for each lead arranger, they suggest to take a (potentially weighted) average of the dis-
tances of bank i with respect to all others. That is, a bank’s interconnectedness equals
Interconnectednessi,t = 100×
(
1−∑k 6=i xk,t ×Distancei,k,t) , (4.2)
where xk,t is the weight given to bank k at time t. The measure is naturally bounded
between 0 and 100, with a higher number suggesting higher systemic interconnectedness
through the syndicated loan market. We employ a size-weighted measure, where xk,t is
the ratio of the t− 1 total assets of bank k to the sum of all assets of banks which have
completed a deal in the prior twelve months. This measure has the advantage that com-
monality with large banks leads to greater systemic risk, while commonality with a small
firm is of lesser importance. Finally, in some parts of the paper we will explicitly focus
on, arguably, the largest systemic event; the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September
15th, 2008.3 In those specific tests we will also use the firms’ interconnectedness with
Lehman:
InterconnectednessLehmani,t = 100× (1−Distancei,Lehman,t) . (4.3)
Note that this is a strictly backward-looking measure, i.e. it measures the interconnect-
edness based on the deals signed twelve months prior to Lehman’s collapse.
Finally, we proxy the effect of signing a loan on interconnectedness by means of a
measure we term ∆Interconnectedness. The ∆Interconnectedness measure is defined at
the loan-facility level, by computing the percentage change in Interconnectedness, end-of-
month after signing, relative to end-of-month pre-signing. This measure provides us with
a directional news shock in terms of the interconnectedness of the bank.
We summarize the interconnectedness measure by plotting its time-series characteris-
tics in Figure 4.1. In the left-hand panel we plot the average interconnectedness across
time, while on the right-hand side we provide a few examples for four specific banks. The
interconnectedness had been steadily increasing up until 2008. Starting right around the
collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008 interconnectedness started to drop dramatically.
The decline lasted more than two years. As the global economy started to strengthen,
the average interconnectedness started to rapidly rise again. The final four years of our
sample are characterized by slow decline with fewer dynamics.
Looking at the right-hand panel, we can clearly see the effect of the financial crisis
3Of course, the second half of 2008 contained many important systemic events. There is however
little debate on the fact that the failure of Lehman was ‘the first domino,’ (see e.g. Brownlees and Engle
(2016)).
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Figure 4.1: Interconnectedness Dynamics
This figure plots the estimated interconnectedness based on Equation (4.2). The left panel plots the cross-sectional
average interconnectedness measure across time, while the right-hand panel plots the interconnectedness of a number of
international example firms.
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Wells Fargo J.P. Morgan Societe Generale UBS
on the various firms. The decline in interconnectedness of J.P. Morgan and UBS is far
less pronounced than for the other two firms. In particular, Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale’s intercon-
nectedness drops by about 50% over a three year period, and takes until 2011 to recover,
while UBS is at its old level in 2010. Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale also seems to be much harder hit
by the European Debt crisis, in line with its base of operations.
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Data on banks and their syndicated loans are obtained from LPC DealScan. We obtain
information on the bank, its role in the syndicate and the size of the loan. Since our focus
is on banks of systemic importance, we remove all deals of banks with fewer than ten deals
throughout our sample period of 1986 to 2016. In total we have almost 500,000 deals,
spread out over 394 months and 959 different lead arrangers, who provided syndicated
loans to a large number of firms spanning 84 two-digit SIC industries. We use this data
to compute the interconnectedness measure described in the previous section for each
lead-arranger month.
Stock market information for the banks in our sample are obtained from CRSP for US
banks, and Datastream for non-US banks, for the period 1980 to 2016. We match stock
market data to the above mentioned dataset by bank name. We obtain bank financial
information from Compustat NA for US banks, and from Compustat Global for non-US
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
This table provides the descriptive statistics for all variables of interest as well as control variables. All variables but
∆Interconnectedness are at the firm-month level, while the former is at the loan-facility level. Spread is the 5-year CDS
quote for senior debt issues, winsorized at the upper 1%. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets winsorized at 1%.
Leverage is computed as short plus long-term debt, divided by total assets. Credit rating is an ordinal variable based on
S&P ratings, where 1 is AAA, ranging to 21 for C/D. Idiosyncratic volatility is computed as the variance of monthly CAPM
residuals, where parameters are estimated over the past 36-60 months depending on availability. Bid-ask spread is the
bid-ask spread divided by the mid quote. Market return is last month’s CRSP value-weighted index return. The risk-free
rate is the one-month treasury bill rate. The Term structure slope is 10-year minus 2-year interest rate obtained from the
Federal Reserve’s H15 reports.
N Mean Min Median Max SD
Interconnectedness 5,377 58.80 25.19 63.19 80.23 16.41
∆Interconnectedness 77,389 -0.10 -29.16 -0.04 31.98 1.53
Spread 5,444 94.58 3.207 75.84 554.5 83.20
Size 3,816 13.36 11.89 13.41 14.72 0.767
Leverage 4,209 0.301 0.0443 0.237 0.850 0.174
Credit rating 3,428 5.601 1 6 20 2.191
Idiosyncratic Volatility 3,885 89.97 5.990 62.89 559.8 101.8
Bid-ask spread 5,476 0.134 0.0108 0.0946 1.444 0.105
Market return 5,485 0.00728 -0.185 0.0118 0.114 0.0427
Risk free interest rate 5,338 2.067 -1.195 1.761 6.875 1.704
Term structure slope 5,485 1.560 -0.140 1.680 2.830 0.838
banks. We match this data to DealScan and the corresponding bank names, through
GVKEYs using the matching list of Chava and Roberts (2008).
We obtain data on CDS spreads, as well as their bid and ask prices for the global
banks in our sample from Bloomberg for the period 2002 to 2016. We use monthly data
on 5-year CDS quotes for senior debt issues, as these are generally regarded as the most
liquid CDS available. Sufficiently liquid data on CDS prices is available for only a limited
number of banks, resulting in a sample of 60 of the major banks. The dataset covers
the most important financial institutions, and contains all, but two Chinese banks on the
2017 list of G-SIBs, published by the financial stability board (FSB, 2017). The CDS
spreads are matched to DealScan based on bank name.
Descriptives of the resulting variables are provided in Table 4.1. It bears noting that all
variables, except for ∆Interconnectedness, are at the firm-month level. ∆Interconnectedness
is at the loan-facility level. All the remaining variables are used in our CDS analysis along
with the Interconnectedness variable. The ∆Interconnectedness variable is used in our
event study, in conjunction with standard daily CRSP data.
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4.4 Syndication Interconnectedness and the Equity
Market
In this section we investigate whether or not equity markets react to changes in the com-
position of the loan portfolio of the major financial institutions. Our analysis consists
of two parts. First, we consider one of the biggest shocks to the financial system of the
last decades, the fall of Lehman Brothers on September 15th, 2008. We investigate the
stock market reaction of the other financial institutions to its demise. In this case, we are
primarily interested in whether or not investor reaction to financial firms that were more
tightly linked to Lehman, through the syndicated loan market, was stronger. Second, we
investigate whether the equity market generally reacts to news regarding the network of
syndicated lending. To that effect, we look at the stock market reactions to the announce-
ment of each of the loans in the DealScan sample. One would not necessarily expect a
market reaction to the mere signing of a deal on the banks’ side. While obtaining a large
loan can have a strong positive impact on the borrower (e.g. Gasbarro, Le, Schwebach,
and Zumwalt, 2004), it could also be regarded as daily business of the leadarrangers.
Stock markets may, however, react if the signing of the loan has a strong impact on the
risk of the financial institution.
For each event, we collect equity market (simple) returns around the completion date.
We measure return performance by cumulating daily abnormal returns around the deal
completion. We consider the pre-event date [−1,−1], the event date itself [0, 0], as well as
post-event windows [1, 1], [1, 3] and [1, 5]. We compute daily abnormal returns based on
the methodologies described in Brown and Warner (1985). In particular, we compute the
abnormal returns relative to the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), where
the factor loadings are obtained using OLS estimates in a ‘clean’ period of 252 to 21
days before the event where available, with a minimum number of 120 observations. The
market, HML and SMB factors are obtained from Kenneth French’s website.
Since our hypothesis is that the market’s reaction should depend on the interconnect-
edness, we consider a linear regression on the cumulative abnormal returns. We adjust
the standard errors for heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) robust covariance matrix.
While the events in the second part of our analysis are randomly spread across time, there
may be some concerns of event-induced variance for the Lehman analysis. (e.g. Boehmer,
Masumeci, and Poulsen, 1991). In their nomenclature, our implementation may best be
compared to the ‘Ordinary cross-sectional’ tests, augmented to allow for cross-sectional
heteroskedasticity. Compared to their suggested ‘Standardized cross-sectional’ implemen-
tation, their simulations show the Ordinary version controls size slightly better at the cost
of lower power, which we prefer.
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4.4.1 Equity Market reactions to Lehman’s Failure
We start our analysis of the stock market around the collapse of Lehman. For each firm,
we compute the InterconnectednessLehmani,t measure of Equation (4.3) in August 2008, as
well as the CARs around the event date of September 15, 2008. Our sample consists of a
total of 43 firms for which we have sufficient data to compute both the interconnectedness
measure and the CARs.
The resulting regression estimates are presented in Table 4.2. First consider Panel A,
which is based on the raw returns. Specification I shows that the failure of Lehman had a
large effect on the firms in our sample, with a negative return of 9% on the [0,0] window,
but the stock prices bounced back by nearly 12% over the next five days. Specification II
shows that this rebound was weaker for those firms that were tightly linked to Lehman
through the syndicated loan market. The cross-sectional standard deviation of intercon-
nectedness of these firms was about 38, such that a one standard-deviation increase in
interconnectedness would decrease the [1,5]-CAR by almost 5%. Specification III shows
that this was not just a geographical proximity effect, as ICLehman remains significant after
including country fixed effects.4
Panel B, which reports the same regressions for abnormal returns based on the Fama-
French three factor model confirms the result of the raw returns. Interestingly, specifica-
tion I shows that the financial firms were not hit harder than their usual risk exposures
would suggest, but their rebound was in fact stronger. The second specification confirms
the sign and magnitude of the effect of the interconnectedness with Lehman on the stock
market reaction to its failure, and is near identical to the results based on raw returns.
4.4.2 Equity Market Reactions to Syndicated Loans
The results of Table 4.2 establish that firms more closely related to Lehman in the syn-
dicated loan market were affected more strongly by Lehman’s failure. These results are
perhaps not entirely surprising. It has been well established that stock markets react to
news, and stock prices of firms that are directly and strongly affected by said news, react
more strongly. The interconnectedness measure captures how close the bank’s business
is to that of Lehman. As a result, the interpretation may be two-fold; either it is simply
the proximity to Lehman - after all, these are all large financial institutions - or, investors
actually react to the risk inherent in the interconnectedness.
To differentiate these two potential explanations we try to establish whether markets
react explicitly to changes in the interconnectedness of the syndicated loan market. We
therefore use the standard event-study approach to measure the market reaction to syndi-
cated loan announcements. We are particularly interested in the extent to which abnormal
equity returns are a function of the impact of the loan signed on the syndication-driven
4More generally, all the results in the remainder of this chapter are robust to the inclusion of country
fixed effects, but have not been reported for the sake of brevity. The results are available upon request.
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Table 4.2: Equity Market Reaction to Syndicated Loans: Lehman’s Failure
This table investigates the market reaction on banks’ equity around Lehman’s failure on September 15, 2008, as a function
of the interconnectedness the banks had with Lehman. The table provides OLS estimates, with White (1980) robust
standard errors, of a constant and Lehman Interconnectedness, Equation (4.3), on Cumulative Abnormal Returns. Each
column corresponds to a different CAR window. The top panel computes CARs based on raw returns, while the bottom
panel uses Fama-French three-factor abnormal returns. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
CAR [-1,-1] [0,0] [1,1] [1,3] [1,5]
Panel A: Raw Returns
I Constant -0.228 -8.908*** 4.653*** 7.092*** 11.78***
(0.480) (0.828) (1.197) (2.217) (2.442)
II ICLehman -0.00275 -0.0146 -0.0604*** -0.131** -0.125***
(0.0142) (0.0114) (0.0215) (0.0491) (0.0382)
Constant -0.0674 -8.055*** 8.173*** 14.75*** 19.04***
(1.069) (1.189) (2.160) (4.217) (4.301)
III ICLehman -0.00186 -0.0191* -0.0690** -0.143** -0.129**
(0.0139) (0.0111) (0.0278) (0.0656) (0.0525)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Fama-French Three Factor Abnormal Returns
I Constant -0.492 0.364 0.00920 0.957 5.478**
(0.502) (0.840) (1.159) (2.023) (2.318)
II ICLehman -0.00308 -0.0166 -0.0606** -0.124** -0.120***
(0.0138) (0.0109) (0.0228) (0.0490) (0.0367)
Constant -0.314 1.325 3.524 8.145** 12.46***
(1.061) (1.273) (2.148) (4.005) (4.152)
III ICLehman -0.00205 -0.0206 -0.0681** -0.133** -0.122**
(0.0142) (0.0122) (0.0262) (0.0537) (0.0470)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
interconnectedness of the lenders. The loan announcement is news to the market, and
the resulting changes in interconnectedness proxy the severity and sign of the shock. To
achieve this, for each signed loan, we compute the percentage change in interconnected-
ness of next month, with respect to the current level of interconnectedness, which we refer
to as ∆ Interconnectedness.
We obtain a total of nearly 78,000 loan announcements from DealScan for which we
can compute the ∆Interconnectedness measure and CARs. A loan signing occurs almost
every single day, which raises the concern of clean identification of an effect. This issue is
mitigated by two factors. First, since events happen on almost every day, the raw return
would simply be a proxy for the average return over the entire sample, and is therefore not
informative. The Fama-French residual returns do not suffer from this problem. Second,
if the ∆Interconnectedness measure is significant, a spurious results would entail that
some other event systematically happens to those banks that signed a loan, in the short
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Table 4.3: Equity Market Reaction to Syndicated Loans: General Intercon-
nectedness - Linear Specifications
This table investigates the market reaction on banks’ equity to changes in the interconnectedness of their loan-portfolio
over the period 1986 to 2016. The table provides OLS estimates, with White (1980) robust standard errors for regressions
on Cumulative Abnormal Returns. Each column corresponds to a different CAR window. ∆IC is defined as the percentage
change in monthly interconnectedness after the signing of the announced deal. Post-Lehman is a dummy which equals
one for after September 15, 2008. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively.
CAR [-1,-1] [0,0] [1,1] [1,3] [1,5]
I Constant 0.00218 0.00866 0.0202*** -0.00563 0.0300*
(0.00751) (0.00747) (0.00751) (0.0130) (0.0164)
∆IC -0.00809 -0.0204* -0.0487*** -0.0825*** -0.179***
(0.0114) (0.0121) (0.0115) (0.0198) (0.0253)
II Constant 0.00218 0.00866 0.0202*** -0.00563 0.0300*
(0.00751) (0.00747) (0.00751) (0.0130) (0.0164)
∆IC -0.00450 0.0169 -0.0319** -0.0158 -0.103***
(0.0137) (0.0150) (0.0140) (0.0241) (0.0304)
∆IC -0.0104 -0.108*** -0.0484*** -0.193*** -0.221***
× Post Lehman (0.0164) (0.0180) (0.0168) (0.0286) (0.0372)
III Constant 0.00791 0.0118 0.0197* 0.000330 0.0436*
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0177) (0.0223)
Post Lehman -0.0152 -0.00840 0.00132 -0.0158 -0.0362
(0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0147) (0.0253) (0.0321)
∆IC -0.0102 0.0137 -0.0314** -0.0217 -0.116***
(0.0154) (0.0165) (0.0156) (0.0269) (0.0340)
∆IC 0.00485 -0.0992*** -0.0497** -0.177*** -0.185***
× Post Lehman (0.0219) (0.0231) (0.0223) (0.0382) (0.0491)
period following the exact announcement date, which is correlated with the impact that
loan has on the interconnectedness of the firm’s loan portfolio. It seems unlikely that such
a pattern would exist by sheer chance.
We present the results of our analysis in Table 4.3. As stated before, we only consider
the Fama-French adjusted returns, to control for most market wide events. Specification
I considers a constant and ∆Interconnectedness. Importantly, there appears to be no
pre-announcement effect at all. On the day of the announcement, there appears to be no
systematic average return effect, but we do observe a marginally significant coefficient on
∆Interconnectedness. Indeed, if a loan increases the interconnectedness of the financial
institution, there is a small, but statistically significant negative effect on its share price.
Rather, the effect appears to move slower and accumulate over time. Indeed, looking at
the [1,5] CAR, we observe a statistically convincing, moderately large negative effect of
∆Interconnectedness.
Specifications II and III further investigate how the equity market reacted to increasing
interconnectedness in light of the Lehman event, which highlighted the fragility of the
financial system. Indeed, specification II suggests that the announcement date effect
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Table 4.4: Equity Market Reaction to Syndicated Loans: General Intercon-
nectedness - Piecewise Constant Specification
This table investigates the market reaction on banks’ equity to changes in the interconnectedness of their loan-portfolio
over the period 1986 to 2016. The table provides OLS estimates, with White (1980) robust standard errors for regressions
on Cumulative Abnormal Returns. Each column corresponds to a different CAR window. ∆IC α% is a dummy variable
which equals one if the ∆IC associated with the deal exceeds the α% quantile. Robust standard errors in parentheses;
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
CAR [-1,-1] [0,0] [1,1] [1,3] [1,5]
I Constant -0.00147 -0.000777 -0.00255 -0.0449*** -0.0542***
(0.00567) (0.00600) (0.00575) (0.00990) (0.0126)
∆IC 1% -0.0330 -0.0387 0.0784 0.0534 0.193
(0.0822) (0.0814) (0.0754) (0.123) (0.158)
∆IC 99% 0.0424 0.0382 -0.103* -0.153 -0.309**
(0.0609) (0.0623) (0.0609) (0.102) (0.137)
II Constant -0.00231 0.00108 -0.0116* -0.0498*** -0.0596***
(0.00583) (0.00620) (0.00591) (0.0102) (0.0129)
∆IC 5% -0.0127 0.0189 -0.0570* -0.0558 0.0322
(0.0322) (0.0305) (0.0313) (0.0529) (0.0676)
∆IC 95% -0.00218 0.0181 -0.128*** -0.0635 -0.165**
(0.0277) (0.0306) (0.0293) (0.0492) (0.0667)
III Constant -0.00290 0.00573 -0.00720 -0.0438*** -0.0402***
(0.00623) (0.00660) (0.00631) (0.0109) (0.0138)
∆IC 10% -0.0331 0.0270 -0.0143 -0.00675 0.0745*
(0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0199) (0.0345) (0.0440)
∆IC 90% 0.0197 0.0379* -0.0346* 0.00694 0.0532
(0.0194) (0.0210) (0.0201) (0.0338) (0.0445)
only started after Lehman. The magnitude of the coefficient is five times as large as the
equivalent coefficient in specification I. The cumulative effect, as captured by the longer
horizon CARs, also demonstrates that markets reacted much more heavily to similarly
sized shocks following this first systemic event. Finally, specification III confirms that
this is not merely a mean-effect in the returns post-Lehman.
To investigate the economic magnitude of the coefficients, consider a median loan
signing. The median loan actually decreases the interconnectedness of a firm by -0.04%.
For such a loan, based on specification III, the expected announcement return is a mere
0.004%. In short, such a loan has no impact on the stock price, which is to be expected.
Signing syndicated loans is part of the daily business of financial institutions, and as long
as nothing changes to the risk of the bank, its valuation should not fundamentally change.
Alternatively, we can consider a higher quantile of the distribution of ∆Interconnectedness.
Its 95% quantile equals 1.44, resulting in an abnormal announcement return of -0.143%,
which is still moderately small. However, the 5-day CAR accumulates to 0.432%. In fact,
the predicted 5-day CAR exceeds negative 1% for about 1.2% of the deals signed.
The magnitude of the coefficients suggest that the stock market reaction is to the
tails of the distribution; stock market reactions only occur for signed loans which have
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a large negative impact on the interconnectedness of the lead arrangers. To test this
more formally, we construct ∆Interconnectednessα dummies, which equal 1 if the variable
exceeds its α quantile in the natural direction, and zero otherwise. Table 4.4 considers
such piecewise constant specifications, using both left- and right-hand side quantiles of
∆Interconnectedness. Specifications I, II and III consider the 1, 5 and 10%, respectively,
of deals that had the largest impact on Interconnectedness in either direction.
The table shows that indeed, the signing of a loan only has a stock market reaction
if the loan is severely detrimental to the interconnectedness of the firm. Looking at
specification I, we observe a -0.31% return for the 1% most increasing loans, and no
stock market reaction to the bottom extremes. The magnitude of the coefficient becomes
smaller when we consider the 5% most increasing deals, and becomes insignificant when
we consider the 10% most detrimental deals in Specification III.
Overall, we conclude that the equity market does appear to react to interconnectedness
stemming from syndicated loans, but only if the loan has a severely detrimental effect on
the bank’s interconnectedness. For most of the loans, there is no significant stock reaction.
This is not unexpected given that the signing of syndicated loans is business as usual,
there is no real news.
4.5 Syndication Interconnectedness and the CDS Mar-
ket
The previous section showed that the equity market is mostly concerned with the severe
downside of interconnectedness. Correspondingly, an investigation of the market reactions
to the risk stemming from syndicated loans is ideally suited to the CDS market, which
by construction only looks at the extreme down-side risk of companies.
In this section, we therefore consider to what extent the level of interconnectedness is
priced in CDS spreads for the major financial banks. Our empirical approach is based on
the following fixed-effects panel specification:
CDSi,t = β1Interconnectednessi,t +β
′
2X
Firm
i,t +β
′
3X
Market
t +β
′
4X
CDS
i,t + γi + δt + i,t (4.4)
where CDSi,t is bank i’s spread in month t, Interconnectednessi,t is the interconnect-
edness of bank i at time t to other banks in the system. XFirmi,t is a vector of bank specific
information, XMarkett is a vector of market wide and macro economic variables, and X
CDS
i,t
is a vector of CDS specific control variables. We use 5 year CDS quotes for senior debt
issues at the monthly interval, since these are generally considered to be the most liquid.
We organize our specifications and results discussion in three groups, bank specific factors,
market wide factors, and CDS specific factors. While contemporaneous, all variables on
the right-hand side are observable at the time the CDS spread is measured, which is the
end of the month.
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We follow previous literature on CDS pricing in controlling for factors known to af-
fect movements in CDS prices. We control for bank specific factors, market factors and
CDS microstructure factors shown to influence CDS prices. We start by controlling for
bank size, leverage and credit rating following Drago, Di Tommaso, and Thornton (2017)
Benkert (2004) and Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo (2009). Leverage is expected to be
positively related to spreads, as it increases bank default risk. Larger banks are expected
to be better able to weather difficult times, therefore, we expect size to be negatively
related to spreads. We obtain data on leverage and the log of total assets (size), from
Compustat NA and Compustat Global. Credit ratings are strongly related to the default
probability of the bank. We transform credit ratings into discrete numbers where the
AAA-rating takes on the lowest value and the D-rating takes on the highest value. As
a result, we expect credit ratings to be positively related to spreads. The riskier the
bank, the higher the numerical rating, the higher the spread. S&P credit ratings are
obtained from Compustat and Bloomberg for all banks in our sample. Lastly, we control
for bank idiosyncratic risk following Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo (2009) and Annaert,
De Ceuster, Van Roy, and Vespro (2013). We compute the idiosyncratic variance as the
variance of CAPM residuals, estimated over the past five years of monthly stock return
data, obtained from CRSP. Theoretically, higher volatility leads to higher default risk,
which is, in turn, positively related to CDS spreads.
We control for market wide factors, because general macro economic conditions have
a significant effect on probabilities of default. We follow Annaert, De Ceuster, Van Roy,
and Vespro (2013), Drago, Di Tommaso, and Thornton (2017), Alexander and Kaeck
(2008), Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001), Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo (2009), and
Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2007) by including the contemporaneous monthly CRSP value-
weighted return as a control variable. Improvements to general economic conditions are
likely to decrease probabilities of default and increase recovery rates (Annaert, De Ceuster,
Van Roy, and Vespro, 2013). We also include a measure for market wide volatility to proxy
for the business climate following Benkert (2004), Drago, Di Tommaso, and Thornton
(2017), and Annaert, De Ceuster, Van Roy, and Vespro (2013). The assumption here
is that a higher level of volatility is associated with with higher levels of uncertainty
about economic prospects. It follows that we expect market volatility to have a positive
relationship with spreads. We measure market wide volatility as the variance of the
past five years of monthly CRSP’s value-weighted return. We control for the risk free
interest rate based on Merton (1974), where the risk-free rate represents the drift in
the risk neutral world, where the higher the rate, the smaller the probability of default
(Annaert, De Ceuster, Van Roy, and Vespro, 2013; Benkert, 2004; Drago, Di Tommaso,
and Thornton, 2017; Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo, 2009; Fabozzi, Cheng, and Chen,
2007). It follows that we expect to find a negative relationship between spreads and
the risk free interest rate. Another possible explanation for the expected relationship is
that higher risk free rates signal economic growth, and as a result, default becomes less
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probable. Lastly, we include a measure for the slope of the term structure, which is widely
seen as a predictor of the business cycle (see e.g. Estrella and Mishkin, 1997). We expect
a negative relationship between the slope of the term structure and spreads, because a
high slope indicates expected economic growth. Similarly, a negative relationship may
stem from a high slope, to the extent that it carries information about future interest
rate levels, which implies lower credit risk (Annaert, De Ceuster, Van Roy, and Vespro,
2013). Following Annaert, De Ceuster, Van Roy, and Vespro (2013), we take the difference
between the 10 year and the 2 year yields as reported by the Federal Reserve’s H.15 forms.
Despite having a global sample, our macro-economic controls are all US-based. For a
large number of countries some of the control variables are simply not available. Given
the monthly frequency of our analysis, the US-based measures will typically capture the
worldwide slow-moving patterns in variables, decreasing the significance of the limitation.
Finally, we control for CDS specific information. We follow Annaert, De Ceuster,
Van Roy, and Vespro (2013) and Fabozzi, Cheng, and Chen (2007) and control for the
bid-ask spread. Bongaerts, De Jong, and Driessen (2011) develop a theoretical asset pric-
ing model, which predicts that derivative securities may also contain liquidity premia.
They confirm empirically that part of the CDS spread is indeed due to liquidity. Sim-
ilarly, Fabozzi, Cheng, and Chen (2007) also find that liquidity has a significant effect
on CDS spreads. We measure liquidity as the relative bid-ask spread on CDS quotes,
(bid-ask)/midquote, following Annaert, De Ceuster, Van Roy, and Vespro (2013). Based
on findings by the above mentioned papers, we expect to find a negative relationship
between interest rates and spread.
4.5.1 CDS Market Reactions to Lehman’s Failure
Previous research shows that banks that are interconnected, and those that are more
similar to failing institutions, generally suffer more when the respective institution fails
(Dumontaux and Pop, 2013; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010a). We start by investigating
whether banks that are interconnected to Lehman, experience greater negative effects
on the market. Specifically, we look at whether surviving institutions interconnected to
Lehman through syndicated loans experience higher spreads in the CDS market.
Table 4.5 shows our panel specification of Equation (4.4), where we use the ICLehman
measure of Equation 4.3, rather than the general interconnectedness, and our sample
is naturally restricted to those banks and time-periods that had business dealings with
Lehman. We consider five different specifications. All specifications have bank and year
fixed effects, and use standard errors clustered by bank and year. The first specification
merely estimates the impact of the level of interconnectedness with Lehman on the CDS
spreads.
As all regressions show, the more interconnected to Lehman the surviving banks are,
the higher their CDS spreads become, which in turn means, the more likely to default they
are according to investors. The average Interconnectedness with Lehman is about 60 with
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Table 4.5: CDS Market Reaction to Syndicated Loans: Lehman’s Failure
This table investigates the pricing of banks’ CDS spreads around Lehman’s failure on September 15, 2008, as a function
of the interconnectedness the banks had with Lehman. This table presents OLS estimates with standard errors clustered
by firm and year. ICLehman is the firms’ interconnectedness with Lehman, computed as in Equation (4.3). Clustered
standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ICLehman 0.876*** 2.413*** 0.794*** 0.901*** 2.595***
(0.288) (0.502) (0.274) (0.289) (0.555)
Size -78.32*** -74.71***
(13.93) (15.09)
Leverage 6.706*** 6.533***
(1.320) (1.304)
Ratings 21.06*** 23.15***
(6.074) (5.500)
Idiosyncratic volatility 0.921*** 0.626***
(0.238) (0.214)
Risk-free interest rate -17.55*** -25.96***
(2.546) (7.078)
Term structure slope -5.932 -17.81
(7.787) (12.72)
Market Return -1.700** -2.319***
(0.678) (0.736)
Market Volatility 1.851 -0.212
(1.329) (1.817)
Bid-Ask spread -97.45*** -8.375
(31.72) (63.40)
Observations 538 263 538 538 263
Adjusted R-squared 0.742 0.839 0.766 0.745 0.854
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
a standard deviation of 20. Hence, a one-standard deviation increase in interconnectedness
increases the CDS spread by about 17.5bp, which is both statistically and economically
significant, given that the average spread over the this sample is around 110 bps. The
next three specifications control for bank, market, and CDS specific variables respectively.
All variables, but the Bid-Ask spread, have the expected sign and natural magnitudes.
The unexpected effect of the Bid-Ask spread can be explained by the discreteness of
CDS spreads in the early sample. CDS spreads were mostly quoted up to one-eights
of dollars up until 2006. As a result, the relative bid-ask spread is inherently higher
for low-spread observations where relatively large relative bid-ask spreads may occur for
cheap contracts. Regression (5) considers the interconnectedness measure and all controls.
The impact of interconnectedness increases roughly three-fold compared to the simple
regression, suggesting that during this time-period, a one standard deviation increase in
interconnectedness with Lehman, increased CDS spreads by over 50bps, which is large
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Table 4.6: CDS Market Reaction to Syndicated Loans: General Interconnect-
edness I
This table investigates the market pricing of on banks’ CDS spreads to the level of interconnectedness of their loan-portfolio
over the period 2002 to 2016. This table presents OLS estimates with standard errors clustered by firm and year. IC is
the firms’ interconnectedness measure, computed as in Equation (4.2). Clustered standard errors in parentheses; ***, **
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IC 0.133* 0.159 0.0935 0.126* 0.198
(0.0754) (0.135) (0.0745) (0.0750) (0.126)
Size -17.41*** -27.16***
(5.545) (5.589)
Leverage 1.383*** 1.444***
(0.314) (0.299)
Ratings 2.856* 3.150**
(1.565) (1.469)
Idiosyncratic volatility 0.0867* 0.0341
(0.0523) (0.0503)
Risk-free interest rate -4.875*** -1.824
(1.213) (1.887)
Term structure slope -26.99*** -33.80***
(3.186) (4.741)
Market Return -2.127*** -2.107***
(0.248) (0.336)
Market Volatility 2.726*** 2.432***
(0.416) (0.553)
Bid-Ask spread -83.15*** -139.8***
(9.907) (19.10)
Observations 5,336 2,269 5,208 5,328 2,224
Adjusted R-squared 0.634 0.641 0.653 0.639 0.671
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
considering the fact that the unconditional standard deviation of CDS spreads is around
110 in this sub-sample.
The results in Table 4.5 show that large shocks are indeed observed by the market and
investors react. However, the more interesting question is whether investors only react to
large shocks, or whether they also react to smaller movements in the market. We consider
the full sample, and the general Interconnectedness measure of Equation (4.3) in Table
4.6. The table follows the same general format as Table 4.5. The coefficients on the control
variables typically have the same sign and magnitude as in the previous specification. The
coefficients on interconnectedness however have strongly decreased, and mostly become
insignificant. The table suggests that over the 2002-2016 period, loan-syndicate members
interconnectedness was not priced in CDS spreads.
In order to reconcile the apparent inconsistency between the two tables, we investigate
the impact of Lehman’s failure on the relationship between interconnectedness and CDS
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4.5 Syndication Interconnectedness and the CDS Market
Table 4.7: CDS Market Reaction to Syndicated Loans: General Interconnect-
edness II
This table investigates the market pricing of on banks’ CDS spreads to the level of interconnectedness of their loan-
portfolio over the period 2002 to 2016. This table presents OLS estimates with standard errors clustered by firm and
year. IC is the firms’ interconnectedness measure, computed as in Equation (4.2). Post Lehman is a dummy variable
taking the value of one starting October 2008. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IC -0.179* -0.228 -0.159* -0.199** -0.196
(0.0926) (0.166) (0.0918) (0.0924) (0.160)
IC × Post Lehman 0.515*** 0.654*** 0.403*** 0.536*** 0.646***
(0.107) (0.171) (0.102) (0.107) (0.174)
Size -18.73*** -29.72***
(5.524) (5.659)
Leverage 1.635*** 1.715***
(0.319) (0.304)
Ratings 2.069 2.648*
(1.588) (1.481)
Idiosyncratic volatility 0.0747 0.0451
(0.0517) (0.0499)
Risk-free interest rate -4.748*** -0.290
(1.203) (1.839)
Term structure slope -29.24*** -37.80***
(3.113) (4.628)
Market Return -2.006*** -1.922***
(0.244) (0.332)
Market Volatility 2.149*** 1.536***
(0.384) (0.506)
Bid-Ask spread -85.43*** -141.4***
(9.924) (19.00)
Observations 5,336 2,269 5,208 5,328 2,224
Adjusted R-squared 0.638 0.646 0.655 0.643 0.675
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
spreads. Table 4.7 includes an interaction term between interconnectedness and a post-
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy dummy. The issue of systemic risk became well-known and
much more pressing following its first realization in recent memory. While the inherent
risk due to the interconnectedness did not necessarily increase after Lehman, it did partly
realize, which potentially lead to simple awareness of the risk. Indeed, the fact that
markets quickly adapt prizes to newly discovered patterns is not new (e.g. McLean and
Pontiff, 2016).
All specifications are the same as those presented in Table 4.6, except we include the
interaction term in all of them. Across specifications, the pre-Lehman Interconnectedness
coefficient is small or statistically zero, while the post-Lehman coefficient is economically
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Table 4.8: CDS Market Reaction to Syndicated Loans: General Interconnect-
edness III
his table investigates the market pricing of on banks’ CDS spreads to the level of interconnectedness of their loan-portfolio
over the period 2002 to 2016. This table presents OLS estimates with standard errors clustered by firm and year. IC is
the firms’ interconnectedness measure, computes as in Equation (4.2). Post Bear Stearns is a dummy variable taking the
value of one starting April 2008, while Post EU crisis takes the value one starting June 2010. Clustered standard errors
in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IC 0.0486 0.0310 0.0652 0.262*
(0.0781) (0.136) (0.0827) (0.143)
IC × Post Bear Stearns 0.131* 0.268**
(0.0755) (0.136)
IC × Post EU crisis 0.125** -0.107
(0.0583) (0.0877)
Size -28.02*** -26.86***
(5.654) (5.592)
Leverage 1.541*** 1.411***
(0.307) (0.294)
Ratings 2.835* 3.155**
(1.473) (1.467)
Idiosyncratic volatility 0.0310 0.0348
(0.0505) (0.0504)
Risk-free interest rate -1.891 -1.967
(1.906) (1.893)
Term structure slope -33.97*** -34.29***
(4.703) (4.808)
Market Return -2.099*** -2.086***
(0.335) (0.338)
Market Volatility 2.325*** 2.483***
(0.544) (0.561)
Bid-Ask spread -140.2*** -140.3***
(19.12) (19.16)
Observations 5,336 2,224 5,336 2,224
Adjusted R-squared 0.635 0.671 0.635 0.671
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
and statistically large. The coefficient on the interaction term is significant and positive in
all specifications and ranges from 0.5 to 0.65. Taking the full specification (5) to illustrate
the economic magnitude of interconnectedness, we see that a one standard deviation,
about 17bps in the full sample, increase in interconnectedness leads to a 11bp increase in
spreads. This effect may seem small, but represents approximately 10% of the average
spread in our sample.
It appears that the post Lehman CDS spreads more accurately reflect the systemic risk
of the financial system, as proxied by the syndicated loan interconnectedness measure.
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4.6 Conclusion
Two remarks are in order. Despite the fact that Cai, Eidam, Saunders, and Steffen (2018)
show that the syndication based interconnectedness measure is distinct from the more well
known systemic risk meaures such as SRISK and ∆Covar, they are correlated, and the
results of Table 4.7 should therefore be interpreted more broadly in the sense that CDS
markets appear to price systemic risk since Lehman’s fall.
Second, the results of the regression would look similar if a different event, which
occurred within a reasonable time-frame, would cause the CDS market to start paying
attention to systemic interconnectedness. We therefore consider two alternative critical
economic events, which may drive the difference in pre- and post-Lehman effect of in-
terconnectedness on spreads. Although Lehman Brothers was the most prominent event
linked to the start of the financial system troubles, Brownlees and Engle (2016) point out
that that the acquisition of Bear Stearns in March of 2008 and the European crisis of
May 2010 were also seemingly important events. Table 4.8 presents results of the usual
regressions (1) and (5), but includes interaction terms between interconnectedness and a
dummy variable for each of these events, rather than the Lehman event. The magnitude
of the coefficients for the Bear Stearns interaction is much smaller than that of Lehman,
whilst the European crisis had no impact at all, confirming that Lehman appeared to
be the event that sufficiently shook the market for them to incorporate the degree of
interconnectedness in the spreads.
4.6 Conclusion
We investigate to what extent financial markets price the risk inherent in (systemic)
interconnectedness. We measure the interconnectedness of financial firms through their
joint exposures to syndicated loans, using a dataset of nearly half a million deals. Our
analysis considers both the equity market and the downside-focused Credit Default Swaps
market. The results are mostly consistent; both markets adapted their behavior to the
new reality of large financial firms failing following the demise of Lehman Brothers.
We confirm prior research by documenting that both markets reacted heavily to the
failure of Lehman itself. Moreover, firms that were tightly connected to Lehman had
stronger negative stock price reactions, and their CDS spreads were generally higher.
The fact that markets reacted to this big news is indeed not too surprising. In this
paper we dig deeper into the systemic risk inherent in the syndicated loan market, and
investigate to what extent small changes, or differences, in interconnectedness spurred
reactions in financial markets. We find that the level and shocks to interconnectedness
mostly occurred without impact pre-Lehman, but garner strong market reactions post-
Lehman, and continue to do so.
In terms of the equity market, we find that markets react strongly to the announcement
of deals that have a large negative impact on the degree of interconnectedness. The
economic and statistical significance of the result is driven by 5% of deals that led to the
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largest increase in interconnectedness. There is no such impact in the middle or the left-
tail of the distribution, suggesting that most syndicated loans are treated as day-to-day
business, and that equity markets mainly care about the potential downside risk of such
deals.
CDS prices did not reflect the inherent risk of interconnectedness pre-Lehman. Con-
trolling for a large set of firm and market characteristics, we find that post-Lehman, CDS
spreads are strongly related to the level of interconnectedness of the firm. Similar to the
equity results, the CDS market now recognizes and prices the inherent downside risk of
interconnectedness.
Our results show that market participants recognize, and are worried about, the sys-
temic interconnectedness in the syndicated loan market. After the risk materialized dur-
ing the financial crisis, banks paused their systemic risk increasing behavior briefly, but
quickly resumed business as usual soon after the shock. Market participants however, are
clearly still worried about the potential negative effects of this strong network.
Indeed, our findings suggest that perhaps the financial system may actually be more
stable if banks were to diversify their risks less. This point has been made earlier by
De Vries (2005), who argues that risk concentration may lead to more frequent individ-
ual bank failures, but that the risk segregation will likely reduce the risk of a systemic
breakdown.
A natural objective of regulation is to increase the stability and resilience of the fi-
nancial system by regulating the extent and nature of interbank linkages. This paper,
in line with Cai, Eidam, Saunders, and Steffen (2018), provides evidence to suggest that
linkages through large corporate loans should also be taken into account in measuring
interconnectedness, and potentially be limited by regulations. The current assessment
methodology for Global Systemically Important Banks involves indicators regarding five
broad categories; size, interconnectedness, lack of readily available substitutes or finan-
cial institution infrastructure, global (cross-jurisdictional) activity, and complexity (BIS,
2013). Although interconnectedness is taken into account, the measure is based on direct
exposure among financial institutions. Our results show that indirect linkages appear to
be a point of concern for financial markets as well, and should be explicitly taken into
account.
Importantly, the paper shows that market participants appear to be actively monitor-
ing the interconnectedness stemming from syndicated loan markets. Interconnectedness
increasing moves by banks are punished through higher costs of capital. This demon-
strates how the market plays an active role in the monitoring of systemic risk of large
financial institutions, above and beyond the limitations imposed by regulating agencies.
Overall, the paper shows that the old adage of mere upside of syndication is over,
and market participants are concerned about the underexposed negative implications of
syndication. Risk is not appropriately diversified if it is spread across a small group of
highly influential and large financial institutions, and this is recognized by the market.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Syndicated loan issuance has grown dramatically in the past years and it plays an in-
creasingly important role in financing. It has become the dominant source of financing
for corporations, outgrowing bond and equity issuance. Its size, in turn, makes it an
important contributor to the financial system.
Broadly, this dissertation investigates syndicated loans from the perspective of bor-
rowers and of the issuing banks. The first question this dissertation tries to answer is
whether banks are social institutions, even in instances when the public is less aware of
their dealings. We investigate this by looking at sin firms - firms in the alcohol, tobacco
and gaming industry - and the spreads banks demand on their loans. Previous research
found that sin firms experience a premium in equity markets. Investors shun these firms
due to social constraints, which in turn affects their returns. We seek to investigate
whether, in the reduced presence of public scrutiny, sin firms would experience similar
outcomes.
In chapter 2, we find that sin firms consistently pay a lower spread on their loans,
relative to otherwise similar firms. In an attempt to explain these results, we control for
various aspects which have been shown to affect sin firms and/or loan conditions. We start
by controlling for earnings quality, following Kim, Park, and Wier (2012). Our results
show that although a better earnings quality does indeed have a negative relationship
with loan spreads, it does not explain the lower spreads sin firms pay. We also control
for bank-borrower relationship. When the bank is familiar with the borrower, spreads
are on average lower, however, this does not explain the sin effect. Third, we control for
firm beta. We follow the premise that when firms are anti-cyclical, they might be seen
as a hedge opportunity by banks. We find that beta is positively related to loan spreads,
but controlling for this does not eliminate the negative sin effect on spreads. Lastly, we
control for organizational structure, following the theory that corporate diversification is
negatively related to a firm’s cost of capital. Our evidence is inconclusive regarding the
effect of diversification on spreads.
The results in chapter 2 suggest that banks don’t inherently care about social issues.
When public scrutiny is not a concern, profit seems to be the sole driving force behind
these institutions. Although this result may not come as a surprise, it is important to
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question the true drivers of the recent initiatives of financial institutions and other firms
towards more sustainable and social behavior. Is this change indeed what society needs,
or is it simply “window dressing?”
Two major themes following the global financial crisis have been credit rating reliability
and bank risk taking. Credit ratings play an important role in the financial sector, and
their accuracy is an important factor to consider. After the crisis, rating agencies were
heavily criticized for inflated ratings on risky securities in exchange for lucrative fees.
According to Baghai, Becker, and Pitschner (2019) the use of credit ratings has not
declined in the period from 1999 to 2017, rather it has increased. The authors conclude
that this fact points to a lack of better alternatives. A recent article in the Wall Street
Journal reiterates the role credit ratings played in the financial crisis, and the fact that
these issues remain. The article states that a decade later, there is evidence [inflated
ratings] persist as Credit Rating Agencies fight for market share (Podkul and Banerji,
2019).
Chapter 3 sets out to investigate the effect of credit ratings on syndicated loan prices.
Although many of the articles referring to issues with credit ratings refer to the bond
market, there is ample evidence that banks also use credit ratings in the syndicated loan
market. We show, in line with previous research, that credit ratings explain a significant
part of the syndicated loan prices we observe. The problem with credit ratings is that
they are provided by different agencies, their methodologies are not entirely known to the
market, and they don’t always coincide, which results in what we call “split ratings”. We
show that when a borrower has two credit ratings, and they are split, the borrower pays
a higher spread than the spread observed on a similar borrower with the same average
rating. More importantly, we show that an individual borrower that moves from having
a split rating to having a non-split rating experiences a lower spread, and vice versa.
Podkul and Banerji (2019) argue that the regulatory remedy, competition among credit
rating agencies, set forth to help alleviate issues observed with credit ratings seems to
backfire. Similarly, Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) model competition among Credit
Rating Agencies and find that competition can reduce efficiency. The authors show that
efficiency may be higher under a monopoly rather than a duopoly despite the potential
for increased informativeness of two credit ratings.
The importance of syndicated loans, and their effect on interconnectedness, was il-
lustrated during a speech by the then Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke at the
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition in Chicago in May 2010: “We have
initiated new efforts to better measure large institutions’ counterparty credit risk and in-
terconnectedness, sensitivity to market risk, and funding and liquidity exposures. These
efforts will help us focus not only on risks to individual firms, but also on concentrations
of risk that may arise through common exposures or sensitivity to common shocks. For
example, we are now collecting additional data in a manner that will allow for the more
timely and consistent measurement of individual bank and systemic risk exposures to
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syndicated corporate loans.” (Bernanke, 2010)
A response to the global financial crisis and the evident excessive risk taking by banks
is Basel III, which builds on Basel II by including, among other things, specific standards
on system-wide risks, by taking into account “the interlinkages and common exposures be-
tween financial institutions, especially for those deemed systematically important” (Caru-
ana, 2010). The updated methodology published by the Bank of International Settlement
(BIS) in 2013 to identify “Global Systematically Important Financial Institutions (G-
SIFIs),” explicitly includes interconnectedness, but the syndicated loan market plays no
material role in identifying the G-SIFIs (BIS, 2013). Regulation is however just one aspect
in increasing the stability of the system. As Caruana (2010) argues, market discipline is an
essential part of the puzzle to promote financial stability, and this responsibility lies with
the financial industry, which includes banks, shareholders, investors and other market
participants.
In chapter 4 we study the effect of interconnectedness on the value of the issuing bank.
Previous research showed that the interconnectedness from syndicated loans is positively
correlated to other measures of systemic risk. This chapter investigates whether market
participants price this interconnection, or whether the negative aspects of the syndicated
loan market are clouded by the positive aspects. The results show that prior to the demise
of Lehman, and the financial crisis, markets did not price this risk. After these events
however, markets seem to be aware of the risks. As a result, syndicated loans that signifi-
cantly increase the level of interconnectedness are punished by the markets. Importantly,
markets also recognize that signing syndicated loans, in and of itself, is not necessarily
a bad thing. Our results show that market discipline, one of the important elements in
financial stability as mentioned by Caruana (2010), is at work. We provide evidence that
market participants recognize and punish banks that increase interconnectedness through
syndicated loans.
To summarize, this dissertation shows that banks are, ultimately, pragmatic financial
institutions. Loan provision is at the core of their business model, and information is at
the core of loan provision. We don’t find evidence that they are socially inclined, and
appear to mainly price their assessment of the risk inherent in the borrowers. This is also
reflected in their dealing with borrowers in the face of split ratings, where they are shown
to be risk averse. Finally, we document that banks temporarily adjusted their syndicated
loan network structure after the fall of Lehman, but quickly resumed business as usual
when the economy settled down. Banks do little, if not for bucks.
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Research Impact
Two of the most pressing issues in the world are (i) climate change and (ii) the sus-
tainability and stability of the global economy. In recent years, these two facets have
become increasingly interlinked, with a strong push from both regulators and the public
on companies and national economies to become ‘greener.’ Progress has been slow, but
is gradually accelerating to a point where companies, particularly those in the public eye,
are making real efforts towards sustainability.
Of course, the increased demand for sustainable practices is a business opportunity.
Some companies take these opportunities and aim to actually offer sustainable products or
services. Other companies put most of these investments towards the marketing budget,
without making a real effort to improve their practices. The latter is often referred to
as ‘greenwashing’ or ‘window dressing,’ the practice of making an unsubstantiated claim
about the environmental or social benefits of a product or service.
The movement towards more environmentally friendly or sustainable services and prac-
tices has also reached the banking sector. Dutch examples include Triodos and ASN bank,
who claim to be pioneers in “ethical banking.” More recently, 130 international banks,
amongst which many Dutch banks including ABN AMRO, ING, and Rabobank signed on
to the “Principles for Responsible Banking’, whose aim is “to help banks align their busi-
ness strategies with society’s goals” as set froth in the Paris Climate agreement (UnepFi,
2019). According to UnepFi (2019), “the Principles provide a framework for sustainable
banking, and help the industry to demonstrate how it makes a positive contribution to
society.”
Chapter 2 of this thesis aims to investigate to what extent banks behave ethically,
or sustainably, behind the scenes. That is, are these sustainable initiatives restricted to
the consumer side of businesses that is visible to the public, or do they extend to the
business-to-business operations of corporate lending? We analyze the interest rates firms
pay on their large corporate loans, and in particular to what extent the rates differ for
so-called “sin-firms,” firms in the alcohol, tobacco, and gaming industry, from all other
firms. Against all expectations, we find that banks actually charge these firms less than
their non-sin counterparts, suggesting that the portrayed public image of banks differs
from their actions. From a purely business standpoint, it is not entirely surprising; many
of these industries will perform well in any economic climate, making them less risky.
This does however not explain the full discount they receive. An important footnote is
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that our sample ends in 2014, preceding the acceleration of the green and sustainable
boom. However, we find no evidence that the discount has reduced as time progressed in
our sample, which started in the 1980s.
The chapter highlights that we should be more critical of business practices in the
financial industry. The rates set by the banks do not reflect the full cost to society, and
consumer banking is only a small part of their full operations. Recent initiatives such as
green bonds, the Equator Principles, and the ‘Principles for Responsible Banking’ are a
step in the right direction, but generally, sustainability and banking are still two concepts
which are hard to integrate.
The second major issue is the stability of the global economy, which has been an al-
most continues problem over the last decade. Starting with the financial crisis in 2008,
followed by the European sovereign debt crisis around 2011, and more recently because
of “Trumponomics” and Brexit. The severe magnitude of the first on this list was caused
by underestimation of risk, and the resulting excessive risk taking of large financial in-
stitutions. When the risk materialized, Bear Sterns, and subsequently Lehman Brothers
were insolvent, which triggered a worldwide financial crisis. In subsequent years, a reg-
ulatory push was made to address these shortcomings and prevent a similar event from
occurring by the Obama administration. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) was introduced in 2010. Unfortunately, many
of these regulations have been reversed in the relentless pursuit for economic growth. In
2018, a decade after the global financial crisis destabilized the US economy, the US House
voted a regulatory rollback on Dodd-Frank, which significantly waters down the Obama-
era rules governing the banking industry in search of greater stability (Rappeport and
Flitter, 2018).
The European Commission is also actively working toward sustainable finance. One of
the main examples of this is the EU High-Level Group on Sustainable Finance (HLEG).
It is involved in steering capital flow toward sustainable investments, identifying steps
necessary to protect the financial system from sustainability risks, and deploying these
policies on a pan-European scale. Among the issues the HLEG focuses on are credit
ratings. The report writes “CRAs are systemically important institutions, and their risk
assessment methods influence the sustainability and stability of the financial system.”
The goal of the HLEG is to make the focus of these ratings less narrow and to include
ESG information into credit ratings (European Commission, 2018).
Chapters 3 and 4 try to shed some light on some aspects of banks’ role in these events.
The former investigates how banks assess the risk of their borrowers, and the role large
Credit Rating Agencies, such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, play in this assessment.
We find that banks strongly rely on these outside assessments. Given the inadequacy of
their risk assessments preceding the financial crisis this is somewhat troubling.
The second of these chapters studies how the banks’ core operations contribute to this
risk. During the financial crisis, Lehman Brothers was injected with money by the gov-
ernment for the fear of a domino effect. The operations of banks are strongly intertwined
through continuous collaborations, such that the failure of one bank may easily propagate
to the next. We investigate one of these collaboration channels, the joint issuance of large
corporate loans, and find that these offer a credible threat to financial stability. The loan
portfolios of different banks are very similar, such that all banks may be faced with (the
same) problems at the same time. After Lehman’s failure, investors appear to be aware
of this, and react strongly to large increases in this interconnectedness.
The two chapters highlight channels through which the bank impacts the economy
beyond their own income statement. They play a crucial role in the economy and the
risks they take therefore impact all of us.
Correspondingly, the analyses and conclusions put forth in this dissertation are of
relevance to the broad public, but especially to regulators in charge of the banking sector’s
stability. Chapter 2 shows that banks are, almost naturally, primarily driven by pure profit
motivations. Chapters 3 and 4 show that banks appear to have learned little from the
financial crisis and have resumed their practices as before, some of which caused, or at
least escalated, the crisis.
The conclusion is that banking still hardly looks beyond the bucks.
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